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SCHOPENHAUER'S CONTACT WITH THEOLOGY

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In lectures the charm of which his students will never forget, Dr. C. C. Everett used to speak of Schopenhauer as the most brilliant of the profound philosophers. This German thinker is perhaps little read in England, and still less in America, where the levels of culture are low, and the primitive life-instincts still fresh and strong. But among old and reflective peoples the case is bound to be different; so far as he is known at all, he is certain of a hearing—and a not unsympathetic one, whatever the final verdict. He has already ploughed deep in German thought, and his influence in France and Italy is considerable. Perhaps he is (or would be) most easily understood in India, his doctrine, in capital points, being parallel to the Buddhist philosophical writings. As we in America get further on, in age and in reflective habits, he will probably be more and more read here; and one of the crucial problems of philosophical thought may come to be, how Schopenhauer shall be disposed of.

In venturing to speak of Schopenhauer's contact with theology, I have in mind the broader use of the term, as standing for some kind of reasoned treatment of the first principles of things. What I mean is that Schopenhauer concerns himself more or less with the same fundamental questions that theology is occupied with, and that he has views which may be compared with current (or at least historical) theological teachings. One might even say that theology is one special form of philosophy rather than something to be contrasted with it,—though of course theology (or certain types of it) may accept preliminary data that philosophy (or certain types of it) would disregard. A philosophy that does not cope with the intimate and deep-lying difficulties that theology attempts to solve is hardly philosophy at all. A philosophy

may be even anti-theological, as was Nietzsche's, and none the less—or rather all the more—be comparable to theology.[1]

Schopenhauer's general view of the world is that of the relative idealist, but absolute realist. What is material is phenomenal, subjective, but the ultimate reality of the world is not dependent on any one's feeling or knowledge or thought for its existence.[2] It is will,—with which consciousness (whether its own or that of an observer) has only a passing and no necessary connection. The function of consciousness is a purely practical or pragmatic one:[3] it arises under certain circumstances as a guide (or light) to action, helps the will to attain the objects of its desire—that is, within limits, for any final satisfaction of the will is in the nature of the case impossible. But the will may act instinctively and unconsciously, and does so in the inorganic and lower organic worlds, and to a considerable extent even in animals and men. Occasionally, indeed, consciousness attempts something more than a pragmatic rôle; it essays to see things as they are, irrespective of their practical uses. From this disinterested curiosity and pure contemplation spring philosophy and art. But philosophy and art are rare products—only exceptional men, and those exceptionally situated, are capable of them. We all, indeed, in rare, happy moments may share in the elevation and joy they bring; but at bottom we are will, not intellect, and in the common run of our days have the fate and lot which our nature entails.

I. The Doctrine of Human Nature and of the Human Lot

What is it to *be* will,—not merely to see and interpret the world in the light of it (philosophy), but to be it one's self (experience—something very different from philosophy or any intellectual exercise)?

[1] A special reason for attending to Schopenhauer at the present moment might be said to be that thereby one is initiated into an understanding of that strange, new phenomenon in European thought, Nietzsche. It is idle to read Nietzsche without a preliminary acquaintance (and a pretty thorough one) with Schopenhauer.

[2] I have elaborated Schopenhauer's view of this subject in an article, "Schopenhauer's Type of Idealism," published in the Monist, January, 1911.

[3] I may be allowed to refer to my article, "Schopenhauer's Contact with Pragmatism," in the Philosophical Review, March, 1910.

Schopenhauer raises this question with regard to the whole world, but practically it is what will as experience means to us human beings that is in the foreground of his inquiry; here alone, indeed, can the question be answered directly, for it is only ourselves that we know at first hand; as to animals, plants, and the elements we can only reason and infer.

The question is, of course, a very personal one; it goes to the heart and marrow of us. Nor have we any assurance that the answer will be pleasant or satisfactory. Many of us would appear to be ready to do almost everything—work with our hands, travel, read books, even take up mathematical or philosophical problems—rather than think about ourselves; is it that we divine something not quite pleasing in ourselves? All the same, let us ask the question, taking for the time Schopenhauer as our guide.

Will, Schopenhauer explains, comes from want or is want—and want is of itself an unpleasant sensation. It means the absence or deprivation of something, and this is painful—so that in a sense the will, or at least willing, has its origin in pain—and actual willing is to get rid of pain. And when we get what we want, and perhaps after struggling long, the satisfaction or pleasure is momentary—we have it and then it is gone. Yes, it is principally negative, says Schopenhauer, and means little more than that we are no longer in pain; the painful wish or want no longer exists—that is about all. Plato, he says, recognized the negativeness of pleasure, making practically only two exceptions, namely, pleasant scents and the joys of the mind.[4] And when one want is satisfied, another arises of the same general nature, and with, sooner or later, the same passing and negative result. Indeed we seem in this way to be committed to an endless succession of wants, much as the mind, in searching for explanations, is committed to an inevitable and interminable succession of causes—and both successions, as Schopenhauer conceives them, are wearying. Or if for the moment a new want does not arise, we come to be in a more unhappy plight still, for nothing occupies us, we have a feeling of emptiness, of boredom; we might do something, and there is nothing to do—

[4] Plato, Republic, ix, p. 264.

hence tedium, languor, *Langeweile*. It is a more intolerable condition than want itself, and desperate are the measures sometimes taken to escape from it. And so between these two the will oscillates; thrown now on the Scylla of want and pain, and now on the Charybdis of tedium and boredom, it does not have a happy time of it. Some of our wants become passions; they carry everything before them, perhaps clouding the reason and drowning the conscience—the sexual passions particularly. Even men of genius feel them, Schopenhauer says; they soar to the heavens, and then earthly instincts oppose and they fall back. We find Schopenhauer in his university days, with reference no doubt in part to this phenomenon, picturing life as a restless, painful conflict of reason and the eternal in us with the animal, of the few moments of bright, happy life with the oppressive hours of illusory pleasure. The sceptre of the Earth-Spirit rests heavily on men—and Schopenhauer himself felt it.[5] In a cooler, more objective way he later devoted a chapter to sexual love,[6] in which he shows how what has been said of wants in general preëminently applies to it; it begins in pain and ends in satiety—the satisfaction being chiefly in the allaying, the temporary annulling, of the desire. It accords with all this that to Schopenhauer the main reality of life (so far as the will is concerned) should be pain. This is the positive thing. Pleasant things to which we become accustomed no longer give pleasure; but painful things do not cease to be painful.[7] The three greatest goods—health, youth, and freedom—we are hardly aware of while we have them; not so with sickness and age. The hours go all too quickly when they are pleasant; when they are painful they go slowly enough. The pleasure that counts for much is the contrast to some previous pain; sometimes, as I have said, our pleasure is little more than relief from pain.

I have been speaking of wants and their satisfaction; but

[5] Cf. J. Volkelt, Arthur Schopenhauer (Leipzig, 3d ed., 1907), pp. 45–46.

[6] "Metaphysik der Geschlechtsliebe," in Werke (Frauenstädt ed.), vol. iii, pp. 511–523.

[7] Werke, vol. iii, p. 660; cf. p. 659, "Wir fühlen den Schmerz, aber nicht die Schmerzlosigkeit; wir fühlen die Sorge, aber nicht die Sorglosigkeit; die Furcht, aber nicht die Sicherheit." (When not otherwise indicated, the citations are from the Frauenstädt ed. of Schopenhauer's works.)

sometimes they are not satisfied—and here comes a new kind of experience. Want is pain and its satisfaction is only negative; but to be crossed, thwarted in our wants, is worse yet. And this is man's lot to a greater or less extent. With some, perhaps with many or with most, their wants are more often crossed than met. They barely live, barely maintain themselves—to say nothing of failure to experience any of the richness and fulness of life. Necessity hunts them through all their days and does not allow them the pleasures of thought and reflection. Schopenhauer evidently felt keenly the pitiable condition of what we call the masses.[8] He refers to negro slavery, to the operatives in factories, to the children of tender years working ten, twelve, and fourteen hours a day. This or something analogous is the fate of millions on millions. Their existence is little more than a fight for existence. And then that which they fight against—death—overtakes them at last; sometimes, though rarely, from very weariness they welcome it. Even those called successful in life, the high in station, do not always get what they want, and fear, anxiety, and trouble more or less pursue them. Crowned heads are sometimes uneasy in their minds, and the innocent and the good are liable to untoward accident and unmerited ill; how, says Schopenhauer, have the Ophelias, the Desdemonas, the Cordelias, been at fault? Moreover, though we manage to escape all the accidents and injustices that fall to the lot of so many, though we are among the few entirely happy ones, this is only for a time—sooner or later in common with the humblest laborer we too have to die, and few of us wish to.

Yes, Schopenhauer goes further. To him there is something abnormal, something contrary not only to the will, but to reason, in death; something abnormal and contrary in pain, any kind of it. Pleasure we ask no questions about, but pain—why should it be, why should it be at all? Any particle of it seems to spoil the fair plan of things. It is something incomparable—not balanceable by any amount of pleasure. The happiness of thousands, says Schopenhauer, cannot be weighed against the anguish and martyr-death of one soul. If there were a hundred

[8] Werke, vol. ii, p. 368; compare his reflections, when fifteen and sixteen years old, in travelling through France, as cited by J. Volkelt, op. cit., p. 9.

times less suffering than there actually is, the mere existence of suffering would still damn the world. If the world is to be perfect, final (*Selbstzweck*), there must be no suffering in it—and no death.[9] The language may seem fantastic and exaggerated, it involves an idealism completely strange to the modern spirit; yet a deep truth may lie behind it.

But man not only wants and suffers—he acts: how does he act? What are we as acting beings in relation to one another? Schopenhauer does not question that there are disinterested people in the world, he does not doubt real morality; but to his mind they and it do not abound. He even admits that there is occasionally real badness, malice;[10] and the greater part of our right actions, he thinks, are due to the influence of law and public opinion. Unselfish love, spontaneous justice, that is, principle, are rare; we do not ordinarily expect them and are surprised and touched when we see them; as Hamlet says, "To be honest, as this world goes, is to be one man pick'd out of ten thousand."[11] The need of law and government, that is, of organized force, is partly to compel those men to be just who would not be so of themselves, and to chain the brutality that lurks in the many. Naturally men are egoistic, and even when we are faithful to the bargains we have made, we drive as hard ones as we can in the first place. This is taken for granted in the world of affairs: every one, we say, looks after his own interest; one class wants as much wages as it can get, another as much profits, another as much interest, another as much rent. Our ordinary political economy but traces the laws which self-interest follows in different situations; if man were ideally just and disinterested, this political economy would fall to pieces, its whole character as a science depends on taking self-interest as a principle. Accordingly society, particularly industrial society, is a war of interests: *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Once violence was common, with

[9] Werke, vol. iii, p. 662.

[10] Werke, vol. ii, pp. 393, 398; by this is meant seeking the harm and suffering of others, without expecting to gain thereby, that is, disinterestedly. Compare a psychological explanation, vol. ii, pp. 429–430.

[11] Werke, vol. ii, p. 191. Compare the lines of Theognis (83–86) to the effect that you could not find one shipload of really trustworthy and incorruptible men upon the face of the world.

slavery the result; and because violence ceases, we must not imagine that the war ceases. Schopenhauer points to cunning as an equally potent weapon of war, and he even thinks it is a less respectable weapon than is force.[12] Yet in this strife, this war, whether of individuals or of classes, we hurt one another; yes, Schopenhauer says (the full significance of the statement we shall see later), the principal source of the gravest evils that befall man is man himself: *homo homini lupus.* The rule of might instead of right which Kant held impossible even to think of as a natural law, since it would contradict itself, is really, Schopenhauer says, the actual and matter-of-fact law we see in nature—not only in the animal, but in the human world; society as it largely exists is just this self-contradictory thing, not in idea merely, but in practice. Socrates is put to death and Christ is crucified; in such acts a characteristic trait of man comes to expression. From this point of view Schopenhauer once compares the world to Dante's hell—the difference being that here man himself is the devil to his fellows; and the arch-devil Schopenhauer finds in those world-conquerors who get some hundred thousands of men lined up against one another and then call out, "Suffering and death are what you are born to, now fire away at one another with musket and cannon!" And, he says, they do it[13] (apparently he thinks there are some fools in the world as well as devils). Aside from this reckless, colossal egoism, there is the tame prosaic egoism of every day. Most men know, Schopenhauer observes, innumerable sufferings of others in their vicinity, but do not set about mitigating them, because this would involve some self-denial on their part. If we meet a stranger, our first thought is apt to be, "Can he be of use to us?" If not, we are not specially concerned about him. And so, on the other hand, when we ask information or counsel of another, we lose confidence if we find that he has some interest in the matter one way or the other. Self-interested creatures

[12] Werke, vol. ii, pp. 394–399, cf. p. 428. Compare the speech of the Athenian envoys at Lacedaemon: "Mankind resent injustice more than violence, because the one seems to be an unfair advantage taken by an equal, the other is the irresistible force of a superior" (Thucydides, i, 77).

[13] Werke, vol iii, p. 663; cf. vol. ii, p. 383, "Woher denn anders hat Dante den Stoff zu seiner Hölle genommen, als aus dieser unserer wirklichen Welt?"

we mostly are, and the spectacle is not pleasing, and the consciousness of it (when we are capable of undeceived consciousness) not pleasing either.

For this leads to another point: we human beings, Schopenhauer holds, are much given to self-deception. We like to appear well in the eyes of others—the ordinary man is not half so much concerned about what he is as about what others think of him,[14] and this is the cause of many complications and much misery in the world; but (something subtler far) we like to appear well in our own eyes, and so we hide ourselves from ourselves, we cover up our real motives, we like to think there is nothing wrong about us,[15]—for there is nothing so unwelcome as shame. Sometimes we can stand the contempt of others—but self-contempt is intolerable and we do anything and think anything rather than allow it. And yet how pitiful this sort of a being is, a being, the theologian might say, who loves darkness rather than light because his deeds are evil!

Undoubtedly, it is not a flattering view of actual human nature which Schopenhauer gives, and it has more in common with the older theological views and with the New Testament than with the genial liberalism of our day. But because a thing is not flattering or pleasant, it does not follow that it is untrue. Schopenhauer says that in considering this graver side of things first, he parts company with ordinary moralists and takes Dante's way, which first conducted into hell. And he thinks it an educational mistake to do differently. He questions the policy of giving a pleasant picture of the world to children, of allowing them to think that rectitude and virtue are the maxims generally followed. The children will find out the truth later, he remarks, and then think none the better of their teachers; better say, giving a first example of honesty and sincerity, "The world lies in wickedness; men are not what they ought to be; but do not allow yourself to be misled, and do you be better!"

[14] Compare Schopenhauer's view of "ritterliche Ehre" summarized in Volkelt, op. cit. pp. 264–265; also of the masks (of virtue, patriotism, religion) men put on, particularly the mask of politeness—yes, sometimes even that of "Freude und Glück," ibid., pp. 268–269.

[15] "Wir betrügen und schmeicheln Niemandem durch so feine Kuntsgriffe, als uns selbst," Werke (Grisebach ed.), vol. i, pp. 386, cf. 421; vol. iv, pp. 459 f.; vol. v, pp. 215 f.

And now, beyond all the facts I have mentioned,—which show how different experience of will is from objectively contemplating it,—is the perishableness of the things we strive for, the passingness of time and of all things in it. The pure phenomenality of the world, the dream-like character of everything in it, made a deep impression on Schopenhauer. Things are and they are not—there are few more moving expressions of this fact, outside of some of the Psalms and of Marcus Aurelius, than in the pages of Schopenhauer. It is as if his soul longed for the eternal and found it not.[16] The present is alone real, and in a moment it, too, with all that is in it, is gone.[17] Even as a boy Schopenhauer felt this. It was the basis of the contrariety in temperament between himself and his mother, tingeing his thoughts with a certain melancholy.[18] When in France at the age of fifteen and sixteen, he thought of the thousands of human forms long gone to decay that had traversed the amphitheatre in Nîmes, whose ruins he visited; in Toulon he pictured to himself the joyless and hopeless life of the miserable galley-slaves of the pre-revolutionary time; in Lyons he compared the unheard-of horrors of the Revolution that had only a few years before taken place there with the unconcerned business and bustle now going on at the very places of execution. "It is inconceivable," he wrote, "how time in its might wipes out the vividest and most horrible impressions." And in these travels we find him translating a poem of Milton's, in which the longing to escape from the realm of time comes to expression.[19] For if things go, what is the use of fixing our hearts on them? "What in the next moment no more is, what completely vanishes like a dream, is never worthy serious effort," says Schopenhauer.[20] He is speaking of striving and getting, we must remember—that is, from the standpoint of the will; not of will-less contemplation, philosophic or

[16] Compare what he says, "des Menschengeistes, der gerade weil er so vergänglich ist, das Unvergängliche zu seiner Betrachtung wählen sollte," Werke, vol. iii, p. 505.

[17] The existence of the present is "ein stätes Sterben," Werke, vol. ii, p. 367.

[18] Of course it was not this alone that led to the break between them; see the details in Volkelt, pp. 13–16.

[19] Volkelt, p. 9; cf. "Nachlass" (Grisebach ed.), vol. iv, p. 365.

[20] Volkelt quotes this, p. 261.

artistic, nor of true moral action, both of which do give joy, he holds, and lift us out of the changeable and the perishable altogether. But the vanity of the efforts of the will proper is more than a thought with him, it is a feeling and a conviction. We take such pains, spend such labor, he in effect says, and what is the result? The things we get are not what we expect them to be. He enlarges in particular on the deceptive nature of honor and fame, and on the illusory nature of sex-attraction; and life in general, he holds, is brighter in anticipation than in experience.[21] But more than this, the things do not last after we have got them. It is so of life itself. How we strive for it! 'T is the first good to most of us, we will give anything else for it—yet what is it? To the mass of men, labor, care, disappointment. Schopenhauer sees the slave, sees the factory operative, the factory child; and he thinks that sitting in the woollen mill, and doing over and over again ten, twelve, and fourteen hours a day the same mechanical tasks, is purchasing pretty dearly the privilege to breathe.[22] He raises the question whether the profits cover the cost.[23] Moreover, the existence we so painfully win, we soon lose. Man alone has clearly the idea of death—and the more sensitive and thoughtful more clearly than the rest; and hence man, above all the higher man, is haunted by the fear of death. In his seventeenth year, Schopenhauer tells us (writing late in life) he was seized with the same sense of the misery of existence that came to Buddha in his youth, as he contemplated sickness, age, pain, and death.

In all this Schopenhauer thinks he has got hold of the broad permanent features of the human lot and of human character. He does not believe that man changes much or will change. He is not idealistic or Utopian as to man's future. Indeed, should all mankind's wants be met, a goal of striving be reached and Utopia be here, he questions whether a fearful *Langeweile* would not set in—yes, and whether an over-population might not eventually arise, which would start striving and want all

[21] See Volkelt, pp. 262–267.

[22] Life is "ein Geschäft, dessen Ertrag bei weitem nicht die Kosten deckt" (quoted by Volkelt, p. 245).

[23] "Nachlass," vol. iv, p. 350.

over again.[24] Even if Utopia could be endured, men would still die, so that real satisfaction on the earth would still be impossible. But there is no reason to concern ourselves with these remote possibilities. Schopenhauer thinks of man very much after all as the world has generally thought till recent years. I believe it was Sir Henry Maine who pointed out how rare had been the idea of progress in the history of humanity. It might be called an Occidental invention. Plato did not know it, nor Aristotle. Nor apparently did Christianity—at least we find Jesus once asking, "When the Son of Man cometh [that is, when the culmination of earth's history arrives], shall he find faith on the earth?" and the coming, as ordinarily pictured in the New Testament, is not to greet something perfect that has been evolved, but to separate the bad from the good and to institute an irrevocable judgment. The idea of man's gradually, progressively moving towards perfection is perhaps not more than two centuries old. Schopenhauer thinks it is an illusion. He has what we might call a static view of man. The generations succeed one another, but they are much the same. Man is a species much like any other—the monkey, the lion, any given tree or plant—in that it has certain constant qualities. There is no progress to more and more perfect oak-trees, or to more and more perfect lions; there is none to more and more perfect men.

By such a view as this human life is not robbed of significance, but the significance changes. Once in a while conditions are favorable and we see a perfect tree. So at rare intervals, in happy conjunctions of circumstances, we see perfect (relatively perfect) specimens of the type of man. The significance of human life is in producing these specimens—they are the flower of time; but they do not necessarily come at the end of a so-called temporal evolution, but here, there, any time, when the conditions are favorable.[25] Schopenhauer has in mind the men

[24] Werke, vol. ii, pp. 113–114.

[25] Cf. Volkelt, pp. 3, 303, on the "aristokratischer Zug" in Schopenhauer's philosophy and his "aristokratischindividualistische Erlösungsphilosophie." Here, it may be noted, is the starting-point for Nietzsche's doctrine of the Superman; he quotes (Werke, vol. ii, p. 266, "Taschenausgabe") from Schopenhauer: "die Menschheit soll fortwährend daran arbeiten, einzelne grosse Menschen zu erzeugen—und dies und nicht Anderes sonst ist ihre Aufgabe."

of philosophical and artistic genius, and the holy men or saints, of whom presently. The point now is that Schopenhauer expects no change in the general constitution of human affairs. If he would still recognize in some sense "a far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves," it is not an earthly one. Individuals (aside from a crisis which may be compared to conversion) do not radically change; their actions may, more or less, but not the principles of their character.[26] Changes are in knowledge, not in will; bad men can no more be turned into good than lead into gold, the egoism of a given person no more be reasoned or persuaded out of him than the cat can lose its instinct to catch a mouse. Schopenhauer thinks it childish to believe that men's characters can be changed by presenting to them rational ideas, by begging, imploring, and so on;[27] intelligence may be increased, that is all. So society will not radically change. Egoism must be expected to continue and to work its havoc; the masses must still sacrifice themselves and suffer, and only so can leisure, the opportunity for genius, arise; illusion and disappointment will still largely characterize the human lot; sickness, old age, and death will still await all alike. The men of genius will have their happy moments and produce their immortal works, which all at scanty intervals may enjoy; the self-forgetting, self-denying, loving, and serving saint may know joy; but *im Grossen und Ganzen* humanity will continue much as it is today.[28]

[26] Werke, vol. ii, p. 347. That character may gradually develop and come to full expression only in the course of a life, goes without saying; but development is not change.

[27] Werke, vol. ii, p. 359; cf. vol. ii, p. 320, "Die Tugend wird nicht gelehrt, so wenig wie der Genius," etc.; also p. 434. Cf. Theognis, lines 429–438: "To beget and rear a child is easier than to instil good principles. No one ever devised means for making fools wise, or bad men good; . . . no amount of teaching will make a bad man good." These lines are quoted both by Plato and Aristotle (Symonds, The Greek Poets, vol. i, pp. 263–264).

[28] Schopenhauer once ventures on a priori considerations which make the case more hopeless still. Even perfect intelligences, he says, would in time exhaust the world, and then, for lack of novelty, find existence a bore. The world, as simply the manifestation of will, is a closed world. "Weil nämlich das Wesen aller Dinge im Grunde Eines ist, so ist alle Erkenntniss desselben nothwendig tautologisch; ist es nun ein Mal gefasst, wie es von jenen vollkommensten Intelligenzen bald gefasst sein würde; was bliebe ihnen übrig, als blosse Wiederholung und deren Langeweile, eine endlose Zeit hindurch?" This is the blackest thought in Schopenhauer.

All this of the human world, and perhaps the reader will say it is enough. But the outlook on nature is, to Schopenhauer, no more comforting. It is one thing to observe nature, to see the ideas of things, to feel the beauty of all that appears—but what it would be to *be* those things is another question.[29] What would it be to be a stone forever falling or trying to fall, with its one single meaningless tendency? Happy, we may say, is it that it is unconscious! What would it be to be those restless chemical elements, flying, avoiding, uniting, separating, those electric sparks, darting and hissing, those vital forces, incessantly toiling and ever defeated, shaping nothing that lasts, producing new individuals to take the place of old ones only to see them go too, never reaching a goal, condemned to see species vanish as well as individuals, and to face the time when the last lingering products of their hands will be no more? Happy, perhaps, are they that they do not know the end from the beginning,—do not, save as they come to partial consciousness in man, know at all! And this is saying nothing of the apparently inevitable conflict between these lower forms of life and existence. Schopenhauer knew the facts which Darwin has brought home to us before Darwin, and a world in which beings maintain themselves by consuming one another and every devouring animal is the living grave of others and owes its life to a whole series of martyr-deaths, excited a kind of horror in his mind. A ravenous animal, even an animal clutching its prey, has a kind of terrible beauty about it —art often makes it a subject; but what would it be to *be* that animal—not to say, to be its prey? The thought almost sickens us, and when men say that a world in which such things happen and come near being the rule is the best possible world, Schopenhauer answers, Absurd, a crying absurdity.[30] For it appears to be

[29] "Inzwischen heisst ein Optimist mich die Augen öffnen und hineinsehen in die Welt, wie sie so schön sei, im Sonnenschein, mit ihren Bergen, Thälern, Strömen, Pflanzen, Thieren, u. s. f.—Aber ist denn die Welt ein Guckkasten? *Zu sehen* sind diese Dinge freilich schön; aber sie *zu sein* ist ganz etwas Anderes" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 667). Again, "Jeder Zustand, jeder Mensch, jede Scene des Lebens, braucht nur rein objektiv aufgefasst und zum Gegenstand einer Schilderung, sei es mit dem Pinsel oder mit Worten, gemacht zu werden, um interessant, allerliebst, beneidenswerth zu erscheinen:—aber steckt man darin, ist man es selbst,—da (heisst es oft) mag es der Teufel aushalten" (vol. iii, p. 425).

[30] Werke, vol. iii, p. 667.

so all up and down the line: animals live in part on one another; men in part on animals; the animals or men that do not live on one another live on plants that are only their kindred lower down; the plants themselves are ravenous, they steal of the water and the earth. The unbrotherly strife that so largely exists in human society exists throughout the world—a hungry will is everywhere; and since it is all of one kind, Schopenhauer compares it to Thyestes of Greek legend, who ate his children, that is, consumed his own flesh. And there is no change, no progress, in the lower world any more than in the human: the lion remains a lion, the tiger a tiger, the snake a snake for ever and ever, just as a bird does, or a fish, or a tree.

Such are the broad lines of the world as Schopenhauer sees it —the world, that is, not now as observed, contemplated, by a willless intelligence, but as experienced, felt,—as known to one who is a part of it. Behind all its seemings, the world is will, and this is, broadly speaking, the nature and lot of the will.

Browning exclaims,

"All's right with the world";

Schopenhauer says, "Something is wrong with the world"; and perhaps Schopenhauer comes nearer to the profoundest consciousness of man. One need not deny his exaggerations of the unhappy or evil side of life: when he says, for instance, pleasure is negative, the distinction seems more academic than real; when he says the will is never satisfied, this may suggest its infinity rather than any reflection upon it; when he says the millions suffer, we may ask, do they need to suffer; when he says there is no progress, we may ask whether there cannot be progress; when he says there is egoism and strife, we may ask whether there may not be love and joyful co-operation. But that the world as it exists is wrong, whatever it may be or might be or will be, wrong too in a deep way, radically wrong, is a different matter, and it is a view that makes the nerve of some of the great religions of the world,—for instance not only of Buddhism, but of historic Christianity. There are things that ought not to be, and yet they are. It is a repellent antinomy; and yet in it, or rather in the first of the two propositions, it may be that what is highest in

man comes to expression. Had not Schopenhauer had some dim sense of a perfect world, he could never have condemned the world as it is—and if we on the other hand find the world satisfactory, it may only be because our idealism is low or is gone. It has always been so. It was Jesus' thought of the kingdom of heaven that made the existing kingdoms of the world appear to him like a vale of darkness and Satan. It was Sakyamouni's vision of a possible state in which should be neither sickness nor age nor pain nor death that made the present life of man seem so pitiful and sad. Moreover, the ideal in the light of which man views the real may make the inspiration by which he transforms it. It is the idealist, not the optimist, who becomes hero, reformer, saviour. It is those who feel the world evil who help to make it good. This is the secret of the great redemptive religions, Buddhism and Christianity. Into religions of this kind, as contrasted with mere nature and natural religions, not only idealism, but the profoundest searchings of the mind to find a way of redemption, and the most ardent energies of the will, may go—into these religions they have gone.

The world is radically wrong. This, then, is what Schopenhauer says. He does not say it like one bringing an indictment against the world, he has no personal grievance, he has no more respect for fretfulness, for misanthropy and hypochondria than any one else;[31] he rarely used the term Pessimism by which his views are commonly dubbed,[32] and when he does, it is principally by way of opposition to Optimism, which seemed to him a wicked way of thinking, a mockery on the nameless sufferings of men; he simply finds the world taken from the inside as experience—and apart from the rare moments of philosophic and artistic contemplation in which we simply look at it, and from the transcendency of ourselves altogether which is the essential meaning of morality—the opposite of what we conceive a perfect world would be; it is a world of egoistic striving in which there is never rest, a world in which things cross one another and prey on one another,

[31] Compare, for example, Werke, vol. ii, p. 468; vol. iv ("Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik"), p. 199.

[32] T. Bailey Saunders justly comments on this, in his Schopenhauer (London, 1905), p. 84.

a world of pain and age and death. Once he calls it the worst possible of worlds, but by this he says distinctly he does not mean the worst conceivable. I might illustrate his meaning by comparing it to the troubled business of some merchant that goes, but barely goes, and, if it got worse, would go under; so the world is just barely so ordered that it can exist. A worse would involve non-existence.[33] Elsewhere he mentions specific ways in which it might be worse;[34] and still again he says that a more violent will to live, with its extremer sufferings, would make a hell[35]—for, notwithstanding the strong comparison which I quoted earlier, our actual world stops, in Schopenhauer's estimation, short of that extreme. The case is the same with nature at large, nature and man are essentially alike:—to use the wonderful language of the New Testament, "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together."[36]

How does such a world—with man as its crown and revealing its inmost essence—come to be? There is the dark and inscrutable problem. Schopenhauer strives to keep close to facts, and to venture on no wild speculations. And yet, as if against himself, or at least his professions,[37] he has his dim gropings, his conjectures and vague views. The wonderful thing is the way in which his latent idealism and implicit and absolute ethical sense come out in them. We in these days are apt to take the world as we find it for granted: not so Schopenhauer—according to the implicit logic of his mind, only the good, the perfect, can be taken for granted; the original of things, the primitive datum,

[33] Werke, vol. iii, p. 669. So Leibnitz's optimism did not maintain that this was the most abstractly desirable world, but the best of all worlds that could exist, or were possible.

[34] Werke, vol. iii, p. 670; an alteration in the chemical constitution of the atmosphere, and an elevation of the temperature of the globe, are examples.

[35] Werke, vol. ii, p. 468.

[36] Schopenhauer quotes Aristotle approvingly, ἡ φύσις δαιμονία ἀλλ' οὐ θεία ἐστί (De divinat., c. 2, p. 463), and opposes pantheism, saying that a God who could have allowed himself to be turned into a world like ours, must have been plagued by the devil, Werke, vol. iii, p. 398; he believes in the ἓν καὶ πᾶν of the pantheists, but not in the πᾶν θεός, vol. iii, p. 739. The "unendlicher Naturgeist" is simply the "beharrlicher Wille zum Leben"; on the moral, or inner, side the world is anything but a theophany, vol. iii, p. 678; cf. Volkelt, p. 189.

[37] Werke, vol. iii, pp. 679, 736–737; cf. Frauenstädt's Einleitung, Werke, vol. i, pp. 38–39.

that which is beyond all explanation, because it needs none, cannot be like this faulty world we see.[38] We regard pain and sickness, old age and death, as a part of the natural order of things; but no, says Schopenhauer, they are not natural; they could not be, but for some violation of the final law of things, they are results, penalties of wrong-doing somewhere.[39] Let us for the moment transplant ourselves into a very different atmosphere from the modern one and conceive of ourselves as tarrying for a while in purgatory, as Dante conceived it,—how far should we be from right if we imagined that what we saw about us was the natural, normal order of things, if we did not recognize that it had its cause and its reason for being outside itself, that it was but a passing state for souls who had done wrong and were now learning to do better, that it was a provisional world entirely? By some such comparison we may perhaps make real to ourselves the kind of speculation Schopenhauer was led into in regard to this strange and unsatisfactory world in which we live. It is not a world that has its own justification, he repeatedly declares; it cannot be explained by itself—there is no proof that it exists for its own sake, its own advantage. And the explanation Schopenhauer gives, or rather ventures on, is moral. As implicitly as the Greeks of Homer's world felt, when some calamity or ill overtook them, that there must have been wrong-doing somewhere which now the gods were punishing,[40] so Schopen-

[38] I am giving here the implications of Schopenhauer's thought, not quoting him; but (Werke, vol. iii, p. 194) he speaks of the order of nature as not the only and absolute order of things, and says that ethics is inseparable from this conviction; cf. vol. iii, p. 740, where it is reckoned among the distinctive marks of his philosophy, as contrasted with pantheism, "dass bei mir die Welt nicht die ganze Möglichkeit alles Seins ausfüllt." He repeatedly speaks of "ein ganz anderartiges Dasein, eine andere Welt," for instance in vol. iii, pp. 495, 497.

[39] Schopenhauer speaks sympathetically of the religions that recognize "dass Schmerz und Tod nicht liegen können in der ewigen ursprünglichen und unabänderlichen Ordnung der Dinge, in Dem, was in jedem Betracht sein sollte," Werke, vol. iii, p. 188. Frauenstädt recognizes the distinction: "Denn die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben ist nicht Verneinung des Urseienden, der absoluten Substanz, sondern nur Verneinung jenes intelligibelen Willenacts, dessen Erscheinung diese unsere räumlich-zeitliche Welt ist," Werke, vol. i, Einleitung, p. 87.

[40] So also to Aeschylus, when a man suffers, it is a divine Nemesis upon sin (Jebb, Classical Greek Poetry, p. 181).

hauer says, "Every great suffering, whether it be physical or spiritual, tells us what we deserve, for it could not come to us, had we not deserved it." [41] I remember, when first coming on passages of this sort, saying to myself that Schopenhauer was far more under the influence of the older theological ideas of mankind than he was aware of—and it would perhaps not be exaggerating to speak of him not only as the metaphysician *par excellence* of our modern world, but as the moralist-metaphysician, the theologian, *par excellence*.[42] It is only that he was a "theologian" after his own kind, and not perhaps quite after the manner of the divinity schools. He is not theist, though he has a friendlier feeling for theism than for Spinozism or pantheism, since it contemplates a time when this world was not.[43] But he is also removed from the smooth and easy ways of modern rationalism,[44] which traces the evil in life and in man to circumstances and conditions, and ignores the headlong, egoistic will,—which thinks man is what he is by his habits and his actions and not by his nature. Schopenhauer is so far with Luther and with Augustine against Pelagius.[45] He thinks that not only does man act as he ought not to act, but *is* what he ought not to *be;* yes, that his actions come from his nature, being simply called forth

[41] Werke, vol. iii, p. 666. Volkelt, p. 281, says, "In der That, es tritt uns bei Schopenhauer in seiner Lehre von der Weltschuld eine altehrwürdige Weisheit, ein uraltes düsteres Ahnen der Menschheit entgegen."

[42] Volkelt, p. 279, says, "Schon in seiner Jugend bemerkte Schopenhauer gegen Schelling, dass das Moralische das Allerrealste sei, dem gegenüber alles, was sonst als real erscheint, in Nichtigkeit versinke"; cf. Schopenhauer's express words (Werke, vol. iii, p. 506), "Das Moralische ist es, worauf nach dem Zeugniss unseres innersten Bewusstseins alles ankommt." Still further, Schopenhauer, while emphatically dissenting from the view that theism is inseparable from morality, will not admit that the same may be said of metaphysics in general, meaning by this the view that the order of nature is not the only and absolute order of things: therefore, he adds, one might propose it as the necessary credo of all just and good men; "I believe in a metaphysic," Werke, vol. iii, p. 194, cf. vol. iv ("Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik"), p. 109.

[43] Werke, vol. iii, p. 189; he also has severe words of reprobation for naturalism, saying that it is a "fundamentaler" and "verderblichster Irrthum," yes, really an "eigentliche Perversität der Gesinnung," to give the world "bloss eine physische, keine moralische Bedeutung." As to Schopenhauer's attitude to pantheism, cf. Volkelt, p. 189.

[44] Cf. Werke, vol. i, "Ueber die vierfachen Würzel," p. 122; vol. iii, p. 718.

[45] Werke, vol. iii, pp. 693, 694, 718.

by external occasions, as the action of the forces of nature in general is called forth by the occasions, not produced by them—out of the good treasure of his heart a good man brings forth good things, and out of the evil treasure an evil man evil things (this saying of Jesus Schopenhauer quotes with absolute approval).[46] Hence it is not so much a change in conduct as a change in nature that man needs.[47] Down deep is the need, and the sin, of man—and down deep, beyond anything we have experimental knowledge of, is the guilt. Man comes into the world with this headlong, unscrupulous, sometimes ferocious will to live—circumstances have not made him so, he has not made himself so by any temporal act, any more than the animal has made his will to devour, or the plant its will to seize on nourishment wherever it can get it. How can we account for such a fact, how can we keep morality (right) at the bottom of things, how avoid the conclusion that it is an insane, immoral world in which we live?

Schopenhauer answers: by supposing that the will, which, in its varying forms, is the driving force and essence of this world, somewhere in the wide reach and infinite space of things fell, wandered from the right course, became estranged from the bliss at the heart of things; and that here in this world, which it fashions—for something of subtle, creative, divine power still attaches to it and it trails clouds of glory as well as of shame—here in this world it is undergoing expiation,[48] is coming to a knowledge of itself; and that thus it is led by its very suffering and finiteness, by sickness, by old age, by death, to renounce itself, to transcend itself, to wish to cease to be any longer as this striving individ-

[46] Werke, vol. iv, "Die beiden Grundprobleme," p. 251, quoting Luke 6, 45.

[47] Werke, vol. iii, p. 693. Schopenhauer is stating here the Pauline position, but at bottom he is at one with it: "Wenn auch die Schuld im Handeln, im *operari*, liegt; so liegt doch die Wurzel der Schuld in unserer *essentia et existentia*, da aus dieser das *operari* nothwendig hervorgeht, wie ich in der Preisschrift über die Freiheit des Willens dargethan habe." Volkelt says, p. 285, "Kant's Lehre vom radikalen Bösen ist der Schopenhauerischen vom Leben als einer Schuld nächstverwandt."

[48] "Das Leiden ist in der That der Läuterungsprocess, durch welchen allein, in den meisten Fällen, der Mensch geheiligt, d. h. von dem Irrweg des Willens zum Leben zurückgeführt wird" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 731). Cf. Volkelt, p. 357. Perhaps I should say that instead of "this world, which it fashions" in the text, a more correct expression would be "this world, in which it manifests itself."

ual, cut off from other individuals and warring with them, to cease to be altogether, if living and striving alone are life, but really rather to re-enter that bliss, that rest, from which it came, and which cannot be named or conceived, save as the contrary of all we know as fitful, uncertain, struggling life. At bottom it is the same profound ethico-philosophical process of thought that led to the doctrine of the Fall of Man,—a doctrine which the present day finds so absurd, and yet which Schopenhauer declared the one doctrine which reconciled him to the Old Testament, pervaded in general as he found it to be with shallow optimistic hopes.[49] We in these days more easily dispense with the idea of a fall, because, if we conceive of perfection at all (as we ordinarily do not), we put it at the end or the summit of things; but if we put perfection at the beginning or at the basis of things, as Christianity does in its idea of God,[50] and as Schopenhauer essentially did, then there must have been a fall—otherwise we cannot account for the imperfect world we find.[51] Why the will erred, how it erred, how it could have erred, Schopenhauer does not say, and knows he cannot say—they are questions beyond all power of answer. But the idea of a fall (*Abfall*, *Abirrung*, *Verirrung*, *Wahn*—such are his phrases) seemed to him a metaphysical and a moral necessity.

[49] Werke, vol. iii, pp. 666, 713.

[50] Mr. Bernard Shaw's "God" is one who can make something more perfect than himself; not so the Christian idea.

[51] When preparing at Weimar for the University and reading the tragedies of Sophocles, the conviction came to him, "dass alle zeitlichen Uebel gegründet seien in einem unbedingten ewigen Urübel" (so Volkelt, p. 11, citing W. Gwinner, Schopenhauer's Leben, 2d ed., pp. 746–747) To save the essential rightness of things Schopenhauer even goes further than Christian theology, for it conceives of man as put here in this world without his will, which Schopenhauer calls a "schreiende Ungerechtigkeit" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 692); according to Schopenhauer, man is here because of his will,—it is his will that makes the world and all things in it, so that in his suffering and disappointment he but experiences what he has made and finds out its sorry character. In complete intelligence, indeed, he would not have made it. But if man as he exists here is the work of a different being from himself, then the responsibility for what he does (seine Schuld) falls back on his author (Werke, vol. iii, p. 676). "Daher ist er nur in dem Fall, dass er selbst sein eigenes Werk sei, d. h. Aseität habe, für sein Thun verantwortlich" (Werke, vol. iv, "Die beiden Grundprobleme," p. 73). Consolation is accordingly to be found not in the physical, but in the moral, view of things (Werke, vol. iii, p. 676), and his philosophy, he holds, is the only one that does full justice to morality (ibid.; cf. Volkelt, p. 331).

There is, then, no arbitrariness in the world; there is rather eternal righteousness (over and over Schopenhauer uses this phrase); we ought to be unhappy, therefore we are so. We blindly choose individual life and now in living we see what we choose. Guilt and misery are equal; and if in a special case one man sins and another suffers, yet, more deeply seen, the one who sins and the one who suffers are the same—the same in kind, the same in essence. He who injures another really, like Thyestes, bites into his own flesh. The eternal order does no wrong. We, will—in men, animals, plants, and insensate things,—we, the world, are responsible for what we suffer in the world.[52] Such, if I may say so, is Schopenhauer's theodicy.

II. The Doctrine of Redemption

To the early Christian view the world as it then was, full of sin and suffering and death, did not deserve to stand, awaited its end, and would soon have it. A new world would arise in which right would dwell, in which sorrow and crying and pain would be no more, in which death itself would cease—a world in which the face of nature would be made over, in which not only men should no longer war, but the lion should lie down with the lamb and the leopard with the kid, in which a great love and a great peace should enwrap all things. It was a dream into which all the idealism of a people's mind and heart was concentrated.

The world has grown sadly wiser since the days of Jesus and Paul and the writer of the Apocalypse; and to our steady science, and unwinged philosophy, and limited moral demands, the idea seems fantastic. And yet occasionally those who live in their minds and moral imaginations more than in their senses have

[52] Werke, vol. ii, p. 415: "Will man wissen, was die Menschen, moralisch betrachtet, im Ganzen und Allgemeinen werth sind; so betrachte man ihr Schicksal, im Ganzen und Allgemeinen. Dieses ist Mangel, Elend, Jammer, Qual und Tod. Die ewige Gerechtigkeit waltet: wären sie nicht, im Ganzen genommen, nichtswürdig; so würde ihr Schicksal, im Ganzen genommen, nicht so traurig sein. In diesem Sinne können wir sagen: die Welt selbst ist das Weltgericht. Könnte man allen Jammer der Welt in *eine* Waagschale legen, und alle Schuld der Welt in die andere; so würde gewiss die Zunge einstehen."

kindred thoughts, and, allowing for changed intellectual conditions, a similar idea confronts us in Schopenhauer. If, indeed, death is natural, a part of the normal order of things, if pain and suffering are only what we must expect, if sin and wrong are to be taken for granted, in other words, if there is nothing strange, repellent, and unnatural about the world as we find it, then is Schopenhauer's idea nonsensical and the speculation by which he reaches it a trouble over nothing; but if so, equally nonsensical is the historic Christian idea that has come down to us today, not altogether changed, in the common conception of heaven. The nerve of Schopenhauer's, as of the Christian, view is that wrong and suffering and death are somehow contrary to us, contrary to the mind as well as the heart, something abnormal or irrational, something requiring explanation, something that cannot possibly be conceived as ultimate, unless irrationality and deviltry are put at the heart of things; for it is because what we see and experience, the whole melancholy spectacle of the world, is not natural, that Schopenhauer and the original Christian tradition were led to conceive a second nature, a supernature, another order and scheme of things, in which all that perplexes and affronts and confounds us has disappeared. Professor Deussen of Kiel speaks of Schopenhauer as a philosopher *christianissimus* [53]—and in some of Schopenhauer's meta-

[53] Erinnerungen an F. Nietzsche (1901), p. 104. Compare Professor Hans Vaihinger of Halle: "Man kann im Gegentheil sagen, dass keiner der neueren Philosophen so tief in des Wesen des Christenthums eingedrungen ist, und den Kern desselben so warm vertheidigt hat, als Schopenhauer. Man vergleiche nur, was Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart und selbst Schleiermacher über das Christenthum gesagt haben, mit dem, was sich bei Schopenhauer findet. Insbesondere sind es drei Grundbegriffe des Christenthums, welche bei Schopenhauer tiefste Würdigung finden: das Böse, die Liebe, die Weltverachtung" (Nietzsche als Philosoph, 3d ed., pp. 66–67). Schopenhauer speaks of Christianity as "jene vortreffliche und heilbringende Religion" (Werke, vol. ii, p. 458). He distinguishes its kernel from its husk, explaining, "Bei keiner Sache hat man so sehr den Kern von der Schaale zu unterscheiden, wie beim Christenthum. Eben weil ich diesen Kern hochschätze, mache ich mit der Schaale bisweilen wenig Umstände: sie ist jedoch dicker, als man meistens denkt" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 718). The ethics of Christianity he declares indestructible (Werke, vol. ii, p. 458, cf. p. 483), but it is its sense of man's need of redemption (of a change of nature, not merely in conduct) that makes his real point of contact with it; see vol. iii, p. 693, also pp. 718–719. Protestantism, despite Luther's serious views, is on the whole, to his

physical presuppositions, as well as in certain aspects of his ethics, this is true.

We have seen that Schopenhauer accounted for the world and its evil by an original aberration of the will, and that he cleared the essential nature of things of taint by saying that as the suffering is the will's, so is the guilt. In this is implied the essential freedom of the will, to which Schopenhauer held along with Kant, and, if space allowed, I should be glad to give some account of the wonderful little treatise in which his view is expounded.[54] As man is, Schopenhauer holds that his actions are all determined: with a certain character (and every man has an inborn character) a given stimulus or situation inevitably calls forth a certain act—there is as much, and, at bottom, the same, necessity in human conduct as in natural events. And yet man feels responsible for his acts, he knows they are his acts and not another's—we are the doers of our deeds: and if there is any sense in this deep consciousness and feeling, then when we have done wrong it must be that it was possible for us to do otherwise; and if our act springs inevitably from our character, it must have been possible for that character to be different; and if we have not

mind, an "Abfall" from Christianity (vol. iii, p. 718): it is an "ausgeartetes Christenthum" (vol. iii, p. 719).

Schopenhauer honors especially the older, severer, ascetic type of Christianity. The whole passage deserves to be quoted: "Der Protestantismus hat, indem er die Askese und deren Centralpunkt, die Verdienstlichkeit des Cölibats, eliminierte, eigentlich schon den innersten Kern des Christenthums aufgegeben und ist insofern als ein Abfall von demselben anzusehen. Dies hat sich in unsern Tagen herausgestellt in dem allmäligen Uebergang desselben in den platten Rationalismus, diesen modernen Pelagianismus, der am Ende hinausläuft auf eine Lehre von einem liebenden Vater, der die Welt gemacht hat, damit es hübsch vergnügt darauf zugehe (was ihm dann freilich missrathen sein müsste), und der, wenn man nur in gewissen Stücken sich seinem Willen anbequemt, auch nachher für eine noch viel hübschere Welt sorgen wird (bei der nur zu beklagen ist, dass sie eine so fatale Entree hat). Das mag eine gute Religion für komfortable, verheirathete und aufgeklärte Pastoren sein [cf. John Henry Newman, Discussions and Arguments, p. 42]; aber das ist kein Christenthum. Das Christenthum ist die Lehre von der tiefen Verschuldung des Menschengeschlechts durch sein Dasein selbst und dem Drange des Herzens nach Erlösung daraus, welche jedoch nur durch die schwersten Opfer und durch die Verleugnung des eigenen Selbst, also durch eine gänzliche Umkehrung der menschlichen Natur erlangt werden kann" (vol. iii, pp. 718–719).

[54] "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, I. Ueber die Freiheit des Willens," Werke, vol. iv, pp. 3–102.

determined the character here in this earthly life, we must have done so elsewhere. Without responsibility, no ethics—neither morality nor immorality in any genuine sense of the word; and without ultimate freedom, the possibility of alternative choice, no responsibility; if we, in our very selves, are not the doers of our deeds, we are not accountable for them. This is the argumentation; and according to Schopenhauer we are responsible. It is our inmost will that makes us what we are—that will which is simply revealed to us by the successive circumstances of life, not shaped or created by them. We cannot understand this freedom: understanding is limited to single acts which may be traced back to this as their ultimate ground; but freedom itself is un-understandable, we can see its place and necessity, but we cannot comprehend it, or even clearly, objectively conceive it—it is, Schopenhauer confesses, a mystery, and, in his eyes, a holy one, since all the sanctities of life hang on it. The will has gone wrong—and in this way, to this extent, the world is wrong: such is Schopenhauer's logic.

But if such is the evil of the world, and such its origin, how shall we escape from it—how pass from the purgatory which this world essentially is? Many, disappointed, beaten, or baffled in life, have recourse to suicide. Nothing serves to bring out the peculiar and distinguishing character of Schopenhauer's philosophy better than his treatment of suicide. He does not call it a crime, but it is to his mind a vain and foolish act—it does not end the trouble; for the trouble is that one wants happiness and cannot get it—and one dies wanting happiness and because he cannot get it; that is, he dies willing life and happiness— his will is alive in death as truly as in life, it is the cause of his death; yet in this will which seeks life and the happiness of life is the root of all the trouble, for instead of allowing suffering and disappointment to quiet and allay this will, one goes on craving as strongly and lustily as ever, and is like a sick man who, rather than suffer a painful operation—which would cure him—to be completed, prefers to remain sick. For the will is not, according to Schopenhauer, the result of life and the bodily organization, it is the cause of them or rather the reality of them; and the uncured will, the will untaught by the real lessons of life, gains nothing

by suicide—being only deepened and confirmed in its illusions by this desperate act. In other words, the suicide has lost his chance of finding the meaning of life—he goes from it after all his years no wiser than when, full of headlong will, he came to it. Will unredeemed, will vain and empty, not going to happiness or knowing what happiness is,—such is the spectacle which the suicide presents to Schopenhauer's mind. We escape from suffering, not by quitting the world, but only by stilling the will to live, which makes the world. Wherever there is will to assert a separate, individual existence, craving its own separate, individual welfare and happiness, there is bound to be suffering, according to his reading of existence. The world—this world as we know it—is the result of the action and clashing of innumerable wills of this description; hence the suffering, which we all sooner or later taste. Not escaping from suffering, but fathoming its meaning, is the true human task.

Did Schopenhauer, then, we may ask, believe in immortality? In a sense—a deep sense—I would answer, yes. Our consciousness may go, our intellect, but the will and the peculiar type it assumes, the character—in other words, our profoundest being, often unknown to us in our own life—this does not go; it belongs to a realm of the indestructible—it is this and what is like it that has made the world, and it belongs to the inner essence of the world. Schopenhauer's phrase is "indestructibility," a more absolute term than immortality. In nature, that is, among plants and animals, there is no essential difference between the individuals of a species, they are all one idea and there is no occasion for the perpetuation of the individuals,—there is only the indestructibility of the type, that is, of the will incorporated or objectified in it. But there are radical differences between human individuals; as Schopenhauer puts it, "each man is a particular idea," "an entirely peculiar idea"; hence in the case of men the indestructibility of the idea carries the essential indestructibility of the individual with it. Intellect, consciousness, are more or less passing things, but the will cannot be destroyed—and if it wills to live, it will live; if it wills to seek after happiness, it will seek after happiness; and if it dies, as the suicide ordinarily dies, because of an inextinguishable thirst for

happiness and life, then in some other manner of existence it is bound to pursue the same illusory search and striving as here.[55] The difference of Schopenhauer's from our ordinary view—or at least a difference—is that to him immortality is a fate rather than anything else, that separate, striving life elsewhere is no better than separate, striving life here; and that the supreme task is to transcend this egoistic will, lustful of life and pleasure, once and forever.

Suicide, then, is no way out. The real way must be of a different character—it must take account of the seat of the trouble. In fact, Schopenhauer points out two ways—one partial, the other complete. The trouble, I need not repeat, is in our interested, craving will. Well, one way is to leave the standpoint of the will altogether, as we do in philosophy and art—to become pure, observing, contemplating intelligence and appreciation. When we can lose ourselves in philosophic study, when we can contemplate the beautiful, the sublime, or the terrible in nature, putting our personalities and our personal fortunes out of view, a singular elevation and rest come over us—for the moment anxieties, cares, hopes and fears, fortune and misfortune, merit and demerit, are gone, "*und uns ist völlig wohl.*" It is that painless condition, Schopenhauer says, which Epicurus praised as the highest good and the state of the gods—for we are for that moment freed from the miserable driving of the will, we celebrate the Sabbath from the labors to which we are condemned, the wheel of Ixion stands still. Philosophy and, above all, art are, to Schopenhauer, the flowering of life, and extraordinary and almost rapturous are the expressions he sometimes uses—it is a veritable redemption from our individuality, its finiteness and its woes, which they bring. He quotes Goethe's lines,

> "*Was im Leben uns verdriesst,*
> *Man im Bilde gern geniesst*"

("What in life vexes us, we yet enjoy in a picture"), and recalls

[55] "So lange keine Verneinung jenes Willens eingetreten, ist was der Tod von uns übrig lässt der Keim und Kern eines ganz andern Daseins, in welchem ein neues Individuum sich wiederfindet, so frisch und ursprünglich, dass es über sich selbst verwundert brütet" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 574). Compare: "Was jeder im Innersten *will*, dass muss er *sein*" (Werke, vol. ii, p. 433).

a period in his youth when he was constantly trying to see himself and his doings from outside and to picture them—probably, as he adds, to make them more enjoyable. If only the moments of philosophic and artistic joy could last!—they are like the ray of sunlight that sometimes cuts through a storm and, though in the midst of it, is unaffected by it. For a few indeed they may last, those so gifted and so fortunately circumstanced that their lives can practically be given up to philosophical activity or to artistic creation. They are among the perfect specimens of our human type, they are the favored ones of earth—those for whom, as Nietzsche asserted in essential sympathy with Schopenhauer, the world and all the rest of mankind exist; they make a kind of justification of the world. But these perfect ones are rare, and the times when most of us can enjoy their works are rare. For the great majority, life is in the main not philosophic and aesthetic contemplation or creation, but struggle, struggle to live, suffering, disappointment, sickness, old age, death—yes, even genius does not escape the last-named fates; and sometimes genius is a tragedy, for there are those who have the power to see and create, and circumstances do not allow them to do so.

Hence another way of redemption is needed for man—even for the genius. The fact is, we live, and cannot merely look on life; we live, and philosophy and art do not change life; we live, and have the lot of living things, birth and change and death; we live, and cannot rid ourselves of the demands of life—sometimes using ourselves up in the struggle to live at all; we have put ourselves into being and now we feel the yoke-straps of the necessity we have created. Even to elevate a few above care the rest of us must work with more care—the men of genius stand on the backs of the laboring multitudes.[56] And so, confronted with these imperious realities, philosophy and art may seem not only a partial, but an illusory, redemption. They take man away from life, and how does that help those who have still to live? Thus Schopenhauer is led on to a deeper doctrine.

The doctrine, it must be admitted at the outset, is of an unheard-of hardness and extremity—that is, is so to us of the Western world, full of the pulse of life and with all our naïve confidence

[56] Here is another starting-point of Nietzsche's.

in it unbroken. The blood of the Vikings and of primal man is still in us—we come into the world lustful and willing, and we continue to crave and to will without end. Very well, says Schopenhauer (in principle), so far as this is the case I have no medicine for you—I have medicine only for such as are sick; the will is almighty and I lay down no rules for it. But if perchance the world is not to your mind, if your lot, the common human lot, is not to your mind, if you yourself are not to your mind, if you would rather be something different from this hungry, craving, restless, ever dissatisfied, beaten, and baffled being that you are, I can perhaps show you a way out—and this is, to be abrupt and bald, to cease to wish to live a separate, individual existence. For, he argues (and it is the gist of his general philosophy), the world and life are the manifestation, or objectivation, of will, of my will and your will and the wills in animal, plant, and stone; the contradictions and confusion of the world and life are the manifestation of the inner contradictions and confusion of will itself, each individualization of it wanting its own way, I wanting mine, you yours, others theirs, each asserting itself, subjecting others or subjected to them, each implicitly saying, "I," "I," and tolerating others only as they serve it (make the I more I), the world having only so much order as is necessary to keep these contradictions going. Hence, since the craving for individual life is the seat of all the trouble, there is no way out but to still the craving, to let it die and cease to be.

I have said Schopenhauer "argues," I have even spoken of his "prescribing" to those who are sick. But in reality arguing and prescribing amount to little in his estimation. It is a matter at last of each man's experience, of each man's intuition, and of each man's will. If, notwithstanding all that has been said respecting the unsatisfactoriness and even bitterness of life taken as experience, one still has courage and the will to live, he can go on living and death need have no terrors for him—for death has no power over the essential will, and while one wills to live, one will live in some form or other; will is the essence of the world, and birth and death only affect its manifestation, not its content. In the Bhagavad-Gita Krishna raises by thoughts like these the

mind of his young pupil Arjuna, when, seized with compunction at the sight of the arrayed hosts (somewhat as Xerxes was), he loses heart and desires to give up the battle in order to avert the death of so many thousands. Krishna leads him to this point of view, and then the death of thousands no longer restrains him; he gives the sign for battle. It is the point of view of Goethe's Prometheus, who says,

> "Here sit I, form men
> After my image,
> A race, like myself,
> To suffer, to weep,
> To enjoy and to rejoice,
> And thee not to heed
> As I."

It is only as by experience or reflection one is led to a different view, as one becomes weary of birth and death, weary of striving to maintain a separate, individual existence, weary of the contradictions, the clashings, and the miseries of a world in which this individualistic striving comes to outward and visible expression, as one pines and longs for another type of existence, for a different kind of world from that we know—it is only so that Schopenhauer's other alternative has any practical meaning or application to him.[57] The will is sovereign and it can choose.

But if one chooses to be a different being and have a different world, one can be it and have it. The non-existence of this world is just as possible as the existence of it.[58] The will has fallen from the normal and eternal order of things (dimly conceived, but absolutely held to, by Schopenhauer) and can rise to it. We must radically distinguish Schopenhauer's thought from what is often called the pessimistic view of man as a being of no account —of no significance and no power; Schopenhauer's pessimism is as different from that of the *blasé* man of the world or of a contemner of human beings and trifler with them like Napoleon

[57] The alternatives are powerfully and movingly stated in Werke, vol. ii, pp. 334–336.

[58] "In der That ist die Unruhe, welche die nie ablaufende Uhr der Metaphysik in Bewegung erhielt, das Bewusstsein, dass das Nichtsein dieser Welt ebenso möglich sei, wie ihr Dasein" (Werke, vol. iii, p. 189).

and all the other conquerors, military and commercial, who ride over men's prostrate forms to glory, as light from darkness. Man's life on the earth is vain, but not man—and Schopenhauer's essential thought is that man might be at better business, yes, be a better thing than he is.

The difficulty is in conceiving how man can transcend the will to live—for the wish to be, to assert ourselves, to prolong our days and even to live forever as this particular individuality, seems to belong to our very nature. And yet, Schopenhauer says, he who goes to meet death bravely and unconcernedly (he has in mind the soldier or hero of any type) triumphs over the will to live; to such a man there is something more than life, and he had rather die than not heed the call—and it is a total perversion of his consciousness, a psychological untruth, to say he does so only as he expects to live again. Schopenhauer quotes Schiller with approval: "*Das Leben ist der Güter höchstes nicht.*" [59] To him morality itself, as disinterested love, transcends the individual will to live; it is a striving in quite an opposite direction from that towards happiness, welfare, life; [60] in love, he was aware, one may give up life. But if in these ways man's lust for life may be conquered, so in others it may not be so much conquered as quieted, made dead. Schopenhauer tells of Raymond Lully, a youthful courtier who afterwards became famous in the annals of the church. Enamoured of a beautiful woman, he was at last bidden to her chamber, where he went expecting the consummation of his desire, but instead she opened her bodice and showed the bosom horribly eaten by cancer. He turned, left the court, and went out into the desert to do penance; he became dead to life. So the sight of any irremediable illness, or of slowly creeping old age, or of

[59] Werke, vol. iii, p. 498, the reference being to the Braut von Messina.

[60] Werke, vol. ii, p. 427; cf. vol. iv, "Die beiden Grundprobleme," p. 113. In vol. iii, p. 240, Schopenhauer even uses language that will seem to many extreme: "Das Unmoralische im Willen als eine Unvollkommenheit desselben anzusehen, wäre ein grundfalscher Gesichtspunkt: vielmehr hat die Moralität eine Quelle, welche eigentlich schon über die Natur hinaus liegt, daher sie mit den Aussagen derselben in Widerspruch steht. Darum eben tritt sie dem natürlichen Willen, als welcher an sich schlechthin egoistisch ist, geradezu entgegen, ja, die Fortsetzung ihres Weges führt zur Aufhebung desselben." Again (vol. iii, p. 564), he says that virtue and egoism are "von Grund aus Entgegengesetzte."

actual death, may turn one from life—so powerfully may its instability and fleetingness be felt. Or the pages of history may sicken one, the triumph of the unprincipled and vile, the indignities heaped on the poor and the weak, the general sordidness—one may not see "the steady gain of man" of which our American poet speaks, and even today, in the midst of all our wealth and "progress," Matthew Arnold's line,

"The millions suffer still and grieve,"

may seem true. Yes, a kind of tragedy may seem to lie at the basis of the world, and, as the glories of the Periclean age rested on slavery (the necessary subjection of the many), so, *mutatis mutandis*, now; that there may be leisure for genius, the rest must toil. Hence it may at last come over one that the root of the tragedy, and the presupposition of all disappointment and of all pain, lie in that strong will to live, and to live at any cost, that he is aware of in himself, and he may sicken of it and desire to cast it out.

Thus, either by violent shock and suffering or by a musing contemplation of the world and a train of natural reflection, the eager imperious will so characteristic of most of us may be quieted, stilled, deadened. The ordinary motives that lead to the striving, troubled life of men then act no longer. If they do arise, as from time to time they may, the effort of the will comes now to be to deny them, to mortify them. Schopenhauer goes far in the ascetic practices he countenances; and the higher, severer, extremer forms of mortification he describes almost with awe. It is not the genius he now portrays, but the saint. The saint denies, for example, that most concentrated form of the will to live, the sexual impulse. He chooses poverty and gives away, not merely to help others, but that the satisfaction of wishes, the sweetness of life made possible by earthly possessions, may not lure his will again. He does not strive when others do him wrong—wounded vanity or pride no longer stirs him. He gives to his body sparingly, lest it grow strong and bloom and reawaken the will; he fasts rather and chastises the body, in order to break and kill out that will to live of which it is the expression. And when death comes to him, it is not pain nor dis-

appointment, but release;[61] for Schopenhauer recognizes the difficulty of self-suppression, the ardor of the conflict, and says that victory may never be complete while the body lasts. It may seem a gloomy picture, but in the dim background there is to Schopenhauer's vision a kind of unearthly light—like the light in the gloom of a monastery chapel, or those churches one may find in Italy that have no beauty or grace when seen from without, but are radiant within. For to Schopenhauer, the saint, or he who is on the way to become one and to the extent he has gone, has freedom as no one else in the world has, he has rest such as cannot come after the proudest earthly victory, and joy for which there are no words. The genius, the philosopher or artist—he, too, has for the moments of his contemplation or creation transcended the standpoint of the will, he lives in another atmosphere than the feverish one in which most men pass their days, he has an elevated joy; but it is all for moments only, and when the will reasserts itself, when the needs and cravings of life are felt, he is in purgatory again. The saint's joy is as deep as his renunciation of the will is, and it is as perduring as that. He may even seem to delight in life again, but it is as one detached from life. He may go about doing good, he may smile, he may sing, he may even dance (Schopenhauer cites the Shakers, the Rappists, the Russian Raskolnik, the ancient Essenes), but it is because he is so absolutely at rest from himself, because there is nothing he wants, because he is now in himself, as it were, all things, all joy and peace. If outward suffering comes to him, he is, like Horatio,

> "As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing,"

—for there is a core of his being beyond the reach of suffering; that is a higher in him than the will to live, and that is untouched.

It is impossible, without verbally transcribing whole passages of Schopenhauer, to give an idea of the emotion he shows in describing the saint. Perhaps because he was not a saint himself and did not pretend to be, he loves the more to dwell on the idea which,

[61] Werke, vol. ii, pp. 449–451: the fasting may go as far as starvation, pp. 474–475.

as it were, haunted his soul and drew him toward it despite himself. The saint is one who, however poor, joyless, and full of privation his outward condition may seem, is filled with inward joy and the true peace of heaven. The man who has his wants gratified is like the beggar who gets an alms and the next day hungers again; the saint like one who comes into an hereditary possession—he is above care and want forever. Nothing troubles him more, nothing can trouble him, for he has cut all the thousand cords of will which hold us bound to the world, and—as desire, fear, envy, anger—drag us hither and thither in constant pain. He now looks back smiling and at rest on the delusions of this world, which once were able to move and agonize his spirit but now stand before him as indifferent as are chessmen to the players when the game is ended, or as, in the morning, the cast-off masquerading-dress, which worried and disquieted us in a night of carnival.[62] Life and its forms pass before him still only as a fleeting phenomenon, as does to one half-awake a light morning-dream through which reality shimmers and which no more deceives; and like this dream they, too, vanish at last, without violent transition. From this, Schopenhauer adds, we can understand in what sense Madame Guyon, toward the end of the story of her life, so often says: "To me everything is indifferent; I can will nothing more; often I do not know whether I exist or not."[63]

We see from all this how little our ordinary ideas of pessimism agree with the view of Schopenhauer. He belongs rather among the mystics, quietists, illuminists, men like John Tauler and Meister Eckhart.[64] He has essential sympathy with Cath-

[62] Cf. John Henry Newman: "We should consider ourselves to be in this world in no fuller sense than players in any game are in the game; and life to be a sort of dream, as detached and different from our real eternal existence, as a dream differs from waking; a serious dream, indeed, as affording a means of judging us, yet in itself a kind of shadow without substance, a scene set before us in which we seem to be, and in which it is our duty to act just as if all we saw had a truth and reality, because all that meets us influences us and our destiny" (Parochial and Plain Sermons, vol. iv, p. 221).

[63] Werke, vol. iii, pp. 720–721; vol. ii, p. 244; vol. ii, pp. 461–462.

[64] Of Eckhart's book, Die deutsche Theologie, he says, "Die darin gegebenen Vorschriften und Leben sind die vollständigste aus tief innerster Ueberzeugung entsprungene Auseinandersetzung Dessen, was ich als die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben dargestellt habe" (Werke, vol. ii, p. 457). Only second stands Tauler's Nachfolgung des armen Leben Christi and Medulla animae. The New Testament is the first initiation, and the mystics the second, to this higher lore.

olic Christianity and with the spirit of Buddhism. Indeed he reverentially describes a phenomenon that is essentially the same under widely different creeds, a phenomenon that belongs to human nature rather than to any specific intellectual atmosphere —he himself remarks on this.[65]

Still less does Schopenhauer's conception of the ultimate destiny of the self-renouncing will correspond with the ordinary pessimistic spirit. I approach a subject of great difficulty here; but the impressions which many have of Schopenhauer's teaching are most superficial. They fancy that he holds that the world is a huge mistake, and that Nothing is the end of it. They think that ceasing to will to live is ceasing to be and that blank nonexistence was what he coveted for himself and all men. Even a scholar like Otto Pfleiderer calls nihilism his eschatology.[66] But many times Schopenhauer indicates that the nothing which the saint awaits is relative, not absolute[67]—there is nothing of this world in it, that is all. Nirvana is the word he often uses (borrowing from the Buddhist vocabulary), which means an extinguishing; but this of itself is not decisive, for the will to live *is* extinguished in the saint, and with the will life sooner or later, and this is the sole positive reference and meaning of the term—but whether there may not be something else in man than the will to live, and whether there may not be some other state or condition than that which we call life, is wholly undetermined. Schopenhauer quotes what the Buddhists say: "Thou shalt attain Nirvana, that is, a state in which four things do not exist —birth, age, sickness, and death." That this state is a mere nothing is a presumptuous assertion. The case may be as with death in general, of which Schopenhauer said in substance that we know what we lose by it but not what we gain.[68] Our posi-

[65] After speaking of St. Bonaventura's Vita S. Francisci and Spence Hardy's Eastern Monachism, and remarking that they tell the same story, he says, "Auch sieht man, wie gleichgültig es ihr ist, ob sie von einer theistischen, oder einer atheistischen Religion ausgeht" (Werke, vol. ii, p. 454). Compare his comments on the Trappist order, as surviving revolutions, ecclesiastical changes, and unbelief, and preserving itself down to the present day in all its purity and awful (furchtbaren) severity (Werke, vol. ii, p. 467; vol. iii, p. 725).

[66] Religionsphilosophie, 2d ed., vol. i, p. 563.

[67] Werke, iii, pp. 222, 703, cf. 699.

[68] Werke, vol. vi, pp. 289–292.

tive knowledge is all of this world; and this, to the extent that the will to live, which is its principle, ceases, of course itself ceases. And we find Schopenhauer expressly agreeing with the Buddhists in their reticence as against the older Brahmans, who talked of reunion with Brahm. Nirvana to the Buddhists is simply the contrast of Sansara (or this world); when it is defined as nothing, that is only to say that the Sansara contains no single element that could serve for the definition or construction of Nirvana.[69] But though no knowledge, no faintest picture of Nirvana is possible, Schopenhauer again and again asserts it as a reality; he repeatedly implies this view of it, even where he does not directly assert it; and in a sense the faith in it may be called the crown, and really the basis, the final presupposition, of all his philosophy. In a way, comparison may be made to the unshakable confidence which he shared with Kant, that there is a reality behind phenomena, a *Ding an sich*—parting company as he thereby did with the whole idealistic or empirical school. He did, indeed, believe that he had discovered the real nature of the *Ding an sich*, holding that it was Will. But had he never reached a definite opinion, he would have held to a transcendent reality all the same. So, now that this will (as the will to live) is supposed to be itself extinguished, Schopenhauer holds that something remains other than the will to live, something that has never shown itself in this world, or only by hints and indirections, though, in the nature of the case, he can have only a negative idea of this "something," as the contrary of the will and the world we know.

Let me quote some of his language. In speaking of one who has renounced the will, he says: "For that which he now is, conceptions fail us, yes, the data for conceptions. We can only call it, that which has the freedom either to be the will to live or not to be."[70] The same idea is implied in his discussion of the ultimate freedom of the will: the will (which does not arise, it should be remembered, out of this world, but simply

[69] Werke, vol. iii, p. 698.

[70] Werke, vol. iii, p. 642. Volkelt, p. 367, happily says, "Ein und dasselbe Subjekt liegt dem sich bejahenden und dem sich verneinenden Willen zum Leben zu Grunde; und dieses Subjekt wird durch den Akt der Willensverneinung nicht vernichtet."

appears here) might, he holds, have originally chosen not to appear and be here, or to be something essentially different from what it is—in which case the whole chain of its phenomenal manifestations might have been different.[71] That the will has mysterious depths beyond what appear on the surface is implied, I may add, in Schopenhauer's view of the way in which intellect is called up by it, made to serve it, only at last to be strange and contrary to it.[72] Again, the very fact that Schopenhauer calls it a fruitless question to ask, "What should I be, if I were not a will to live,"[73] is in a way conclusive, for if I am absolutely identical with my will to live (exhausted in it), the question is meaningless rather than fruitless. Moreover, the whole idea of an original fall, or aberration of the will (*Abfall*, *Abirrung*, *Verirrung*), which has been explained above, implies another type of existence from that of which we have experience—for how could there be a fall, save away from something, or how could there be an aberration, save as some straight and true path of being was presupposed?

To all this may be added more positive statements. Schopenhauer distinctly declares that in his philosophy the world (this world) does not fill out the whole possibility of being. Metaphysics, he says, is the knowledge that the order of nature is not the only and absolute order of things—and ethics is inseparable from this conviction. Particularly does he give praise to Kant for showing that the kingdom or realm of virtue is not of this world, though the reality of it is indubitable to him. When, he says, in witnessing tragedy we feel urged to turn away our will from life, to will it and love it no more, we become thereby aware that something else in us still remains, something of which we have no positive conception save that it is that which does not will life; and for this different kind of willing there must be

[71] Werke, vol. ii, pp. 338–339; in Werke, vol. iii, pp. 221–222, a perfectly clear statement is made that the will (that is, the will to live) is *not* "das Ding an sich schlechthin und absolut." In vol. iii, pp. 582–583, the "Keim" or "innerster Kern" of our being is distinctly contrasted with the will to live as we have it and with the character which it assumes; cf. Volkelt, pp. 190 ff.

[72] Schopenhauer calls the essential identity of the subject of knowing with the subject of willing "das Wunder *κατ' ἐξοχήν*" (Werke, vol. ii, p. 296); cf. my article on "Schopenhauer's Contact with Pragmatism," already referred to.

[73] Werke, vol. iii, p. 737.

a different corresponding kind of being—for if not, how could tragedy exercise its beneficent and elevating influence upon us? In this connection he uses phrases like "an entirely different existence," "another world," and speaks of life as "an oppressive dream out of which we have to awaken."[74] He even dares to turn things round. All, he says, depends upon our standpoint. To those who are wholly immersed in the will to live, and who knowing no other will than this and no other world than that which it begets, what results from the mortification of this will, Nirvana, is indeed nothing. But if we turn our eyes on those who have mortified the will, whose translucent bodies only linger, and who calmly await even *their* disappearance, we have before us not nothing, nor vacancy, but a peace above all rational accounting, a calm like that of quiet seas, a rest, a confidence, a serenity, the mere reflection of which in the countenance, as Raphael and Correggio give it, is a gospel. Yes, "nothing" is relative, says Schopenhauer, and all depends on our standpoint. Nothing is the opposite of something; and if this world is our only something, then the negation of that world is nothing; but if the attitude in which we negate this world is to us the supreme something, then this world itself is nothing, and all its stars and milky ways do not save it from radical illusoriness—all, every bit of it, is manifestation of the will to live, and when that will goes, it goes, all goes.[75]

The state of Nirvana cannot be philosophically described, says Schopenhauer, only experienced, and the experience is individual, incommunicable. It goes by the names of ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and the like—in it subject

[74] Werke, vol. iii, p. 495; compare an extraordinarily daring statement as to the order of nature itself, in which, as he remarks, the lowest inorganic things live unattacked forever, while the most perfect, the living, with their infinitely complicated and inconceivably "kunstvolle" organizations, are continually appearing and disappearing: "Dies ist etwas so augenscheinlich Absurdes, dass es nimmermehr die wahre Ordnung der Dinge sein kann, vielmehr bloss eine Hülle, welche diese verbirgt, richtiger, ein durch die Beschaffenheit unseres Intellekts bedingtes Phänomen."

[75] Werke, vol. ii, pp. 483–487; compare the comments on this close of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, in vol. iii, p. 703; also vol. iii, p. 583, "Das Dasein, welches wir kennen, giebt er (der Resignierte) willig auf: was ihm statt dessen wird, ist in unsern Augen *nichts;* weil unser Dasein, auf jenes bezogen, *nichts ist.*"

and object are transcended;[76] it is a kind of immediate feeling —philosophy might be said to begin with such feeling and then finally to culminate in it, save that the last stage, ecstasy, is beyond all intellectual analysis or accounting.

Let me sum up, in closing, Schopenhauer's interpretation of the meaning of life. To some, pessimism means that life has no meaning. Not so to him. His thought is like this:—

This world is not arranged to make us happy, and happiness is not the aim of life. There is only one inborn error, Schopenhauer remarks with a touch of pathos, and that is that we are here to be happy.[77] Life should teach us a different lesson—the sufferings of life should teach us a different lesson. Yes, death should. Life is not a pleasure, but a task, in his eyes. We are here, strange as it may seem to those who have the superficial notions of Schopenhauer which most people, even scholars, have, and oddly as the language may sound as coming from a philosopher—we are here *to be saved*, rather than to have our natural wants and cravings gratified (that is, to be happy). We of this world are off the track, have wandered from the eternal order, and life is to bring us back. Therefore we appear, therefore we are set in space and time, that gradually, through our varied and successive actions and the course of our lives, we may come to find out what manner of being we are. Suffering, pain, disappointment, and the face of death are to keep us from forgetting ourselves—from thinking that we have some other aim in life than this sovereign one. Suffering, rightly taken, is a means of purification (*Läuterungsprocess*); pain and trouble work toward the true end of life, as with the sick man who takes a long and painful cure and knows that the pain is a part or a sign of his healing; the continuous deception and disappointment we experience are, as it were, intended to give us a sense of the nothingness of our ordinary strivings.[78] Yes, death itself comes

[76] Werke, vol. ii, p. 485.

[77] Werke, vol. iii, p. 729; Kant's great service to ethics, in the eyes of Schopenhauer, is that he purified it of all eudaemonism (vol. iv, "Die beiden Grundprobleme," p. 117); eudaemonists Schopenhauer classes along with the optimists, whom he contemns (vol. iii, p. 507).

[78] Compare Werke, vol. iii, p. 731 (vol. ii, p. 464); vol. iii, p. 658.

under a teleological aspect to Schopenhauer; not only is it a reminder [79] and a desert (yes, "desert," for, according to his logic, if we were what we ought to be, we could not die, Schopenhauer being at one, in bottom feeling, with Paul),[80] but for the good man it is release, too, and at the conclusion of his great essay on "Death and the Indestructibility of our Essential Being" Schopenhauer uses language that gives veritable consolation to any man who has struggled with himself and his faults and wondered whether they must be an enduring part of him, for he hints that with this solemn event, in which man parts with his recognizable individuality, he may also part with that he has struggled against, so that death may be a door to freedom. Yes, we may never know freedom till we die, and so, while peaceful and gentle, as a rule, is the death of every good man, something more than this, a willing dying, a glad dying, a joyful dying is the privilege of the saint. Perhaps it was with this in mind that Schopenhauer once said, "I believe that when death closes our eyes, we stand in a light of which our sunlight is only the shadow." [81]

We may call Schopenhauer a pessimist, if we will,—he spoke of himself in this way at times; but in the light of what I have been saying and quoting we shall hardly call him an absolute pessimist, since beyond the bounds of time and space, and as the last and eternal essence of things, he contemplates a state that is indeed hinted at in certain higher ranges of human experience, but of which one might say, in semi-Scriptural language, that eye hath

[79] Werke, vol. iii, p. 699. Death is spoken of as "die jedesmalige und unermüdlich wiederholte Anfrage der Natur an den Willen zum Leben: Hast du genug? Willst du aus mir hinaus?" The very shortness of life is a means to an end: "Damit sie [the just cited question] oft genug geschehe, ist das individuelle Leben so kurz."

[80] Cf. Werke, vol. iii, p. 581, "Der Tod sagt: Du bist das Produkt eines Aktes, der nicht hätte sein sollen; darum musst Du, ihn auszulöschen, sterben." Also, "Wir sind im Grunde etwas, das nicht sein sollte: darum hören wir auf zu sein." Cf. vol. iii, p. 652.

[81] Nachlass, vol. iv, p. 185 (§ 290). See Volkelt, p. 378, where this and other passages throwing light on Schopenhauer's views on this subject are quoted. The other references are: Werke (Grisebach ed.), vol. v, pp. 281 ff.; Nachlass, vol. iv, pp. 178, 190; Grisebach, Schopenhauer's Briefe, pp. 116, 185; Lindner-Frauenstädt, p. 526; Briefwechsel zwischen Schopenhauer und Becker (Leipzig, 1883), p. 66.

not seen it, nor ear heard it, neither hath the heart of man conceived it. If we call him pessimist, let us admit that he has more in common with those who condemned this world and looked for another some two thousand years ago in Palestine than with those who are ordinarily spoken of as pessimists today. Relatively a pessimist, absolutely and finally an optimist not altogether unlike Jesus, Paul, and Augustine—that is the way in which I should describe Schopenhauer.[82]

[82] Schopenhauer's faith appears perhaps most definitely in his latest works, the Parerga und Paralipomena. Here, to quote from Volkelt, p. 368, "Die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben eröffnet den Weg zu einem Reiche reinen, ruhenden, wandellosen, unbedürftigen Seins. Ja, er glaubt an ein 'gutes under lösendes Prinzip' in dieser Willenswelt, das 'zum Durchbruch kommen und das Ganze erfüllen und befreien kann.'" Volkelt cites Werke (Grisebach ed.), vol. ii, pp. 659, 229 f., vol. v, pp. 296, 224, Grisebach, Schopenhauer's Briefe, pp. 214 f., and refers to Richard Bottger's Das Grundproblem der Schopenhauerischen Philosophie (Greifswald, 1898), where, as he says, the last transcendent depths of the world of Schopenhauer are treated in an interesting manner.

RATIONAL MYSTICISM AND NEW TESTAMENT CHRISTIANITY

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I

To the very title of this paper, or at any rate to the idea implied in it, the average religious thinker might conceivably make more objections than one. He might in the first place inquire whether any meaning can be found in the term "rational mysticism"; and, examining it either from the standpoint of reason or from that of mysticism, might complain that it attempts to bring together two quite incompatible things. Reason has usually held mysticism in scorn, looking upon it as a sort of quack method, if the word may pass, of accomplishing, or of pretending to accomplish, what reason accomplishes in the professional and only legitimate way. Mysticism, from the other side, has been ready enough to repay scorn with scorn: it has claimed to find its way to the secret places of truth by a subtle process far more efficacious than that laborious following of the trail which reason practises; and its independence of reason, its irreconcilability with reason, it has always taken as its glory rather than its shame. What—the average religious man might say—what can "rational mysticism" mean? How, indeed, can such a thing exist at all? And in the next place, even supposing you could manufacture the curious compound that "rational mysticism" would be, and could link the two seeming incompatibles together, how are you going to make any connection between your newly created rational mysticism and New Testament Christianity? Rational, indeed, New Testament Christianity is, or claims to be; and to show its harmony with reason (provided that the thing be not pushed too far) is one of the chief objects that Christian apologetics may well keep in view. But the line of mysticism has commonly been held as being to a considerable extent di-

vorced from the New Testament line. Mysticism has not run, for instance (so it has been said), upon the most prominent lines of Pauline experience and Pauline teaching; its language has not, as a rule, echoed the language in which most students have embodied the results of their investigation into the New Testament system; the processes and programmes of the soul, so to call them, which it has advocated have scarcely run parallel with those on which the New Testament appears to lay the principal stress; nor do the great ideas of sin and salvation and faith, which are the fixed and shining ideas of New Testament Christianity, occupy in the mystical system the central place. What connection can there be between mysticism, rational or otherwise, and the Christianity which, according to the consensus of testimony through the Christian ages, the pages of the New Testament enshrine? The average religious thinker might well suppose that in attempting to bring together "rational mysticism" and "New Testament Christianity" one is attempting to make a series of reconciliations among things that can only look at one another askance, and beating oneself vainly against an impossible task.

And yet that the linking of the three things — mysticism, reason, and the New Testament conception of Christianity—that the linking of the three would, if we could but accomplish it, be most welcome, probably no one would deny. The religious man, though he may think himself to have perceived certain possible ways of reconciliation between reason and the Christian religion as he finds it in the New Testament, and on that point may be satisfied, is conscious that something is lacking still. "Wanting is what?" Mysticism assuredly has a not quite negligible answer to give. That warmth—that sense of immediate contact with a higher world and a higher life—that immersion of the whole personality in the eternal tides—that lifting of the entire inner experience away from the level of problem and solution, of seeking and finding, of painful self-adjustment to spiritual facts and forces which seem, when all is said, to be half-hidden as behind a veil—that sublime ecstasy in which the soul no longer possesses its religion, its Christ, its God, but is possessed by them, enveloped in them, conscious not so much

of any relation between itself and them as of a penetration of itself by them through and through,—these things, which are the things for which mysticism stands and whereof it speaks, would be for the ordinary religious man his religion's perfecting and crown. That he knows. Mysticism may have given up some of the things he has; but it has seized upon a great many things he has not. It may appear to have shifted, as to its standing-ground, away from the fundamentals; but somehow or other it contrives to stretch itself into a sun-bathed atmosphere into which he, with his feet never so firmly planted, cannot lift his head. It may not be an altogether safe guide, and in the programmes it issues may slur over some of the first essential steps of the sacred way; but it speaks as from a fair land whose entrance-gate all would rejoice to find. If, now, the average religious man could but keep what he has, his own grip upon the primary factors of the religious life, his own seriousness in face of the tremendous import of the fundamental facts concerning God and man and sin and redemption, and yet add on to that the glow and color and thrill of the mystical experience, what great gain it would be! His customary religion, partly through its emphasis, its right and proper emphasis, upon the relations between himself and God and upon the necessity for their adjustment, leaves him too conscious of his separateness, of the hard outlines of his own personality as distinct from the eternal life he wants to make his own; and even though he may sometimes, in hours of kindled emotion, become thrilled with joy *about* his religion and the benefits it brings, that, he knows, is not the ultimate joy. If he could, while not losing that sense of separateness of his, add on to it a sense of oneness—if he could be, not only reconciled to God, but one with God—if the realization of that seeming paradox were found to be possible—then the ultimate joy would be attained. To find some method of adhering to the fundamental conceptions of New Testament Christianity, and at the same time possessing the experience which the mystics of history claim for their own—this would be, for every man of earnest religious thought and serious religious purpose, a delight indeed.

Perhaps an endeavor to apprehend the true significance and secret of mysticism may at any rate start us toward the desired

goal. For it may be that those who have entered into the mystical experience have not always given a quite accurate account of the experience they enjoy; and a revision of the account (which of course implies no questioning or suspicion of the experience itself) may enable us to see that mysticism has no quarrel with reason after all. And further, this same revision of mysticism's account of itself may bring mysticism into much closer relations with New Testament Christianity than those in which it usually seems to stand—partly by making clearer what mysticism in its essence really is, and partly by a sudden flashing of light upon our conceptions of New Testament Christianity, showing us how those conceptions need to be deepened and enlarged, and how in that deepening and enlarging they come nearer to mysticism's line. And obviously, if mysticism has already appeared to be reasonable, then to move New Testament Christianity nearer to mysticism is necessarily to move it nearer to reason too. Thus, by bringing mysticism into contact, first with reason and then with New Testament religion, and consequently bringing reason and New Testament religion into closer mutual contact in their turn, we may find that in speaking of "rational mysticism and New Testament Christianity" we are venturing upon no union of incompatibles after all.

II

Undoubtedly mysticism has been right in declaring that religion is ultimately and essentially a losing of self in God—that the significance of religion is not exhausted in any grasp which the mind may fling round facts about God, nor in any adjustment of an external kind which a man may make in his attitude towards God, nor in any change in man's judicial standing before the sight of God, but is a far deeper thing. That recognition, already referred to, of a valuable and desirable element in mystical experience—that recognition which practically all men, though they may sheer off from and think extravagant much of the language in which mysticism expresses or expounds itself, are ready to make—is itself strong testimony to mysticism's nearness to the heart of the whole thing. Indeed, all really re-

ligious men would, if brought to the point, make two admissions. They would admit, on the one hand, that if religion calls for anything at all, it calls for much more than a merely external relationship between man and God, however many faculties of human nature that relationship may cover, and however carefully that relationship may be maintained and cultivated once it is made. And they would admit, on the other hand, that if those instincts of our nature which seem to cry for something outside of ourselves on which they may take hold and in whose answering clasp they may find their complement—those aspirations and variously named (or unnamed) movements which so often go forth from the busy harbor of our inner life as if outward bound upon an unknown sea—that if all these may be legitimately interpreted in a religious sense at all, it is to something like real and intimate union with God that they point. Mysticism, in speaking of losing self in God, is true to our ultimate interpretation of religion and true to our ultimate interpretation of ourselves.

But, under the taunt which cold reason so frequently levels against it, mysticism has permitted itself to be caught in a false antithesis, and has mistakenly accepted as inevitable that hostility between itself and reason which reason has sought to force. "This intimate relation between man and God of which you speak"—so reason's complaint has run—"and this knowledge of God which, as you claim, results from that intimate relation, are not facts discoverable or provable by any instruments at my command. The existence of such a relation and of such knowledge cannot be inferred from any premises that lie before my eyes. In asserting it, therefore, you declare yourself more powerful than I am in my own particular field, come in as a sort of confident but unauthorized amateur where the regular practitioner confesses himself baffled, and set up a preposterous claim which I cannot for a moment allow." Mysticism's mistake has been that it has so frequently answered taunt with taunt, and in its indignation has missed the right reply. "Yes," it has answered, "I do take your place in this department, and perform what you cannot accomplish. They who would penetrate the secrets behind the veil must substitute my guidance for yours." In reply to

reason's attempt to rule mysticism out, mysticism has attempted to rule reason out in its turn: it has willingly occupied the false position into which reason has been eager to thrust it, and, as previously suggested, has given a wrong account of itself and of its rôle. What the true answer of mysticism to the taunt flung at it by reason would have been—the answer by the making of which mysticism would have robbed reason of its arms—we shall presently come to understand. For the moment it may suffice to say that mysticism, rightly interpreted, does not take the place of reason at all; and it is on some such line as this that mysticism should have replied when reason complained or sneered, so repudiating the alternative—as between mysticism or reason —which reason has assiduously pushed to the front. By failing to take this line—by foolishly lifting the gage which reason throws down and by entering into the conflict on reason's own ground—by letting itself be drawn into a wholly unnecessary battle—mysticism loses its opportunity, and becomes discredited in a court where a verdict might easily be won.

For mysticism is not, except incidentally, a matter of knowledge. It is a matter of something else and of something more. What mysticism really aims at, and what mysticism has really reached more or less perfectly in the experience of those who are entitled to the mystic's name, is the acceptance of God by man as the actual, energizing, dynamic source of all that man is—man setting himself in such a God-ward relation that henceforth he is, in regard to all that proceeds from him in the way of activity, emotion, and the rest, mediate instead of immediate, a channel instead of a spring. Mysticism aims at the substitution of God's initiative for man's within man's own personality—except, of course, that the initiative of surrender, the initiative in giving up initiative, must on man's part be ceaselessly maintained. Mysticism aims at using the separateness of man's personality only to secure a unity of man's personality with God's—a unity in which man, so far as he is conscious of his own personality at all, is conscious of it only as a thing that has abrogated all its powers save the power of self-abandonment, and that sleeps. It is more than a relation between man and God: it is a relation wherein there is no more *between:* ay, it is more

than a *relation*—it is a mingling, a threading together, a lying down of the man upon God, a folding of God round every part of the man. All this is only to say in other words what has been said of themselves by the mystics of every age; and this is the experience (let their theoretical account of it be what it may) which the mystics of every age have possessed. But from the point of view of our present theme this involves a good deal. The mystical experience, read thus, is at once perceived to be not a matter of knowledge, nor a substitute for knowledge; and the effort to attain it is in no wise an effort that aims at taking reason's place. Of course, if that close fellowship between God and man, after which mysticism strives, be once established, man will necessarily know more of the God with whom he is made one; and thus, incidentally, mysticism may come, over and above being what in its own essence it is, to be a feeder and enricher of the mind. But primarily, the mystical experience is not a matter of the mind. It is not an attitude of the intellect, nor an attitude substituted for an attitude of the intellect, but an attitude of the whole nature, an attitude—or, more accurately, a movement, a development—of life. It is not a knowing God, but a climbing into God on the part of man, a descent into man on the part of God. That is to say (and this is the crucial point) the mystical experience is the emergence of a new fact, not on the stage of the mind, but on the stage of the world-process itself: its establishment indicates, not that something has been learned or recognized or understood, but that a new *event* has taken place, that the next step of the evolutionary process has been passed. In the establishment of the mystical experience life, as man has known it, moves on through the next stage, which is also the last; something happens in the cosmic order and on the cosmic scale. In the nature of the case, the new cosmic event takes place by degrees, in instalments, as it were, since the individual members of the race, in whom life as it is is embodied, ascend only separately and at too rare intervals into the mystical experience which is life as it is destined to be. But this must not blind our eyes to the fact that every single instance of a genuine mystical experience is another instalment of the one movement which life in its evolution is next called upon to make.

And if we could imagine all men entering upon the mystical experience at once, and could realize what this would imply in the way of the substitution of God's initiative for man's, we should immediately see how the establishment of any mystical experience is really an event upon the cosmic scale, the actual making of what did not exist before.

And so, once again, mysticism is not a reading of the world-process, but a contribution to it, the carrying of it on to a further stage: it is not a new apprehension of the order of the world and its relation to God; it is itself an event in that order and that relation. It is the actual making of something that did not previously exist: it is not an adjustment of relations, but the bringing to being of a new reality: it is a veritable becoming on the part of man, and, one may dare to say, a veritable becoming on the part of God, since, this union once set up, God sends himself through, beats himself out through, man, as previously he did not do. The mystical experience is a creative one, not an inferential one, or a substitute for an inferential one, at all. It is an anticipatory experience, on the part of the mystic's individual life, of that condition of things which is to be the goal of the world-process; it is, in fact, that condition of things beginning to be realized. In the mystical experience, life, and all that led up to it, gives itself up once more to the God from whom it came; and God takes into himself once more the life, with all that led up to it, to which he gave birth. It is the process of things which has been brought up, may one say, to its semi-final stage in the personality of man, now seeking and finding its goal, accomplishing the last stage of all, linking itself up with the personality of God, whence it originally set out, and so making itself rounded and complete. And the answer of mysticism, when reason taunts it with an endeavor to supplant reason in reason's own particular sphere, should run something like this: "I do not take your place nor claim to do your work. You search out what is. I make something that hitherto has not been. My part is not to know, but to create. I bring into the system of things a new fact, on which, once I have brought it in, you may work, if you can and will, in perfect consistency with the method on which you have worked

before. I, at any rate, shall not seek to prevent you. There need be no quarrel between us. You expound the order of things. I supply a new element to the order of things. You say that you have no previous knowledge of all these things whereof I speak. Of course not. Until I call them into being, they are not there for you to know. But that is precisely what I do. In this mingling of God with man which I aim at and in part bring about, I conduct the order of things a step nearer to its goal."

III

Does this conception of mysticism assist us in bringing reason and mysticism nearer together? At first it may but seem to thrust them further apart. Yet it is in thus realizing the part it plays as a part which is not reason's part nor a substitute for reason's part—in thus drawing away from reason—that mysticism comes back into a true and harmonious relation with reason again.

The mystical experience, we have seen, is not in strictness a matter of knowledge, of apprehension; it is a becoming, a veritable act, the final stage in the movement of things working itself out. It is the penultimate passing into the ultimate,—the end, so far as it has hitherto been reached, linking itself back to and up with the beginning again, and so making the real and ordained end, completing the whole. It is the actual construction of the final fact. *And it is precisely the construction of a final fact that reason requires to come upon, or to have presented to it and to recognize, if it is to attain a satisfactory view of things, and if its system is to be complete.*

For reason, in its reading off of the facts of the world, with a view to the apprehension of a unified system of things, comes at last to a point at which it perceives (if its eyes be open) that the necessary facts are not all there to be read off. At any rate the last fact is lacking; and so the unity of things cannot be apprehended, because it does not in reality exist. Reason, for example, may, with its theories of evolution, pass beneath the surface of things and believe itself to have hit upon the underlying chain

of method whereby all that exists has come to be; but this by no means gives it the perfect unity it craves. A mere similarity of method and process all through is not unity at all, though it is true that the word "unity" is not infrequently used in the very loose sense implied. To reach that sort of unity is merely to discover that the programme of things has never been changed —and that is not enough. That kind of unity is like the unity reached by repeated striking of the same note on the keyboard of the piano. It is mere similarity of pattern; and you do not, by having a number of things exactly alike, make one whole. A unity in the pattern implies no unity of essential being. Reason demands, for its own satisfaction, a unity of a deeper and more vital kind. A real unity—the unity which reason, when it knows itself and its desires, calls for—is a unity vital and organic, a unity wherein the initial Being sends itself forth, passes through stage upon stage, becoming in a sense other than itself in the passing and yet remaining itself all the while, and at last returns upon itself, settles down upon itself, once more. What is demanded is a unity which is a self-contained, rounded whole. The entire process, though projected out of the initial Being, must be within the initial Being, too; and so far as there is separateness, it must be only such as is caused by the initial Being choosing to travel outside itself. There must be something more than a series of elements connected together in the same way: the elements of the series (it is by metaphor that one comes nearest to making the point clear) must have beneath them, so to say, a guide-rail from which they do not swerve, and which, however long may be its radius and however wide its sweep, curves back again to its starting-point, so that in the end the idea of separateness in the elements is lost in the idea of the fundamental Being which has sent them forth from itself, which has manifested itself through them, and which through the last of them brings all home once more. It is true that reason has sometimes contented itself with reaching what seemed to be a satisfactory theory of the method whereby the previous stages of things have been worked out, and when it has discovered a similarity of method throughout, has declared unity to be found. But if it read its own requirements aright, reason cannot be thus content. It cannot be satis-

fied with merely discovering how things have come to be. Things themselves (not simply the methods of their becoming) must be unified. What reason wants is to apprehend a unity vital and organic—to perceive how all that is has not only followed out an unchanging programme, but is all through actually the initial Being coming out from itself and returning home upon itself again.

This means that reason, taking up the process of things at the point it has reached in man, its last stage (its last stage for the present, that is), must not stop at accounting for that stage, but must apprehend also how that stage becomes, merges into, the really last stage—in other words, how life in man turns again to its source. Not till it apprehends this will a true unity be reached for thought. Reason must apprehend, not only the penultimate stage, as we called it before, but the ultimate. But this is precisely what thought, reason, cannot do, because the ultimate stage is not reached. In man, as thought discerns him, life is still as it were a loose thread, and is not bound back to the beginning of things again. No mere accounting for man puts this right. You may account for man, theorize as satisfactorily as you like as to how he came to be; but that is a very different thing from seeing everything, man included, as one whole. And when reason looks for this latter vision, it cannot attain it, because the wholeness of things is not worked out. Life, as man reveals it, may be traceable downward from its source; but life, in its human individualism, is not using its individualism in order to carry life on to a goal which is one with its source. The final fact, which reason wants to read off, that is, is not there for reason to read—and, not being there, must be made. Reason, having carried its reading off of the existing facts as far as possible, must confess that what is wanted now is the emergence of a new fact, of a new constructive process which shall continue and complete the unfinished process: reason itself leads us up to the point of seeing that something more—something which is not an exercise of reason, but an exercise of life—must take place if reason's own perfect work is to become possible; and in the end, reason has to watch and wait for something to happen rather than to stop at finding an explanation of what has happened already.

In order to obtain for thought the unity which we demand, we must first develop the real and final unity of life. Or, as previously said, it is the final fact of things, constructed or in process of construction, that reason requires to come upon or to have presented to it, if it is to reach a view of things in which it can rest. Reason itself calls to man, "*Be* something more than you are—make the final fact—in order that I may write the last chapter of my book, and not be put to shame."

And in the mystical experience, according to our former interpretation of it, the final fact is in process of being made. Here life returns upon its source. Here the process of things, having got as far as man, is linked up into one whole as man climbs up into God. Through the mystical experience the completely unified system which reason insists upon having is brought about —not perceived but brought about. The mystical experience finishes, one may venture to say, the creative process, and carries things back to God. Mysticism, then, when it understands itself aright and explains itself truly, remains entirely reasonable just because it does not attempt to substitute itself for reason, but does what, according to reason, requires to be done. It supplies reason with the final fact, and, in doing this, justifies itself in reason's eyes. The mystical experience is reasonable, although not a process of reason, nor something put in place of a process of reason. It does not interpret the system of things —it completes it. And inasmuch as this completing of the system of things is precisely what reason waits for, mysticism links itself with reason in separating itself from reason and in realizing what its own particular mission is; and in speaking of "rational mysticism" we do but call the mystical experience by a title to which it has a perfectly valid claim.

IV

But, now, what of New Testament Christianity? If mysticism, rightly understanding itself, finds that it has become truly rational because it creates the ultimate fact which somewhere or other reason needs to come upon in order to make its own system complete, does it also find itself in line with the religion expounded and prescribed on the New Testament page?

We are proceeding throughout this paper, let it be remembered, upon the idea that if we begin from a revised apprehension of what mysticism in its essence really is, we may find ourselves started upon the road to that ultimate reconciliation of seeming incompatibles which we desire. In other words, the suggestion is that the moment mysticism gives a legitimate account of itself, mysticism moves toward reason and reason toward mysticism, mysticism toward New Testament Christianity and New Testament Christianity toward mysticism. The mutual movement of reason and mysticism, we have seen, is made. But does the other mutual movement begin? Do we find that our idea of New Testament Christianity makes anything like an automatic approach to clasp hands with our clarified and rectified idea of what the mystical experience really is?

An affirmative reply is surely the only one that can be given. If we set the mystical experience, as read above, side by side with the conception of the Christian experience given in the New Testament, it becomes immediately evident that these two are one. So soon as we obtain a right idea of mysticism, our idea of New Testament Christianity—if we come to the New Testament with receptive minds—tones itself up to meet it. When mysticism quits its mistaken self-interpretation and moves on to surer ground New Testament Christianity, in our conception of it, hoists an answering signal, and moves in its turn to meet mysticism there.

For let the phrases wherein the mystical experience was described be recalled. Mysticism is a climbing into God on the part of man, a descent into man on the part of God—that is the sum of them all. But if this be a right description of the mystical experience, it is also a right description of the experience declared in the New Testament to be religion's goal. It is true that the New Testament is largely concerned with the means whereby man may find his way from the lower stages of life up to this highest stage of all—with a self-revelation which God has given—with a work which God has wrought—with the manner in which that divine life wherewith man, moving upward, is to unite himself, has in Christ, moving downward, made offer to unite itself with man—with a faith through which man is to

render all these works and arrangements of God, so to call them, effective for his own self-union with God. But. all through, the ideal of a veritable union between man's life and God's (or between man's life and Christ's, which for the New Testament is the same thing, since the divine life, according to the New Testament, mediates itself to man in and through Christ, and moves down, as was just now said,. to meet man's upward striving, so that oneness with Christ is oneness with God)—all through, that ideal of a veritable union between man's life and God's life or Christ's life is kept in view. And it is a union in the strictest sense—not a mere harmony, not an accommodation of attitude on the part of one to what the attitude of the other requires, but an actual organic oneness, a true linking of personality to personality and of soul to soul. That, and nothing less, is the New Testament ideal.

To show this in any detail would involve a catena of quotations that is impossible here. But for any one who goes open-mindedly to the reading of the New Testament (after all due allowance for the results of reasonable criticism has been made) its mystical call rings clear. It rings in the ministry of Jesus—in the indisputable fact that, according to the presentation of the four gospels, Synoptic and Johannine alike, it was always his whole personality he sought to impress upon the personality of his hearers, and the whole personality of his hearers, as distinct from their assenting minds, he sought to draw into his own. One may venture to speak of the mysticism of Jesus, not in the sense that he was himself climbing into the divine life, for he *was* the divine life, but in the sense that he set himself before men as the One into whom they were to climb. That Christ was in a manner egoistic—may one put it so?—indicates how mystical he meant men to be; for to that egoism of his only mysticism on the part of men could adequately or appropriately respond. In Paul, again, the mystical call rings clear—in Paul, to whom those who fear the language of mysticism so often fly for refuge and for arms. It is not to be denied that Paul spoke frequently of the *means* whereby the mystical experience was to be won—of the machinery, so to term it, which the wisdom and power of God had set at work in order to make the mystical experience possible for

mankind. But always it was "Christ *in* you," "you *in* Christ," and similar phrases that Paul employed to denote religion's goal; and for himself the aim was that it should be not he that lived, but Christ that lived in him; and he saw all the fulness of God in Christ, and, correlatively, in Christ saw also man made full. And this (unless we water down the words to a quite illegitimate extent) is mysticism undefiled. Indeed, the mystical experience of human life united to the life of God through union with Christ was for Paul so much the very essence of Christianity that he assumed it as such rather than argued it, and spoke of it, as it were, without any note of exclamation at the end of his phrase, —for which reason, it may be, we sometimes fail to be arrested as we ought. And so all through. A reading of the New Testament that is unprejudiced and open-eyed finds it the most mystical book in all the world. Theology may have missed the fact not seldom—and may have missed it, partly, because mysticism's wrong account of itself has failed to waken New Testament echoes as mysticism's right account of itself cannot fail to waken them. With a mysticism which understands itself mistakenly the New Testament has nothing to do; a mysticism which is merely a substitute for knowledge, and which repays reason's scorn with scorn, has no kinship with New Testament religion; it is at least on a different plane, since it is not with intellectual knowledge, or with substitutes for intellectual knowledge, that New Testament religion is concerned. But when mysticism begins to talk of a veritable movement of life into God's, the New Testament and mysticism find that they are speaking the same tongue. It is precisely of such a movement that the New Testament speaks. Mysticism makes the final fact—it is with the making of that same final fact that the New Testament deals throughout. Mysticism, in the sense of a real union between man's life and God's, is the atmosphere which pervades the New Testament from cover to cover; and when once, having heard mysticism expounding itself aright, we pass on to listen to New Testament Christianity expounding itself in its turn, we find that both come forth from the secret place with the same light upon their faces, and that the hearts of both beat as one.

But the matter must be pushed a little further before our task

is ended. "You have not yet done" (it might be said) "what at the outset you were going to do. You have not yet made any connection between the mystical experience and those great terms, with the ideas they connote, which recur most frequently in the New Testament account—between the mystical experience and the ideas of sin, salvation, faith, and the rest—between the mystical experience and evangelicalism, in short. Can this also be done? Is it possible for the religious man to feel that 'immersion of his entire being in the eternal tides' which was spoken of earlier, and at the same time to keep a hold upon all the apparatus of truth which gathers round the evangelical idea of reconciliation with God?"

On the true conception of mysticism, the connection is not only possible, but necessary. Mysticism not only permits the New Testament evangelicalism, but demands it. Interpreting itself truly, mysticism, we have seen, tenders itself not as a method of knowledge, but as a movement of life. But having thus corrected one mistake in the statement of its programme, mysticism is forced on inevitably to the correction of another; and the stress which it has often laid upon "contemplation" as the means of union with God must yield to something else. A "movement of life" means a real activity, and implies either something actually done by man's life for itself, or something actually done upon man's life from beyond itself, in order that the necessary movement may be made: if man is to climb into God, the problem at once becomes one which no method of "contemplation" can solve; and we have now to look for forces, whether acting from within the man or from without the man, whereby the "climbing" shall be pushed successfully through. And, taking the mere facts of the situation, a force acting from without the man—a reinforcement of man's power from beyond himself—is at the very least a thing to be desired. For, aiming at the mystical experience as described, we find ourselves with a retarding and depressing weight in our own nature to lift, with the divine life into which we want to climb so far away, and with a movement away from, rather than toward, the divine life always incipient, and often accentuated, within. These are mere matters of easily ascertainable fact, however exaggerated or distorted

some readings of them may have been. How, in face of facts like these, is the true mystical experience to be attained?

It is here that the evangelical side of New Testament Christianity comes in. It is this question that is answered when the New Testament speaks of all those "means"—as we called them —whereof the New Testament does speak in tones so persistent and so loud. When the New Testament talks of sin, it is talking of that movement away from the divine life which is going on within me. When it talks of salvation in Christ, it recognizes that there must be a force, either within me or without me, under whose impulsive power I am to climb into the life of God, and, because the force within me is baffled, points me to a force without. When it speaks of God reconciling me to himself by Christ's Cross, it is mindful of the distance between me the climber and God the goal—mindful, too, of my helplessness—and tells how the far-off God has in Christ stooped out of his distance, taking upon himself the pain of sacrifice involved in the stooping, to meet and touch me, to fetch me, to take me back again with him in Christ to his height. When it talks of faith, of believing and being saved, it talks of my response to that stooping down on God's part, calls me to identify myself with God in Christ in answer to that identification of himself with me which in Christ he has offered and (so far as from one side is possible) has actually made. That is, all the great terms which evangelical religion finds blazoned on the pages of the New Testament are concerned with the means whereby the mystical experience is to be won: they solve the problem which he who aspires to the mystical experience sets himself; and just in proportion to my understanding of the mystical experience, and to my desire for it, will be, not only my willingness to accept, but my passionate cry for, the New Testament presentation of the Christian faith. There is no fear that if I take the mystical experience for my goal, I shall sever myself from those things which students of the New Testament have held as cardinal through the ages. I shall, it is true, have a central conception (itself, however, a New Testament conception) round which all the New Testament ideas are to be grouped in order to receive their interpretation and in whose light they are to be read. Every doctrine which is given as a part

of the "machinery" for producing the movement of my life into God's must justify itself as a means to that end; and in my conception of religion's goal I shall have a test to which every conception of faith, atonement, and all else must submit. But I shall want faith, atonement, and all else—all the great old words and the realities they stand for—not less, but more. And this, not in any pale, eviscerated significance—not in any significance which implies juggling with the old words but not really putting them to fair use, but in a significance which leaves them with the full value rendered to them still. When I set myself to achieve a veritable union with God,—a union wherein the only initiative I keep is the initiative of surrender—a union wherein God becomes the actual dynamic source of all I am—a union wherein the separateness of my personality is used only to secure its unity with God's,—then I shall prize the more warmly all those ringing words and ideas of the New Testament which tell me how God himself, knowing all the obstacles and gloriously conquering them in his wisdom, love, and power, has made it possible for that union to be achieved. New Testament Christianity need have no fear that for him who understands the mystical experience aright one jot or tittle of the religious programme it inculcates will pass away. It is just in that programme that the needed secret will be found. And the religious man, longing for the warmth of the mystic's experience, yet wondering whether in seeking it he may not be divorcing himself from the primary essentials of a true Christian life, may set his misgivings at rest. For if he understand the mystical experience truly, he will through his pursuit of it come to see all the vaster significance in the great New Testament truths of sin, and faith, and incarnation, and Christ, and Cross.

So, in the end, under a right understanding of the mystical experience, we see mysticism moving toward reason and reason toward mysticism; and we see mysticism and New Testament Christianity at one. And, with mysticism thus linked with reason on the one hand and with New Testament Christianity on the other, our conception of New Testament Christianity (which through its link with mysticism becomes endowed with fresh depth) becomes, through mysticism's link with reason, linked

with reason in its turn, and endowed with fresh reasonableness, too. And so, to speak of "rational mysticism and New Testament Christianity" is to venture upon no union of incompatibles after all: it is to bring together three things whose voices blend, and on whose blended voices there comes the sound of a call we ought to hear. For the whole thing has a practical issue—which is this. Only in driving our religious life up to the mystical heights do we render it at the same time most reasonable and most in accord with the New Testament scheme; because only so do we make the "final fact" for which reason calls, and only so do we use the New Testament "means" for the realization of the New Testament ideal.

THE COVENANTERS OF DAMASCUS; A HITHERTO UNKNOWN JEWISH SECT[1]

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Among the Hebrew manuscripts recovered in 1896 from the Genizah of an old synagogue at Fostat, near Cairo, and now in the Cambridge University Library, England, were found eight leaves of a Hebrew manuscript which proved to be fragments of a book containing the teaching of a peculiar Jewish sect; a single leaf of a second manuscript, in part parallel to the first, in part supplementing it, was also discovered. These texts Professor Schechter has now published, with a translation and commentary, in the first volume of his *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*. The longer and older of the manuscripts (A) is, in the opinion of the editor, probably of the tenth century; the other (B), of the eleventh or twelfth.

What remains of the book may be divided into two parts. Pages 1–8 of A, and the single leaf of B, contain exhortations and warnings addressed to members of the sect, for which a ground and motive are often sought in the history of the Jewish people or of the sect itself, together with severe strictures upon such as have lapsed from the sound teaching, and polemics against the doctrine and practice of other bodies of Jews. The second part, pages 9–16, sets forth the constitution and government of the community, and its distinctive interpretation and application of the law,—what may be called sectarian *halakah*.

Neither part is complete; the manuscript is mutilated and defective at the end, there is apparently a gap between the first and second parts, and it may be questioned whether the original beginning of the work is preserved. The lack of methodical arrangement in the contents leads Dr. Schechter to surmise that

[1] Documents of Jewish Sectaries. Volume I. Fragments of a Zadokite Work. Edited, with Translation, Introduction, and Notes, by S. Schechter. Cambridge University Press. 1910.

what we have in our hands is only a compilation of extracts from a larger work, put together with little regard for completeness or order. An orderly disposition, according to our notions of order, is not, however, so constant a characteristic of Jewish literature as to make this inference very convincing.

Manuscript A was evidently written by a negligent scribe, perhaps after a poor or badly preserved copy; B, which represents a somewhat different recension of the work, exhibits, so far as it goes, a superior text. When it is added that both manuscripts are in many places defaced or torn, it may be imagined that the decipherment and interpretation present serious difficulties, and that, after all the pains which Dr. Schechter has spent upon the task, many uncertainties remain. Facsimiles of a page of each manuscript are given; but in view of the condition of the text a photographic reproduction of the whole is indispensable.

The legal part of the book, so far as the text is fairly well preserved, is not exceptionally difficult; the rules are in general clearly defined, and if in the peculiar institutions of the sect there are many things we do not fully understand, this is due more to the brevity with which its organization is described and to the mutilation of the text than to lack of clearness in the description itself. The attempt to make out something of the history and relations of the sect from the first part of the book is, on the other hand, beset by many difficulties. What history is found there is not told for the sake of history, but used to point admonitions or emphasize warnings; and, after the manner of the apocalyptic literature, historical persons and events are referred to in round-about phrases which envelop them in an affected mystery. Even when such references are to chapters of the national history with which we are moderately well acquainted, as in the Assumption of Moses, c. 5, ff., for example, they may be to us baffling enigmas; much more when they have to do, as is in large part the case in our texts, with the wholly unknown internal or external history of a sect. The obscurity is increased by the fact that the allusions are often a tissue of fragmentary quotations or reminiscences out of the Old Testament, chosen and combined, it seems, by purely verbal association, or taken in an occult allegorical sense.[2] The

[2] It may be added that the quotations are singularly inexact.

allegories of which an interpretation is given, as when Amos 5 26 f. is applied to the emigration to Damascus and the institutions and laws of the sect, and Ezekiel 44 15 to the classes of the community, do not encourage us to think that we should be able to divine the meaning by our unaided intelligence. It is a fortunate circumstance that the writer comes back more than once to the salient events in the sect's history, for these repetitions of the same thing in different forms afford considerable help to the interpreter, so that the main facts may be made out with at least a considerable degree of probability.

The principal seat of the sect was in the region of Damascus, where its adherents formed numerous communities. It was composed of Israelites who had migrated thither from Judaea; thither also had come "the interpreter of the law," the founder of the sect; there it had been organized by a covenant repeatedly referred to as "the new covenant in the land of Damascus." Many who entered into this new covenant at the beginning did not long remain true to it; the writer inveighs vehemently against those who fell away, accusing them not only of grave error, but of gross violations of the law; but this crisis had been passed, and when the book was written the community was apparently flourishing.

The most coherent account of the origin of the sect is found on pages 5–6:[3]

At the end of the devastation of the land arose men who removed the boundary and led Israel astray; and the land was laid waste because they spoke rebelliously against the commandments of God by Moses and also against his holy Anointed,[4] and prophesied falsehood to turn Israel back from following God. But God remembered the covenant with the forefathers, and he raised up from Aaron discerning men and from Israel wise men, and he heard them, and they dug the well. "The well, princes dug it, nobles of the people delved it, with the legislator" (Numbers 21 18). The well is the law, and they who dug it are the captivity of Israel[5] who went forth from the land of Judah and sojourned in the land of

[3] In my translation I have sometimes thought it possible to adhere to the text where Dr. Schechter has preferred a conjectural emendation.

[4] That is, probably, against the legitimate high priest of the time (perhaps Onias).—The rendering "*by* his Anointed" is grammatically admissible, but would be unintelligible in this context.

[5] It would be possible to render "the penitents of Israel."

Damascus, all of whom God called princes because they sought him.[6] . . . The legislator is the interpreter of the law, as Isaiah said, "Bringing forth a tool for his work" (Isa. 54 16), and the nobles of the people are those who came to delve the well with the statutes which the legislator decreed that men should walk in them in the complete end of wickedness; and besides these they shall not obtain any (statutes) until the teacher of righteousness shall arise in the last times.

The migration is referred to in several other places: "The captivity of Israel, who migrated from the land of Judah" (4 2 f.);[7] "those who held firm made their escape to the northern land," by which the region of Damascus is meant (7 13 f.; cf. 7 15, 18 f.). The time of the migration is plainly indicated in the passage quoted above (5 20 ff.). The men who, after the end of the devastation of the land, "removed the boundary," and led Israel astray, speaking rebelliously against the commandments of God by Moses and against his holy Anointed, prophesying falsely to turn Israel away from following God, in consequence of which the land was laid waste, are most naturally taken for the hellenizing leaders of the Seleucid time. In this period, it seems that a number of Jews, including priests and levites, withdrew to the region of Damascus,[8] and there they subsequently bound themselves by covenant to live strictly in accordance with the law as defined by their legislator.

With this the other allusions agree. Thus in A, p. 8 (=B, p. 19), at the end of a violent invective against the sinners, of whom it is said, "The princes of Judah are like those who remove the boundary," we read that "they separated not from the people [and their sins, B], but presumptuously broke through all restraints, walking in the way of the wicked (heathen), of whom God said, 'The venom of dragons is their wine, and the head of asps is cruel'[9] (Deut. 32 33). The dragons are the kings of the nations, and their wine means their ways, and the head of asps is the head of the Greek kings who came to inflict vengeance upon them." This again is most naturally understood of Antiochus

[6] The four or five words which follow are unintelligible.

[7] The references are to page and line of the Hebrew text.

[8] Others sought refuge in Egypt; the temple of Onias at Leontopolis had its origin in the same circumstances.

[9] So they understood the words translated in the English version "the cruel venom of asps."

Epiphanes; the calamities he brought on the Jews were a direct consequence of the course of the hellenizing party.[10]

A definite date for these occurrences is given in 1 5 ff.: "When God's wrath was over, three hundred and ninety years after he gave them into the power of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, he visited them, and caused to spring up from Israel and Aaron a root of his planting to inherit his land and to thrive on the good things of his earth. And they recognized their wickedness and knew that they were guilty men, and they were like blind men and like men groping their way for twenty years. And God took note of their deeds, that with perfect heart they sought him, and he raised up for them a teacher of righteousness to guide them in the way of his heart."

The "root" which God, mindful of his covenant, caused to spring up from Aaron and Israel is the men with whom the religious revival, or reformation, began, the forefathers of the sect (see 6 2 f., and below, p. 375);[11] the "teacher of righteousness" is the "interpreter of the law who came to Damascus" (6 7 f., 7 18 f.). The dates refer therefore to the origin of the sect. Three hundred and ninety years from the taking of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar (597 or 586 B.C.) would bring us, by our chronology, to 207 or 196 B.C. The Jewish chronology of the Persian period is, however, always too long by from forty to seventy years,[12] and assuming, as it is fair to do, that our author made the same error, the three hundred ninety years would run out in the middle of the third century. Dr. Schechter suspects, with much probability, that the original reading was "*four* hundred and ninety years," the common apocalyptic cycle (Dan. 9 2, 24; Enoch 89–90; 93, etc.). Making the same allowance for error, we should be brought again to a time not far removed from the pun-

[10] See 2 Macc. 4 16: "By reason of which (sc. their predilection for Greek ways) a dire calamity befel them, and those for whose customs they displayed such zeal and whom they wanted to imitate in everything became their enemies and avengers." Assumption of Moses, 5 1: "When the times of retribution shall draw near, and vengeance arises through kings who share their guilt and punish them," etc., describes the same situation.

[11] Cf. "the whole race of the elect root," Enoch 93 8.

[12] See Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes (3 ed.), vol. iii, p. 189.

ishment inflicted on the people by Antiochus Epiphanes (see above, p. 333 f.).[13]

There is nothing in the texts which demands a later date for the origin of the sect. The last event in the national history to which reference is made is the vengeance inflicted on the heathenizing rulers of the people by "the head of the Greek kings." To the misfortunes of the people in the following centuries, such as the taking of Jerusalem by Pompey or its destruction by Titus, there is no allusion. It may perhaps be inferred not only that the schism antedated these calamities, but that the book was written before them. In the author's frame of mind toward the religious leaders of Palestinian Jewry, he would have been likely to record such conspicuous judgments upon them. A comparison with the Assumption of Moses is instructive on this point. There the sweeping denunciation of the priesthood and the scribes, "their teachers in those times," and of the godless Asmonaean priest-kings, is followed by the well-deserved judgment inflicted on them by Herod, and after him comes Varus, burning part of the temple, crucifying, and carrying off into slavery. The second of the Psalms of Solomon may also be compared.

The schismatic character of the sect would also be explained

[13] A comparison with the Apocalypse of the Ten Weeks in Enoch (93 + 91 12–17) is in point here. The sixth "week" (period of 490 years) ends with the destruction of the temple by Nebuchadnezzar; in the seventh a rebellious generation arises, all whose works are apostasy (the hellenizers of the Seleucid time); at its end the "chosen righteous men of the eternal plantation of righteousness" are chosen to receive the sevenfold instruction about God's whole creation (apparently the cosmological revelations of Enoch); the historical retrospect closes before the robbery and desecration of the temple by Antiochus Epiphanes (170, 168 B.C.), of which the seer knows nothing. The chronological error here amounts to sixty or seventy years.

In the Introduction, p. xii, by a typographical error which is repeated on p. xxii, Dr. Schechter says that the 390 years of the text would bring us "to within a generation of Simon the Just, who flourished about 290 B.C.," and twenty years more would bring us into the midst of the hellenistic persecutions preceding the Maccabaean revolt (about 170 B.C.). Margoliouth, whose hypothesis 490 does not suit any better than 390, takes courage from Schechter's doubts to disregard the numbers altogether. Gressmann (Internationale Wochenschrift, March 4, 1911) is led by metrical considerations to treat all the chronological notices as interpolations, and gives them no further consideration. But even if the figures were introduced by a later hand, they may still represent the tradition of the sect.

if it arose in an age when the character of the political and religious heads of the Jewish people was such as to move God-fearing and law-abiding men to repudiate them with all their ways and works. For it is not merely with a sect, differing from the mass of their fellows in certain opinions and practices, that we have to do, but with a schism. The Covenanters of Damascus are radical come-outers, seceders not only from the land of Judaea, but from established Judaism, on which they look much as the Puritan Separatists in the seventeenth century looked on the English Church; they might have taken to themselves the prophetic word so often in the mouth of the Puritan, "Depart ye, depart ye, go ye out from thence, touch no unclean thing; go ye out of the midst of her; be ye clean, ye that bear the vessels of the Lord" (Isa. 52 11), as they do apply to the religious teachers of the Jewish church the most violent invectives of the same prophet (50 11, 59 4 ff.; see below, p. 344f.). They will not even call themselves Jews, they are Israelites who went forth from the land of Judaea; their Messiah is to spring from Aaron and Israel, not from Judah; when the final judgment comes in its appointed time, it will no longer be permitted to make compact with the house of Judah, but every man must stand in his own stronghold;[14] when the glory of God shines out on Israel, all the wicked of Judah shall be cut off, in the day of its trial by fire. They reject the temple in Jerusalem, and will not offer on its altar. If we consider that the Essenes, notwithstanding their wider divergence from the common type of Judaism, seem to have regarded themselves as within the pale of the church, and to have been so regarded by others—enjoying, indeed, with the people the reputation of peculiar sanctity —the schismatic character of our sect appears in a still stronger light.

The language of the book is not inconsistent with the age to which the contents would seem to assign it. The vocabulary is in the main Biblical, but there are a number of words which otherwise occur only in the writings of the Mishnic age or later. Some of these belong to the technical terminology of the law schools, some of them appear to be peculiar to the sect. A few of the Biblical words also are used in later senses and applications.

[14] Perhaps we should emend *ma'mādō*, 'station,' i.e. sect.

It is proper to bear in mind, however, that the Hebrew originals of the works with which it would be most natural to compare our text, such as Enoch, the Book of Jubilees, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the Gospel, are not preserved; in fact, between the last books of the Old Testament and the rabbinical literature of the second Christian century there is a hiatus in the history of the Hebrew language, so that words which appear for the first time in the Mishna and kindred works may have been, and in many cases probably were, in use much earlier. It is unnecessary therefore to suppose that such words were introduced into our texts by later scribes, though the possibility of such changes must of course be admitted. The particular instances in which Dr. Schechter thinks that late and foreign influences are most clearly to be recognized—the title of the "censor" and the peculiar name for a house of worship—are discussed elsewhere.[15] More remarkable than the vocabulary of the book is its syntax. The consecutive constructions of the perfect and the imperfect are regularly employed, not only in imitation of Biblical models in narrative and prophetic passages, but in the legal part of the book; and in spite of some irregularities, which may in part at least be laid to the charge of scribes, the use of these tenses is generally correct. In this respect the Hebrew of the book differs entirely from that of the Mishna and the contemporary and later Midrashim, in which the characteristic features of classical tense-syntax have entirely disappeared, under the influence, it is generally supposed, of the Aramaic vernacular. In comparison with these writings the vocabulary also is notably free from foreign admixture. There are no words borrowed from Greek and Latin, and only one or two instances where an Aramaic term seems to have been adopted. The orthography also, in its more sparing use of the semivowels to indicate the vowels *u* and *i*, resembles that of the Bible.

The founder of the sect is called the "teacher of righteousness" (1 11),[16] "the only, or beloved, teacher" (20 14);[17] "the only

[15] See below, p. 350, 354 f.

[16] Cf. Isa. 30 20 f.

[17] The Septuagint renders *yāḥīd* most frequently by ἀγαπητός, less often by μονογενής.

one" (20 32); he is "the legislator," that is, "the interpreter of the law" (6 7); and this interpreter of the law, who came to Damascus, is the star who, according to Balaam's prophecy, was to issue from Jacob (7 18 f.).[18] He showed them how to walk in the way of God's heart (1 11); as interpreter of the law he ordained them statutes to walk in till the end of wickedness—statutes which shall not be superseded by any others "until there arise the teacher of righteousness in the last days" (6 11 f.). To him, therefore, are attributed the distinctive principles and observances of the sect as they are set forth in this book. "His anointed," through whom God made known to men his holy spirit, and who is true (2 12 f.), is in all probability the same person with the teacher, the star, just as the anointed from Aaron and Israel who is to arise in the future (20 1) is the same as the teacher of righteousness to whose voice they will then listen (20 32; see below, p. 343).

Those of the emigrants who accepted the guidance of the teacher of righteousness, the interpreter of the law, entered into the "new covenant in the land of Damascus" (6 19, 8 21, 19 33 f., 20 12). The idea of the "new covenant" was doubtless suggested by Jer. 31 31 ff. (cf. 32 36 ff.; Ezek. 37 26, etc.), where the establishment of the new covenant, in the stead of the old covenant which their fathers broke, marks the restoration of God's favor, the beginning of a new and better time. The same use of the passage in Jeremiah is made at length by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (8 6 ff.). The substance of the covenant may be gathered from 6 11–7 5:

> All who were brought into the covenant are not to enter into the sanctuary to light its altar, but became closers of the door, as God said, "Who among you will close its door?" and "Thou shalt not light my altar in vain" (Mal. 1 10);[19] but shall observe to do according to the interpretation of the law for the end of wickedness, and to separate from the children of perdition, and to keep aloof from unrighteous gain, which is unclean by vow and ban,[20] and from the property of the sanctuary, and from

[18] The same prophecy which was applied by Akiba to Bar Cocheba and by the Dositheans to their founder (see below, p. 362).

[19] The sect rejects the temple in Jerusalem and its worship. Cf. 20 21 f., in the last crisis, "they will lean upon God . . . and will declare the sanctuary unclean and will return to God."

[20] Perhaps better, keep aloof, by vow and ban, from unrighteous, unclean gain.

robbing the poor of the people and making widows their spoil and murdering orphans; and to separate between the unclean and the clean, and to show the difference between the holy and the common; and to observe the Sabbath day as it is defined, and the season feasts, and the fast-day, in accordance with the commandments of those who entered into the new covenant in the land of Damascus; to set apart the sacred dues as they are defined; and that a man should love his neighbor as himself, and sustain the poor and needy and the proselyte, and to seek each the welfare of the other; and that no man transgress the prohibited degrees, but guard against fornication according to the rule; and that a man should reprove his brother according to the commandment, and not bear a grudge from day to day; and to separate from all forms of uncleanness according to their several prescriptions; and that a man should not defile his holy spirit, even as God separated for them (sc. unclean from clean). All who walk in these precepts in perfection of holiness, according to all the foundations of the covenant of God,[21] have the assurance that they shall live a thousand generations.

Early in the history of the sect a serious defection occurred. Men who entered among the first into the covenant incurred guilt, like their forefathers, by following their sinful inclinations; they forsook the covenant of God and preferred their own will, and went about after the stubbornness of their heart, every man doing as he pleased (3 10 ff.); the men who entered into the new covenant in the land of Damascus went back and proved false, and turned aside from the well of living waters (19 33 f.). Their names were struck out of the registers of the sect, as were those of such as fell away in later times.

We can readily imagine that many found the rule of the sect too strict and the discipline by which it was enforced too severe. Our texts, however, speak not of such occasional and individual lapses, but of the repudiation of the covenant by numbers at one time. It seems that another leader had arisen, of very different temper from the founder, who drew away many after him. In the eyes of those who remained steadfast in the faith, the new teacher was naturally a false prophet, a kind of antichrist. He is called the liar ("the man of lies," 20 15), the scoffer (1 14); his adherents are scoffers,[22] who uttered error about the righteous

[21] See below, p. 353.

[22] The name comes from Isa. 28 14, where the scorners are the rulers in Jerusalem, who boast of their covenant with death and their compact with hell, who have made lies their refuge and hidden themselves in falsehood. See also Isa. 29 20.

statutes, and spurned the covenant and plighted faith which they established in the land of Damascus, that is to say, the new covenant. They and their families shall have no portion in the house of the law (20 10 ff.). For their unfaithfulness they were delivered to the sword (3 10 ff.), until of all the men of war who went with the liar none was left (20 14 ff.).[23] This came to pass about forty years after the death of the unique teacher (*l. c.*). If the emigration to Damascus occurred under Antiochus Epiphanes,[24] the end of the episode of the false prophet would fall about the beginning of the first century B.C., and we should have at least an upper limit for the writing of the book. The passion which every mention of this defection arouses suggests that it was fresh in memory, and would incline us to date the writing not very long after the time indicated. It should be observed, however, that the sentence which counts forty years from the death of the unrivalled teacher to the end of the liar's army sits loose in the context, and may be a gloss, in which case the book might be some decades older.

With the remnant who remained faithful through the great defection "God confirmed his covenant with Israel forever, revealing to them the secret of things in which all Israel was in error, his holy Sabbaths and his glorious festivals and his righteous testimonies and his true ways and the pleasure of his will, things which if a man do he shall live by them. He opened a way before them, and they dug a well for copious waters." "In the abundance of his wonderful grace he atoned for their guilt and forgave their transgression, and built for them a sure house in Israel, the like of which did not arise in times past nor until now" (3 12–20). The prediction of the sure house (1 Sam. 2 35) seems to be fulfilled in the stability of the sect itself, or perhaps, with closer adherence to the prophecy, in that of its faithful priesthood.

So much may be gathered from the book about the origin and history of the sect. We turn now to its expectation. As a teacher of righteousness, an anointed one (priest), was the founder of the sect, so in the last times a teacher of righteousness, an

[23] It might be surmised that the false prophet had headed an insurrection—perhaps a Messianic rising—which ended in disaster.

[24] See above, p. 333.

anointed one, shall appear (6 10 f.). Those who proved faithless to the covenant are cut off from the community, "from the time when the unique teacher was taken away until the anointed one from Aaron and Israel shall arise" (19 35–20 1), that is, during the whole of the present dispensation. Dr. Schechter regards the anointed one who is to appear in the future as the founder of the sect *redivivus:* the present dispensation "seems to be the period intervening between the *first* appearance of the Teacher of Righteousness (p. 1, l. 11) (the founder of the Sect), who was gathered in or died,[25] and the second appearance of the Teacher of Righteousness who is to rise in 'the end of the days' (p. 6, l. 11). Moreover, the Only Teacher, or Teacher of Righteousness, is identical with the Messiah, or the Anointed one from Aaron and Israel, whose advent is expected by the Sect."[26] The texts, however, say nothing of the disappearance, or a second appearance, or reappearance, or return of the founder; nor do the words "until the teacher of righteousness shall arise in the last days," "until the anointed shall arise from Aaron and Israel," mean that he shall rise from the dead, as Dr. Schechter interprets them.[27] The Messiah whose advent the sect expects at the end of the present period of history is, as in the older parts of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, a priest; and the function of the priest-messiah is not, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, to mediate between man and God, but to instruct men in righteousness, to guide them in the way of God's heart. That the founder of the sect also was both priest and teacher is by no means sufficient to establish the identity of the two figures. It was the office of the priest to teach Israel the law, "all the statutes which the Lord hath spoken unto them through Moses" (Lev. 10 11; cf. Deut. 33 10); "the priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek

[25] Or, as Schechter elsewhere expresses it, "disappeared." Among the synonyms for death, Aaron ben Eliahu names "gather in" (Isa. 58 8).

[26] Introduction, p. xiii.

[27] P. xiii. "We gather from another passage that the Only Teacher found his death in Damascus, but is expected to rise again (p. 19, l. 35; p. 20, l. 1; cf. also p. 6, l. 11)." The verb *'āmad* means, as frequently in the later books of the Old Testament, 'appear upon the scene.' In this sense it occurs repeatedly in the book before us, and there is nothing in the context here to suggest a different interpretation.

the law at his mouth, for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts" (Mal. 2 7). Ezra is the type of a priest who had not only prepared his heart to seek the law of the Lord and to do it, but to teach in Israel statutes and judgments (Ezra 7 10); he was, according to the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, the restorer of Judaism. It was a departure from the ideal of the law itself that, when the priesthood showed itself unworthy of its calling, the teaching function was assumed by lay scribes, and even in later times there were many priestly teachers among the Scribes and among the Doctors. That our sect looks back to one such as its founder, and forward to another as the great teacher of the Messianic age, is in no way surprising. If the author had meant what Dr. Schechter thinks, it is fair to assume that he would have said it unmistakably; for the identity of the expected Messiah with the dead founder, if it was part of the belief of the sect, would of necessity be a singular and significant part of it.[28]

The coming judgment of God is represented rather as a judgment on the faithless members of the sect, including those who have seceded from it or been expelled, than in its more general aspects. The long eschatological passage in B (20 15 to the end) is illegible in spots near the beginning, but the general tenor is clear:

> In that consummation the anger of God will be inflamed against Israel, as he said, "There is no king and no prince, and no judge and none that reproves in righteousness" (cf. Hos. 3 4). Those who turn from the transgression [of Jacob][29] and keep the covenant of God will then confer with one another; their footsteps will be firm in the way of God (and the prophecy will be fulfilled which says), "And God hearkened to their words and heard, and a book of remembrance was written before him for those that fear God and think on his name" (Mal. 3 16), until deliverance and righteousness emerge for those that fear God, "and ye shall return and see the difference between righteous and wicked, and between a servant of God and one who serves him not" (Mal. 3 18). And he shows favor to those that love him and keep his commandments, for a thousand generations.[30] . . .

[28] Cf. Acts 1 11.

[29] See Isa. 59 20.

[30] The quotation is to be thus restored; see Exod. 20 6 and Deut. 7 9. The next two or three lines are very obscure: "From the house of Peleg, who went out (or, will go out) from the city of the sanctuary, and they will rely on God

Each man according to his spirit, shall they be judged by his holy counsel, and all who have broken through the bounds of the law, of those who entered into the covenant, when the glory of God shines out on Israel, shall be cut off from the midst of the camp, and with them all the evil-doers of Judah, in the days when it is tried in the fire. But all who held firmly by these precepts, going out and coming in in conformity with the law, and listened to the voice of the teacher, will confess [31] before God. . . . "We have done evil, we, and our fathers also, when they went contrary to the statutes of the covenant, and faithful are thy judgments upon us." And they will not act presumptuously against his holy statutes and his righteous judgment and his faithful testimonies. They will be instructed in the ancient judgments by which the followers of the unique one were judged, and will hearken to the words of the teacher of righteousness. And they will not controvert the righteous statutes when they hear them; they will rejoice and be glad, and their heart will be strong, and they will show themselves mighty against all the people of the world.[32] And God will atone for them, and they will see his salvation with joy, because they trusted in his holy name.

Here the fragment ends. The destruction of those who fall away from the sect is threatened in other places; it will suffice to quote the most important (19 5 ff.):

Upon all those who reject the commandments and the statutes, the deserts of the wicked shall be requited when God visits the earth, when the word comes to pass which was written by Zechariah the prophet, "Sword, awake against my shepherd and against the man that is my fellow, saith God; smite the shepherd, and let the sheep be scattered, and I will turn my hand against the little ones" (Zech. 13 7). But those who observe it (sc. the obligations of the covenant) are "the poor of the flock" (Zech. 11 7). These shall escape at the end of the visitation, but the former (sc. those who reject the commandments) shall be given over to the sword when the Anointed of Aaron and Israel comes, as it was at the end of the first visitation, of which God said by Ezekiel that a mark should be made on the foreheads of them that sigh and cry,

(cf. Isa. 10 20) when the transgression of Israel is at an end, and will declare the sanctuary unclean, and will return to God. The prince (?) of the people with few words (??)." The house of Peleg may be an etymological allegory for the seceders; the city of the sanctuary is probably Jerusalem (cf. 6 11 ff., above, p. 338); but neither the connection with the preceding nor the meaning of the sequel is clear.

[31] Text, "and confessed," which leaves the sentence without a predicate.

[32] See also 7 20: "The sceptre" (Num. 24 17) "is the prince of all the congregation; and when he arises he will destroy all the children of Seth."

and the rest were delivered to the sword that executes the judgment of the covenant. And so shall the judgment be of all who enter into his covenant and do not hold firmly by these statutes, they shall be visited even with extermination by the hand of Belial. This is the day in which God will visit, as he spoke, "The princes of Judah are become like men who remove the boundary; on them will I pour out my fury like water" (Hos. 5 10). For they entered into the covenant of repentance, but did not turn aside from the way of faithless men, and wallowed in ways of fornication and in unrighteous gain, and avenging themselves and bearing a grudge against one another.

It is possible, of course, that the judgment of the heathen world, which looms so large in most of the apocalypses, may have had a place in parts of the book now lost, but if it had been a very important feature in the expectation of the sect we should hardly fail to find at least allusions to it in the pages in our hands. The author is almost exclusively interested in the sect itself, in the division which had rent it, and in polemics against laxer interpretations of the law. This limitation of the horizon is characteristically sectarian, and may suggest, moreover, as has been said above, that the writer is not far removed in time from the split in the new organization.

The polemic is especially pointed against certain opponents who are described as "those who build a wall and plaster it with stucco" (4 19; 8 12).[33] They follow a commandment (*sau*); probably connoting, as in Hosea 5 11, from which the phrase is taken, an arbitrary rule of their own, a commandment of men.[34] God hates them, his anger is kindled against them (8 18). These "builders" are false teachers; Biblical denunciations of the false prophets are applied to them. (See especially 8 12 f.) Points in which their teaching is particularly assailed are that they allow polygamy and the remarriage of divorced persons during the life of the other party, and hold it lawful for a man to marry his niece;

[33] It is not improbable that the author thought also of the other meaning of the word *tāphēl*, here rendered 'stucco,' viz. something insipid, stupid; cf. Lam. 2 14, in a passage which, like Ezek. 13 10, refers to the false prophets. I see nothing to indicate that "the wall" is the fence or hedge which the Pharisaean rabbis drew around the law to protect it from infraction, as Dr. Schechter thinks.

[34] The text explains, "this is the prater of whom it says, they prate unceasingly" (4 19 f.; cf. Mic. 2 11). Dr. Schechter regards this explanation as "a disturbing parenthesis."

that they defile the sanctuary by the laxity of some of their rules and practice about sexual uncleanness; they presume blasphemously to impugn the "statutes of the covenant of God" (the legislation of the sect), declaring that they are not right, and saying abominable things about them (4 20–5 14). The positions so hotly denounced, especially in the matter of marriage and divorce, are those of the Palestinian rabbis as we know them in the Mishna and kindred works, and in so far as the Pharisees had a dominating influence in the schools of the law they may be regarded as in a peculiar sense the object of this invective, which is, however, sweeping enough to include all rabbinical Judaism. Such verses as Isaiah 50 11 and 59 4 ff. are hurled at them; they are compared to Johanneh and his brother, whom Belial raised up against Moses (5 17 ff.).[35]

The sect prohibited polygamy, which they stigmatized as fornication, arguing from the creation—"a male and a female created he them" (cf. Matt. 19 4), and from the story of the flood—"by pairs they went into the ark," and from the law which forbade the prince to multiply wives unto himself (Deut. 17 17), that is, as they understood it, to take more than one wife. To forestall an objection, it is added: "But David had not read in the sealed book of the law which was in the ark, for it was not opened in Israel from the time of the death of Eleazar and Joshua and the elders who worshipped the Astartes, but was hidden and not brought to light until Zadok arose" (5 2–5; see below, p. 359).

Marriage with another woman while a man had a divorced wife living was apparently put in the same category with having two wives at the same time (4 20 f.; cf. Matt. 5 31 f.). Marriage with a niece (brother's or sister's daughter) they treated as incest, reasoning that marriage between a woman and her uncle stood on all fours with marriage between a man and his aunt, which was expressly forbidden as within the prohibited degrees of kinship.[36] The three snares of Belial by which he ensnared Israel

[35] The Jannes and Jambres of 2 Tim. 3 8.

[36] Such marriages, especially with a sister's daughter, are not only permitted, but especially commended in the Talmud (Yebamoth 62b–63a; see Maimonides, Issure Biah 2 14), and are still common in countries where the Jews are free to follow the rabbinical law. On the Karaite prohibition of marriage with a niece, see below, p. 366.

are fornication (that is, plural or incestuous unions), wealth (that is, unrighteous gain), and the pollution of the sanctuary (4 15 f.; cf. 5 6 f.).[37]

The same rigorous tendency which appears in the attitude of the sect in regard to marriage pervades the whole legal part of the work before us. The rules for the observance of the Sabbath (10 14–11 21) will make this clear.

Concerning the Sabbath, to keep it as it is prescribed.

1. On the sixth day no man shall do any work from the time when the disk of the sun is distant from the western portal [38] by its diameter (?); for this is what he said: Observe the Sabbath day to hallow it.

2. On the Sabbath a man shall not engage in any foolish conversation; and he shall not exact repayment from his neighbor; nor shall he give judgment in matters of property; he shall not talk about matters of work and labor to be done on the next day.

3. A man shall not walk in the country to do the work of his business on the Sabbath. He shall not walk outside of his town above one thousand [39] cubits.

4. No man shall eat on the Sabbath anything except what was previously prepared or what is spoiling in the field. He shall not eat or drink anything but what was in the camp. If he be on the way and descend to bathe, he may drink as he stands, but must not draw water in any vessel.[40]

5. He must not send a foreigner to do his business on the Sabbath day.

6. A man must not put on soiled garments or such as are brought by a gentile, without washing them in water or rubbing them with frankincense.[41]

7. A man shall not exchange pledges [42] of his own accord on the Sabbath.

8. A man shall not follow his cattle, to pasture them outside his town, except within 2000 cubits. He shall not lift his arm to strike them with his fist; if the animal is breachy, let him not take her out of the house.

9. A man shall not take anything out of a house into the street, nor

[37] On the pollution of the sanctuary, cf. Assumption of Moses 5 3; Testament of Levi 14 5 ff.; Psalms of Solomon 2 3.

[38] On the portals of the sun, see Enoch 72, etc.

[39] Perhaps an error of the text for 2000; see below, § 8.

[40] Cf. Jubilees 50 8.

[41] This holds on week-days as well as on the Sabbath.

[42] Perhaps we should read, "make an *'erūb*" (a legal fiction by which dwellings or limits were treated as one). The Sadducees and Samaritans rejected this evasion of the law.

bring anything from the street into the house; and if he be in the entry, he shall not pass anything out of it or bring anything into it.

10. He shall not open on the Sabbath a vessel the cover of which has been luted on.

11. A man shall not carry on his person spices, going out or coming in on the Sabbath.

12. Within a house he shall not lift stone nor earth on the Sabbath day.

13. The nurse shall not carry an infant in arms, going out or coming in with it on the Sabbath.

14. A man shall not deal harshly with his slave or his maid or his hired servant on the Sabbath.

15. A man shall not deliver cattle of their young on the Sabbath day.

16. If a beast fall into a cistern or trap, a man shall not lift it out on the Sabbath.

17. A man shall not pass the Sabbath in a place near the gentiles.

18. A man shall not profane the Sabbath for the sake of gain.

19. If a human being fall into a tank of water or into a place of . . . no man shall fetch him up by means of a ladder or a rope or any implement.

20. No man shall bring upon the altar on the Sabbath anything except the Sabbath burnt-offerings, for so it is written, "aside from your Sabbaths."

The dietary laws afford other examples of the strict rules of the sect.[43] Fish may be eaten only if, while still alive, they have been split open and drained of their blood; grasshoppers and locusts must be put alive into the water or the fire (in which they are to be cooked); honey in the comb is apparently prohibited. So, again, in a house in which a death has occurred, fixtures, such as nails and pegs in the walls, are unclean; and wood, stone, and dust are capable of contracting and communicating various kinds of uncleanness (12 15–18). The sect sees in these stricter distinctions between clean and unclean the superiority of its ordinances over those of other Jews, whom they regard as sinfully lax. The Pharisees are to them gross latitudinarians!

Oaths are to be taken only by the covenant and the curses of the covenant, that is, the vows by which the members of the sect bind themselves, on their admission to it, to live in conformity with its rule and submit to the authority of those set over them,

[43] See 12 12 ff.

and the curses invoked on such as violate these obligations.[44] Oaths by God, whether under the name *Aleph Lamed* (*El* or *Elohim*) or *Aleph Daleth* (*Adonai*) are prohibited;[45] nor is it permissible to mention in the oath the law of Moses; the formula of the oath is strictly sectarian (15 1 ff.).[46] But, though the name of God is not used, "if a man swear and transgress the oath, he profanes the name" (15 3). Obligations voluntarily assumed under oath (vows) are to be fulfilled to the letter; neither redemption nor annulment seems to be allowed, unless to carry out the vow would be a transgression of the covenant.

Another point in which the sect is at variance with the great body of the Jews is the calendar. They represent the faithful remnant to whom God revealed the mysteries about which all Israel went astray, his holy sabbaths and his glorious festivals, and his righteous testimonies, and his true ways (3 12 ff.). The point of this appears when it is compared with Jubilees 1 14: "They will forget my law and all my commandments and all my judgments, and will go astray as to new moons and sabbaths and festivals and jubilees and ordinances" (cf. 6 34 ff., 23 19). The texts before us do not explain what the peculiarities of the sectarian calendar were, but inasmuch as the Book of Jubilees, under the title "The Book of the Division of the Times by their Jubilees and their Sabbatical Years," is cited as an authority for the exact determination of "their ends" (the coming crisis of history), it may be inferred with much probability that our sect had a calendar constructed on principles similar to that of the Jubilees,[47] in which the seasons and festivals were not determined by lunar observations or astronomical tables, as among the Jews generally, but had a fixed place in a solar year. Such upsetting of the calendar is branded as heresy in Midrash Tehillim on Ps. 28 5: "They do not regard the work of the Lord,

[44] Similarly the Essenes, at their reception into the order, bound themselves by the "tremendous oaths" which Josephus describes, B. J. ii, 8 7.

[45] The oath by the Tetragrammaton included *a fortiori*.

[46] The Essenes excluded oaths altogether, except in the initiation of members. See also Slavonic Enoch 49 1; Philo, De spec. legibus ii, 1, and elsewhere (Charles, Secrets of Enoch, p. 65). Our sect recognizes judicial oaths (9 8 ff.) and imprecations (9 12), as well as vows under oath (16 6 ff.).

[47] On the relation of the Jubilees to the sect, see further below, p. 359.

nor the operation of his hands. . . . 'The operation of his hands' means the new moons; as it is said, 'God made the two great lights,' and it is written, 'He made the moon for festival seasons.'[48] These are the heretics who do not calculate (by the moon) the festival seasons and the equinoxes. 'He will tear them down and not build them up.' He will tear them down, in this world, and not build them up, in the world to come." Perhaps the Boëthusians, who hired false witnesses to deceive the authorities about the appearance of the new moon, were not merely animated by a desire to harass the rabbis, but were partisans of some such calendar reform.

The organization of the sect furnished it an effective means of enforcing its rules by discipline. This organization is so peculiar that it must be described in some detail. Like the normal Jewish community, it consists of three classes, priests, levites, and Israelites, to whom as a fourth class may be added proselytes. In this order they are mustered and inscribed in the rolls of the camp. In some sense all the members of the sect are priests. Ezekiel 44 15 is quoted and explained: "'The priests and the levites and the sons of Zadok who kept the charge of his sanctuary' [*sic*]. The priests are the exiles of Israel who migrated from the land of Judah and [the levites are][49] those who attached themselves to them; and the sons of Zadok are the chosen ones of Israel, men designated by name, who arose in the last days." Allegory apart, it appears that the priests were of the Zadokite line, but this legitimacy is assumed, not emphasized. Priests and levites formed part of every court of ten judges (see below, p. 351); and in every company of ten Israelites (the quorum of a religious assembly), a priest, well versed in the Book of Institutes,[50] must be present, to whose words all must conform. If the priest does not possess the requisite qualifications, and a competent levite is at hand, it shall be ordained that all who enter the camp shall go out and come in at his orders. In a

[48] Cf. Jubilees 2 9, God appointed the sun . . . for sabbaths, and months, and feasts; and Jubilees 6 37, the observation of the moon disturbs the calendar.

[49] It seems necessary to supply these words.

[50] "The book of *hagu*." The rendering 'Institutes' is not offered as a translation of the name, but as indicating the probable character of the work. See below, p. 353 f.

case of leprosy the priest shall come and stand in the midst of the camp and the Supervisor shall instruct him in the interpretation of the law; even if the priest be an ignoramus, it is he who must shut up the leper, for the decision belongs to them (13 1 ff.). To a priest is assigned also the duty of taking the census of the commonalty; he who fills this office must be between thirty and sixty years old, versed in the Book of [Institutes and] in all the prescriptions of the law, to pronounce them according to their prescriptions (14 3 ff.).

A much more important place in the organization is filled by an officer whose title (*mebaḳḳer*) signifies 'examiner,' 'inspector,' and may perhaps best be rendered 'Supervisor.' [51] Every "camp," or settlement, of the sect had a Supervisor, and over these stood a "Supervisor of all the camps," who must be a man in the prime of life, between thirty and fifty years of age. To the Supervisor of the individual camp it belonged to instruct the community "in the works of God, and make them familiar with his wonderful deeds of might, and recount before them the things that happened long ago . . .; and he shall have compassion on them as a father toward his children (13 7 ff.)." [52] We have seen that he has even to instruct the priest in the rules for the diagnosis of leprosy.[53] The admission of new members to the sect is also in his hands; no one is permitted to introduce a man into the

[51] Dr. Schechter renders 'Censor,' and remarks, "Such an office, entirely unknown to Judaism, could only have been borrowed from the Romans." But the functions of the Inspector or Supervisor bear no resemblance to those of the Roman censors; and for the identity of the title the translator is solely accountable, not the constitution of the sect. Mr. Margoliouth talks loosely about dependence on Roman administrative models; it would be interesting to learn in what particulars. With the very large authority vested in the Supervisor may be compared that of the managers, or administrators (ἐπιμεληταί), among the Essenes, "without whose directions they do nothing"; though the functions of the managers in the Essene coenobite establishments were of course quite different from those of the Supervisors of our sect.

[52] In the partly illegible lines that follow, his dealing with the congregation is compared with that of a shepherd with his flock.—Dr. W. H. Ward suggests that the title *mebaḳḳer* may be connected with Ezek. 34 11 f., where the verb is used of a shepherd's looking out for his flock.

[53] As in Mishna *Yoma* the High Priest has to be instructed by experts in the ritual of the Day of Atonement, and made to swear not to depart from his instructions.

congregation without his consent. He examines the candidates in regard to their character and intelligence, their physical strength and courage, and their possessions, and enrolls each in his proper place in the lot [54] of the camp (13 11 ff.). From the following badly defaced lines so much at least can be made out, that the Supervisor had extensive powers of control over the dealings of members of the sect with outsiders in the way of trade. He evidently had also a leading part in the administration of justice and the enforcement of the discipline of the sect, but the state of the text here denies us insight into the particulars.

Courts were constituted of ten members,[55] chosen *ad hoc* from the congregation, four of the tribe of Levi and Aaron and six Israelites, all well versed in the Book of Institutes and in the Foundations of the Covenant, between twenty-five and sixty years of age. No man of more than sixty shall be a judge, "for on account of the unfaithfulness of mankind his days were shortened, and through the wrath of God on the inhabitants of the earth he bade to remove their understanding before they completed their days (10 4 ff.)." The rules relating to the competence of witnesses are strict. No one may testify against the accused in a capital case who is not a god-fearing man old enough to be included in the census (that is, at least twenty years of age, Exod. 30 14); nor shall a man's testimony be credited against his neighbor who is himself a wilful transgressor of any of the commandments, until he has come to repentance (9 23–10 3). A peculiar provision is made for the case that a single witness (on whose testimony therefore conviction could not be had) sees a capital offence committed. He is to make known the facts to the Supervisor, who records the testimony in writing. If subsequently the offence is committed again in the presence of another witness, the same process is repeated; on a second repetition, the testimony of the three single witnesses combined suffices for conviction (9 16 ff).[56]

[54] Probably the lands belonging to the sect.

[55] That a court must consist of ten judges, the Karaites deduce from Ruth 4 2. So Anan quoted by Poznanski, Revue des études juives, vol. xlv, p. 67, and p. 69, n. 1.

[56] This seems to be the meaning of the somewhat obscure passage.

Besides the penalties of the Mosaic law, the sect has a formidable means of discipline in expulsion, or as it is called "separation from the Purity," which may in some cases be inflicted even on the testimony of one witness (9 21 ff.). Josephus vividly depicts the desperate straits into which those came who, for grave offences, were expelled from the Essene order; being unable to eat food not prepared by members of the order, they were exposed to starvation. This particular consequence would not follow separation from our sect; but the lot of the excommunicated man was evidently hard enough. "When his deeds come to light he is to be expelled from the congregation, as though his lot had never fallen in the midst of the disciples of God; according to his misdeeds men shall bear him in remembrance . . . until the day when he returns to take his place in the station of the men of perfect holiness. No man shall have any dealings with him in matters of property or work, for all the saints of the Most High have cursed him" (20 3 ff.); such have no part in the "house of the law"; their names are erased from the rolls of the congregation (20 10 f.). They are not only cut off from the communion of saints in this world, but are doomed to extermination by the hand of Belial (8 1 f., 19 14 f.). One who leads men astray and profanes the Sabbath and the festivals shall not be put to death, but shall be committed to the custody of men;[57] if he is cured of his error, they shall keep him for seven years, and afterwards he may come into the assembly (12 3 ff.). A member of the sect who seduces others to apostasy is more severely dealt with: "A man over whom the spirits of Belial have rule,[58] and who advocates defection (Deut. 13 6), shall be judged according to the law of the necromancer and the wizard" (12 2 f.; cf. Deut. 18 9).[59]

The sect possessed the Jewish Scriptures. The books of the law are "the hut of the King" (i.e. the congregation)—the fallen hut which God had promised to raise up; "the pillar of your images" are the books of the prophets, whose words Israel despised. The founder of the sect, the star out of Jacob, is the

[57] It is not clear whether imprisonment or surveillance is meant.

[58] On the spirit of Belial (ruling over Israel) see Jubilees 1 20.

[59] "Rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft," 1 Sam. 15 23.

interpreter of the law who came to Damascus (7 14 ff.). The authority of the Pentateuch is appealed to in support of the position of the sect in the matter of marriage and divorce; their peculiar statutes and ordinances are the true interpretation and application of the law of God. The prophets are frequently cited, and allusions to passages in the prophets or reminiscences of their phraseology are much more numerous. There are similar reminiscences of the Psalms and of the Proverbs, and perhaps of other books among the Hagiographa. As regards the Old Testament scriptures, therefore, the sect stood on common ground with Palestinian orthodoxy.[60] The formula of citation is peculiar; a quotation is usually introduced by the words "as he said," rarely "as God said"; or with the name of the sacred author, "as Moses said." Besides the Biblical books, we have a quotation from Levi—probably the Testament of that Patriarch—introduced by the same phrase as quotations from the Bible; and the reader is referred to the Book of Jubilees by name for an exact computation of the last times. There is nothing to indicate that the authority attributed to these writings was inferior to that of the Hagiographa. The canon of the "Scriptures" was not defined, even in the rabbinical schools, until the second century of our era, and in the sects many books enjoyed high esteem which the orthodox repudiated.[61]

To a different class belong, apparently, the Book of Institutes, and the Foundations of the Covenant, in which the judges must be well versed. To every religious gathering of ten men or more belongs a priest well versed in the Book of Institutes. The title Foundations of the Covenant suggests a writing (or a fixed tradition) dealing with the obligations and duties of members of the sect. The name here rendered Book of Institutes, on the other hand, is obscure,[62] but the fact that a knowledge of it is demanded

[60] In contrast to the Samaritans.

[61] In 8 18 ff., after saying, "Such will be the judgment of every one who despises the commandments of God, and he forsook them and they turned away in the stubbornness of their heart," A adds: "This is the word which Jeremiah spoke to Baruch the son of Neriah and Elisha to his servant Gehazi," referring probably to otherwise unknown apocryphal books. Johanneh and his brother, whom Belial raised up against Moses, are familiar figures of Jewish legend.

[62] The simplest explanation of the form would be to take it as an abstract noun of the type *fa'l*, like *sáḥu;* 'swimming' or *fi'l*, *fu'l*, like *séku* (n. pr.), *tóhu*,

of the priest and of the judges makes it likely that it contained the "statutes and ordinances" of the sect, its peculiar definitions and interpretations of the law, often referred to as *perush;* in technical phrase, a collection of sectarian *halakoth*, such as is preserved in the second part of the texts before us, which seems to be derived from such a legal manual. The objection to committing *halakah* to writing which was long maintained in the rabbinical schools was not shared by the sects, and would be least likely to exist where the ordinances were not in theory a traditional law handed down from remote antiquity, but were attributed to an individual interpreter, the founder of the sect.

The sect had houses of worship, which a man in a state of uncleanness is forbidden to enter (11 22),[63] but nothing more is said about them, except that when the trumpets of the congregation are blown, the blowing shall follow or precede the service, and not interrupt it. It is a natural surmise that they answered to the synagogues both as places of worship and of religious instruction, such, for example, as the Supervisor is required to give. The name, *Beth hishtaḥawōth*, literally, 'house of bowing

bóhu, etc., from the verb *hagah* (root *hagw*), 'reflect, give thought to something,' also 'read' (aloud), so that the noun might literally mean 'study,' equivalent to *midrash*, or perhaps 'reading.'—If the opinion which connects the sect with the Dositheans were tenable (see below, p. 360 ff.), another explanation of the name might be suggested by a passage in Abul-Fath's account of the origin of the Dositheans. He narrates that a son of the Samaritan high priest, named Zar'ah, a man preëminent for learning in his time, having been expelled from the community for immorality, betook himself to Dositheus, who made him the chief of his sect. This man "wrote a book in which he vituperated all the Samaritan religious heads and set forth heresies." The words are, *haja fīhī kul al'a'immetin wa-'abda'a fīhī*. Inasmuch as the Arabic *hajwun* formally corresponds to the Hebrew *hagu*, the Book of *Hagu* in our texts might be identified with this controversial writing of Zar'ah, the disciple of Dositheus. The Hebrew verb *hagah* is thought by Kohut (Aruch Completum, III, 177) to occur in Echa Rabbathi on Lam. 1 4 and 3 33 in the sense 'contemn, deride,' equivalent to the Arabic *haja*, 'lampoon, vituperate.' It might then be conjectured that Abul-Fath had heard of a Dositheau book of *hagu* (in Hebrew) and, taking the word in its Arabic meaning, evolved his description of the character of the work from this etymology.

[63] Some Karaite authorities, also, transferring to the synagogue the holiness of the temple, forbade a man in a state of uncleanness to enter the inner room of the synagogue (Nissi; see Winter und Wünsche, Die jüdische Litteratur, vol. ii, p. 74).

down' (in worship), is peculiar, and may have been chosen to distinguish these sectarian conventicles from the synagogues of regular Judaism, as the English nonconformists of various stripes would not call their meeting-houses churches. It is possible that the prayers of the sect may have been accompanied by genuflections and prostrations such as, though unknown in the synagogue, have formed in all ages and religions a common feature of Oriental worship; but it is also possible that 'bowing down' simply stands by metonymy for worship, as is often the case with the corresponding Syriac verb, *segad*.[64]

Sacrificial worship was also maintained.[65] The City of the Sanctuary was eminently holy; sexual intercourse within its limits is forbidden, "defiling the City of the Sanctuary with their impurity" (*beniddatham*).[66] To this city, probably, the sacrifices were brought to which there is frequent reference. "No one shall send to the altar burnt offerings or oblation, frankincense or wood, by a man who is unclean with any of the forms of uncleanness; for it is written, the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination, but the prayer of the righteous is an acceptable oblation" (11 18 ff.). On the Sabbath nothing is to be brought upon the altar except the Sabbath burnt offerings—that is, we may suppose, the stated daily burnt offerings with the supplementary Sabbath victims (13 17 f.; see Num. 28 1–10). Votive sacrifices are also men-

[64] The coincidence of the name with the Arabic *masjid*, 'place of bowing down,' mosque, is hardly a sufficient reason for suspecting Moslem influence, as Dr. Schechter does, who thinks it possible that the word was introduced by a later (Falasha?) scribe as a substitute for the original term.—Elia Bashiatzi (Adereth Eliahu, p. 58), a Karaite writer of the 15th century, gives *Beth hishtaḥawīya*, together with *Beth hakeneseth* and *Beth hamidrash*, as the three names of the place of worship. Moslem influence can here hardly be questioned; in a later chapter Elia describes the postures of prayer quite after the Moslem pattern, alleging Biblical authority for all of them.

[65] The opinion that after Josiah's reform, or after the restoration of the temple by Zerubbabel and Joshua, Jerusalem was the only place where Jewish sacrifices were offered is refuted by an accumulating volume of evidence from various regions. See D. S. Margoliouth, Expositor, 1911, pp. 40 ff.

[66] Cf. the accusation against the orthodox Jews (5 6): "They defile the Sanctuary in that they do not separate according to the law," etc.—It is possible that the prohibition quoted above applied, not to the inhabitants of the city, but to persons who visited it for the purpose of worship, as is the rule for pilgrims to Mecca.

tioned; it is forbidden to vow to the altar anything that has been procured by compulsion; the priest shall refuse to receive such offerings (16 13 f.). There is nothing to indicate where this sanctuary was situated, further than the natural presumption that it was in the region of Damascus, where the sect had established itself. The priests have the precedence of all others in the community; in its registers their names are enrolled in the first rank. Their place in the courts and in the local religious community, and their duties in the examination of lepers, have already been mentioned. Those who officiated at the sanctuary had doubtless their legal toll from private sacrifices of every kind. Lost property for which no owner appears falls to the priests; a man who has appropriated such property shall confess to the priest, and all that he pays in restitution belongs to the priest, besides the ram of the trespass offering (9 13 ff.).

A charitable fund is provided by monthly payment of certain dues by members of the community to the Supervisor. From this fund relief is given by the judges to the poor and needy, to the aged, to the wanderer (?), to such as have fallen into captivity to foreigners, and others (14 12 ff.).

The religious conceptions and beliefs of the sect present little that is peculiar. For God the name *El* is consistently used, without any epithets. *Adonai* is mentioned only to forbid its use in oaths. The only other name which occurs is the Most High (once, in the phrase "the saints of the Most High," that is, the members of the sect). There is repeated reference to the holy spirit: God, through his Anointed, made men know his holy spirit (2 12); the opponents of the sect, by blasphemous speech against the statutes of God's covenant, defiled their holy spirit (5 11);[67] its members are warned not to defile his holy spirit by failing to observe the distinctions of clean and unclean which God has ordained (7 3 f.).

The "Prince of Lights (*Urim*)," through whom Moses and Aaron arise, is perhaps, as the contrast to Belial suggests, one of the highest angels.[68] The destroying angels execute God's

[67] The holy spirit in them. Dr. Schechter adduces parallels in Jewish writings. Cf. Jubilees 1 21, 23, "Create in them a clean heart and a holy spirit."

[68] Dr. Schechter conjectures that the author wrote *Sar ha-Panim*, the Prince of the Presence, but the passages from Jubilees which he quotes in support of this opinion are hardly convincing.

inescapable judgment on those who turned out of the way and despised the statute (2 6). The fall of the Watchers, which is a favorite subject in the apocalyptic literature, is referred to in 2 18. The chief of the evil spirits is Belial: he is "let loose" during the whole of the present dispensation; he lays snares for men and entraps them, especially in the three sins of fornication, unrighteous gain, and the defilement of the sanctuary (4 15 ff.); his spirits rule over men and lead them to apostasy (12 2 f.); he also exterminates the faithless in the day of God's visitation (8 1 f.). Another name for the devil is Mastema (the commoner name in Jubilees), equivalent to Satan, "the adversary." The angel of Mastema ceases to follow a man who resolves to return to the law of Moses (16 4 f.). According to Jubilees 10 8 f., 11 5, Mastema had permission from God to employ some of his evil spirits to corrupt men and lead them astray.

Concerning the future life we read only that those who hold firmly to the law are "for eternal life," [69] or, as it is elsewhere expressed, "have the assurance that they shall live a thousand generations." To a punishment of the wicked after death [70] or to a resurrection of the dead there is no allusion whatever.

The moral teachings of the sect have been frequently touched upon above in speaking of their rules of life. Man is led into sin not only by the snares of Belial, but by his own sinful inclination and adulterous eyes (2 16; seemingly the *yeṣer hara'* of the rabbis). It was through these that the Watchers fell; by them the generation of the flood sinned, and the sons of Jacob, and their descendants in Egypt and in Canaan, and brought judgment upon themselves (2 14 ff.). We have seen that the sect insisted upon monogamy, and perhaps rejected divorce altogether. Particular emphasis is laid in several places on the commandments, "thou shalt not take vengeance nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people," "thou shalt reprove thy neighbor and not bear sin because of him" (Lev. 19 17, 18).[71]

[69] See Slavonic Enoch 42 5; cf. 9.

[70] So far as may be argued from silence, this is an important difference from Jubilees.

[71] See 7 2; cf. Slavonic Enoch 50 4: "When you might have vengeance, do not repay either your neighbor or your enemy. For God will repay as your

Thus, at the beginning of the legal part of the book, the delivery of a fellow Israelite to the gentiles so that he is condemned by their law is said to fall under this prohibition, and further, "any man of those who enter into the covenant who brings up against his neighbor a matter not in the nature of a reproof before witnesses, but which he brings up in anger, or tells it to his elders to bring the man into disrepute, he is one that takes vengeance and bears a grudge." It is forbidden also to exact of another an oath except in the presence of the judges; he who does so transgresses the law which forbids a man to take justice into his own hands. Every one who enters into the covenant pledges himself not only not to rob the poor and make widows his spoil, but to love his neighbor as himself, to seek the welfare of his fellow, and to sustain the poor and needy. As regards the relations of the members of the sect to gentiles, it is forbidden to shed the blood of a gentile or to take aught of their property, "in order to give them no occasion to blaspheme" (12 6 f.), that is, to prevent the profaning of God's name (15 3), a motive frequently urged in similar connection in the rabbinical writings. On the other hand, no man may sell to gentiles clean animals or birds, lest they offer them in sacrifice, nor grain, nor wine—naught of his possessions; nor shall he sell to them his slave or maid servant who have come with him into the covenant of Abraham (12 9 ff.). He may not pass the Sabbath in the neighborhood of gentiles. They are unclean, and garments they may have handled require purification.

No record of a schismatic body such as reveals itself in our texts is preserved in the early catalogues of Jewish heresies, nor have references to it been discovered in rabbinical sources. Like many sects, it exhibits the separatist inclination to outdo the orthodox in zeal for the letter and in strenuousness of practice, and it is not surprising that its interpretations of the law frequently agree with those of other strict-constructionists, such as Samaritans, Sadducees, Karaites; but these coincidences illustrate a common tendency rather than prove historical connection. The

avenger in the day of the great judgment. Let it not be for you to take vengeance" (ed. Charles, p. 67); cf. Ecclus. 28 1.

relation to the Book of Jubilees is, however, such as to show that there was some affinity between our sect and the circles in which that work originated. Jubilees is cited as authority on the last times; its calendar probably contains the secrets of God's holy sabbaths and glorious festivals about which all Israel was in error; the rules for the observance of the Sabbath in our book accord in many particulars with the injunctions in Jubilees 50 6 ff. (see also 2 26 ff.); and various other resemblances might be pointed out, such as the preference for the unornamented word God (in Jubilees, God, or the Lord), in contrast with the many mouth-filling periphrases in Enoch; the holy spirit in men; the name Mastema for the adversary instead of Satan; Belial who ensnares men, and the spirits of Belial which rule over sinners, besides others to which Dr. Schechter directs attention in his notes. The relation to the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs is less clear. The saying attributed to Levi (4 15) is not found in the Testament, and the other resemblances Dr. Schechter has noted are vague or belong to the commonplaces. The place of honor given to Judah in the Testaments, as we have them, is strikingly at variance with the attitude of our sect toward that tribe and its princes. The Levite Messiah of the Testaments is not precisely the same as the "Anointed from Aaron and Israel" in our book. In Jubilees also there are salient features, such as the more developed angelology and the form of the Messianic expectation, which hardly permit us to suppose that the book was a product of our sect, however highly it may have been esteemed by it.

The sect gives especial honor to the sons of Zadok, the ancient priesthood of the temple in Jerusalem (Ezek. 44 15, 2 Chron. 31 10, Sirach 51 12 Heb.); they are the chosen ones of Israel, men designated by name, who arose in the latter times (4 3); it was Zadok who brought to light the Book of the Law which no one had seen since the death of Eleazar and Joshua (5 5). The context of the latter passage would suggest that Zadok the contemporary of David is meant, who after the deposition of Abiathar became Solomon's chief priest.[72] The precedence given

[72] That Zadok was the name of the "interpreter of the law," the founder of the sect, is a much less probable opinion; the name stands in no connection

to the sons of Zadok may possibly have a side reference to the illegitimate high priests of Seleucid creation, such as Menelaus, though, if this were the intention, we should expect it to be emphasized.

The passages quoted are the only places in the book in which the name Zadok or the sons of Zadok appear, and they are certainly a very slender reason for describing the body which produced the book as a "Zadokite" sect, whatever meaning may be attached to the term. On the contrary, one of the outstanding things in the constitution of the sect is the predominance of the lay element. The Supervisor is a layman; laymen form the majority in every court; the Messiah is the "Anointed from Aaron *and Israel*." Whether the external testimony upon which Dr. Schechter relies for justification of the name is more adequate will be considered below.

Zadok and the sons of Zadok suggest the Sadducees,[73] whose name, according to the most probable explanation, designates them as descendants (or followers and partisans) of Zadok. Here again it is a question whether Zadok of David's time is meant, so that the Sadducees were the Zadokite aristocracy of the priesthood, as most modern scholars think, or whether the name of the Sadducee sect is derived from a heresiarch of much later times, as the Jewish legend represents which makes Zadok, from whom the sect descends, a recalcitrant disciple of Antigonus of Socho, about the middle of the second century B.C., contemporary, if we rightly interpret our texts, with the origin of the sect we are studying.

With the Sadducees, as we know them from the New Testament, Josephus, and rabbinical sources, our sect cannot well be identified. There is, however, a sect sometimes associated with the Sadducees, namely, the Dositheans, in whose teachings and customs Dr. Schechter finds such resemblances as lead him to surmise that the Dositheans were an offshoot of our sect. The

with the origin of the sect or its legislation, but with the bringing to light again of the Pentateuch. The author cannot have supposed that the *written* law remained unknown till the second century B.C.; the reforms of Josiah, based on another recovery of the book by Hilkiah, would preclude such a notion.

[73] The coincidence of names does not count for very much. Abul-Fath names two Samaritan "Zadokite" subsects among the later Dositheans alone.

accounts of the Dositheans in writers of different ages and religious connections, from Origen and Epiphanius down to the Samaritan Chronicler Abul-Fath and the Moslem heresiographer Shahrastani, are notoriously confused and contradictory,[74] so that many scholars have felt constrained to conclude that there was more than one sect of the name. The Fathers generally agree in describing the Dositheans as a Samaritan heresy, though Epiphanius and Philaster have it that the author of the heresy was by extraction a Jew. They frequently bring him into connection with Simon Magus, in the time of the Apostles. According to Origen, he gave himself out for the Messiah foretold by Moses; his followers had books of his, and legends pretending that he had not died, but was still alive somewhere. Other Fathers give no date for the rise of the heresy, but by coupling it with the Sadducees seem to imply that it was older than Christianity; thus (Pseudo)Tertullian (probably after Hippolytus)[75] says that Dositheus the Samaritan was the first to reject the prophets as not inspired; the Sadducees, springing from this root of error, ventured to deny the resurrection also. From this Philaster probably drew the inference that Zadok, the founder of the Sadducees, was a disciple of Dositheus. The Samaritan and Moslem authors agree with the Fathers in treating the Dositheans as a Samaritan sect. Abul-Fath, a Samaritan writer of the fourteenth century, puts the beginnings of the sect in the first century B.C., at the time when the yoke of the Jews had been broken by the kings of the gentiles, and the Samaritans were able to return and restore their sanctuary, which had been destroyed by Simon and John Hyrcanus.[76] The Moslem writer Shahrastani, in his

[74] See Hilgenfeld, Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristenthums, 1884, pp. 155 ff.; Montgomery, The Samaritans, 1907, pp. 252 ff.

[75] See also Epiphanius; the Sadducees were an offshoot from Dositheus.

[76] Not in the time of Alexander the Great, as Dr. Schechter has from Montgomery. Abul-Fath, indeed (and Adler's Chronicle after him), introduces this whole story before Alexander, and makes Simon a protégé of Darius; but the testimony that Dositheus appeared after the time of Hyrcanus, which, as a matter of Samaritan history, may be conceived to rest on tradition, is not to be set aside because, in fitting his Samaritan traditions into the framework of universal history, Abul-Fath is in error by two or three centuries about the date of Hyrcanus. This used to be understood; see, e.g., De Sacy, Chrestomathie arabe, vol. ii (1806), p. 209.

learned work on Religious Sects and Philosophical Schools (first half of the twelfth century), gives substantially the same date: the founder of the Dositheans, who professed to be the prophet foretold by Moses, the star spoken of in the law, appeared about a century before Christ.

In this state of the evidence it is obvious that no argument can be based on the coincidence in time between the origin of the Dositheans and that of our sect. When the Fathers bring the names of Dositheus and Zadok into conjunction, it means no more than that they attributed certain errors to both Dositheans and Sadducees; just as the Talmudic legend which makes Zadok and Boëthus apostate disciples of Antigonus of Socho is but a mythological way of saying that Sadducees and Boëthusians were addicted to the same heresies concerning retribution, or as the coupling of Dositheus and Simon Magus means that both passed for Samaritan arch-heretics.

The first point of agreement between the Dositheans and our sect which Dr. Schechter notes is in the calendar. Abul-Fath says that the Dositheans did away with the computation of the almanac (tables of lunar conjunctions), making all their months exactly thirty days long, and (thus) annulled the correct festivals and the ordinance of the fasts and the affliction (Day of Atonement).[77] The circle of thirty disciples, who, with a woman called Helena (Moon), formed the train of Dositheus, according to the Clementine Recognitions (ii, 8) symbolized the days of the month. If our sect employed the calendar of the Book of Jubilees, as seems highly probable, they also had thirty-day months; but it would not follow that the system was original with them, nor that the Dositheans must have adopted it from them. There were, in fact, from very remote times, two years in use within the area of the ancient civilizations, a lunar-solar year, consisting of twelve lunar months of twenty-nine or thirty days each, with a thirteenth month added every two or three years to maintain approximate agreement with the solar year and make the months fall in the same seasons, and a solar year of three hundred and sixty-five days, divided into twelve months of thirty

[77] Epiphanius avers, on the contrary, that the Dositheans kept their festivals at the same time with the Jews.

days each without regard to the lunations, and five extra days (*epagomenae*). The former was the system of the Babylonians and the Greeks, as well as the Jews; the latter was in use in Egypt from immemorial times until the Roman reforms. From the Egyptians it was borrowed by the Abyssinians; it was employed also for some centuries before and after the Christian era in the calendars of Gaza and Ashkelon. The Persians had the same system; the Yashts contain a liturgy for the thirty regents of the days of the month, the five extra days being assigned to the divine Gathas. Probably under Persian influences, this calendar was established in Armenia, Cappadocia, and other parts of Asia Minor.[78]

Jews and Samaritans not only lived in many of the lands of their dispersion among peoples who used the thirty-day month, but encountered this calendar in commercial centres on the very borders of Palestine with which they had close relations. The advantages of a system in which the festivals came on fixed dates, instead of shifting within wide limits, as they must in the lunar-solar year with its irregular intercalation, are obvious,[79] and an attempt to reform the Jewish calendar accordingly may have been made more than once and in more than one region. The peculiarity of the system of the Book of Jubilees is not the uniform length of the months, but the admission of only *four* extra days, thus making an even fifty-two weeks (364 days), which was of more concern to the author than the increased error of a whole day in the solar year.[80] We do not know whether the Dositheans

[78] See Ideler, Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie, vol. i, pp. 437 ff., 517; Ginzel, Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie, vol. i, pp. 170 f., 287. On the calendar of Gaza, Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes (3 ed.), vol. ii, pp. 88 f.

[79] We have experience of the inconvenience of this system in the wandering of Easter and the Christian festivals dependent on it; a reform by which Easter should come on a fixed date in the solar year has repeatedly been proposed, and a movement is now on foot in Europe to bring this about by agreement of governments and churches.

[80] The year of 364 days is found also in Enoch 72–82, and (by the side of the true solar year of 365¼ and the lunar year of 354 days) in the Slavonic Enoch. The intercalary days are introduced one at the beginning of each quarter of the year (Enoch 75 1); this is also the method in Jubilees; see 6 23. In effect this is equivalent to a year in which eight months have thirty days and four—those

of Abul-Fath and the Sadducees of Kirkisani (of whom later) agreed in this point with Jubilees, or counted *five* extra days like the rest of the world. The former may be thought probable, but it cannot be assumed as certain. The year of 365 days is also found in the Greek Apocalypse of Baruch, c. 6.

Dr. Schechter quotes Epiphanius [81] on the Dositheans as saying, "some of them abstain from a second marriage, but others never marry"; and, although "the text is not quite certain on this point," [82] is inclined to perceive in the statement "at least an echo of the law of our sect prohibiting a second marriage as long as the first wife is alive." The passage in Epiphanius is more than obscure, and the text is for that reason suspected. The passage runs: Ἐμψύχων ἀπέχονται, ἀλλὰ καί τινες αὐτῶν ἐγκρατεύονται ἀπὸ γάμων μετὰ τοῦ βιῶσαι, ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ παρθενεύουσιν. Whatever this may mean, it certainly is not, "some of them abstain from marriage after the death of their first wives," nor does anything in the context justify the large changes in the text which would be required to force this sense upon it. Casaubon's conjecture νἱῶσαι has nothing to commend it. The simplest solution of the difficulty would be to write συμβιῶσαι,[83] "some of them refrain from marital relations after having lived together, others preserve their virginity." Whether this emendation is right or not, it is clear that Epiphanius describes his Dositheans as a kind of Encratite ascetics, while the prohibition of polygamy—whether contemporaneous or consecutive—by our sect has a totally different ground; of asceticism there is, indeed, no symptom in its ordinances.

Dr. Schechter thinks that the statement of Epiphanius quoted

in which the equinoxes and solstices fall—have thirty-one (Enoch 72 13, 19). It is not impossible that this system is implied in the chronology of the flood in Genesis; see B. W. Bacon, Hebraica, vol. viii (1891–1892), pp. 79–88, 124–139; Charles, Jubilees, p. 56.

[81] This is not the place to discuss the value of Epiphanius's testimony. His description of the Scribes and Pharisees at least admonishes to caution.

[82] The text is certain enough, in the sense that all the manuscripts hitherto collated have the same reading.

[83] Nicetas, in reproducing Epiphanius's account of the Dositheans, has τεκνῶσαι, "after having begotten children," which also agrees very well with the context.

above that the Dositheans "abstain from eating living creatures" "may have some connection with the law in our text on p. 12, l. 11, which may perhaps be understood to imply that the sect forbade honey, regarding it as *'eber min hahai* (a limb cut off from a living animal), which would agree with the testimony of Abul-Fath that they forbade the eating of eggs, except those which were found in a slaughtered fowl." Ἐμψύχων ἀπέχονται does not mean "abstain from eating living creatures," but "abstain from animal food,"[84] while our sect certainly did not include vegetarianism among its eccentricities, any more than the depreciation of marriage.

Several authors describe the Dositheans as extravagant sabbatarians. Origen reports that their rule was, that in whatever place and in whatever posture the Sabbath found a man, there and thus he was to remain till its end. Abul-Fath gives a longer account of their Sabbath laws, which are much stricter than those of our texts. It was forbidden, for example, to feed domestic animals or give them drink on the Sabbath, they were to be provided on Friday with enough provender and water to last them through the Sabbath. Extreme sabbatarianism is, however, a sectarian propensity which does not have to be borrowed.

Dr. Schechter quotes Epiphanius further as saying that the Dositheans "have no intercourse with all people because they detest all mankind," in which he thinks "we may readily recognize here the law of our Sect requiring the washing of the clothes when they were brought by a Gentile (because of the contamination), and the prohibition of staying over the Sabbath in the vicinity of Gentiles" (Introduction, pp. xxiii f.). What Epiphanius says is that the Dositheans agree with the rest of the Samaritans in the observance of circumcision and the Sabbath, and in avoiding contact with any one because they feel that all men (that is, all gentiles) are unclean. He had already described the customs of all the Samaritans: They wash themselves and their clothes in water when they come in contact with a foreigner; for they regard it as a defilement to come in contact with any one or even to touch

[84] The familiar title of Porphyry's book on vegetarianism, Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων, will occur to every one. Epiphanius himself explains the word in Haer. 18, 1, "they (Nasaraei) thought it unlawful to eat meat."

a man of another religion.[85] It is, therefore, not a Dosithean peculiarity, but the general Samaritan usage which Epiphanius describes, and it is useless to search for remoter affinities.

The marked hostility to the patriarch Judah with which Eulogius, the Patriarch of Alexandria (died 607 A.D.), charges Dositheus[86] is natural enough in a Samaritan heresiarch; in the same sentence Eulogius accuses him of scorning the prophets of God, which, again, is not peculiar to the Dositheans, but is the general Samaritan position. It has been remarked above (p. 353) that our sect gives especial honor to the books of the prophets "whose words Israel has despised"; and, however unfriendly the attitude of these seceders to the degenerate Judah of their time, there is no indication of animosity to the patriarch, as there is none in the Jubilees.

From a much later time Dr. Schechter has gleaned some notices of a sect of "Zadokites" in whose tenets also he recognizes resemblances to those of our sect. Kirkisani, a Karaite author of the tenth century,[87] says: "Zadok was the first who exposed the Rabbanites and contradicted them publicly. He revealed a part of the truth, and composed books [a book] in which he frequently denounced the Rabbanites and criticised them. But he adduced no proof for anything he said, merely saying it by way of statement, except in one thing, namely, in his prohibition against marrying the daughter of the brother and the daughter of the sister. For he adduced as proof their being analogous to the paternal and maternal aunt."[88]

This is a matter about which our sectaries are especially fierce in their denunciations of the laxity of the orthodox. The argument they employ is the same which Kirkisani attributes to Zadok. It is, however, the obvious argument, if the principle of analogy be admitted in the interpretation of the law; it is com-

[85] Haer. 9, 3; cf. 30, 2: "The Ebionites, like the Samaritans, avoid touching an outsider." A still more extreme fastidiousness on this point is attributed by Josephus to the Essenes; cf. B. J. ii, 8, 10.

[86] Photius, Bibliotheca Codicum, cod. 280 (ed. Bekker, p. 285).

[87] The Kitab al-Anwār was published in 937, not 637, as by a misprint on p. xviii.

[88] Schechter's translation, Introduction, p. xviii.

mon in the Karaite books, and is ascribed to the Samaritans also.[89] Kirkisani also says that the Zadokites absolutely forbade divorce, which the Scripture permitted, agreeing in this with the Christians and with the Isawites, whose founders, Jesus and Obadiah of Ispahan,[90] had likewise forbidden it. We are not told expressly that our sect prohibited divorce, but their prohibition of remarriage during the life of the divorced wife would have the same effect. Finally, Kirkisani says that the Zadokites fixed all the months at thirty days each,[91] and that they did not count the Sabbath among the seven days of the celebration of the Passover and the Tabernacles, making the feast consist of seven days exclusive of the Sabbath. Substantially the same statements are made about the Zadokites by another Karaite author, Hadassi, who flourished in the middle of the twelfth century, and perhaps derived his information from Kirkisani.

What the "Zadokite" writings really were to which these authors refer is not known. It is certain, however, that both the Karaites and their opponents took them to be Sadducean works. In the passage about Zadok, part of which Dr. Schechter quotes (see above), Kirkisani says: "After the appearance of the Rabbanites (the first of whom was Simeon the Just), the Sadducees appeared; their leaders were Zadok and Boëthus. . . . Zadok was the first who exposed the Rabbanites," etc.[92] Zadok's disclosure of a part of truth was followed by the full discovery of the truth about the laws by Anan, the founder of the Karaites. Not only do the opponents of the Karaites stigmatize Anan and his followers as the remnants of the disciples of Zadok and Boëthus, but the older Karaites expressly claim this origin. Thus Joseph al-Baṣir (first half of the eleventh century) says that, in the times of the second temple, the Rabbanites, who were then called Pharisees, had the upper hand, while the Karaites, then known as Sadducees, were less influential.[93] The Karaite author

[89] Schechter, p. xxxvii, n. 21.

[90] Founder of a Jewish sect which arose in Persia about the end of the seventh century.

[91] On this point see above, p. 362.

[92] Quoted in the original by Poznanski, Revue des études juives, vol. xliv (1902), p. 162, n. 2.

[93] Quoted by Poznanski, l. c., p. 170.

of an anonymous commentary on Exodus preserved in manuscript in St. Petersburg [94] polemizes against a disciple of Saadia, the great *Malleus Karaeorum*, about the proper way of determining the beginning of the months (and consequently the dates of the feasts), which the Rabbanites fixed by calculation of the conjunctions, while the Karaites depended on observation of the visible new moon. The ancients, he says, required evidence of the appearance of the new moon.[95] Saadia, who mistakenly assumed that the beginning of the month had been determined astronomically from remote antiquity—the calendar was, in fact, of Sinaitic origin [96]—asserted that the taking of testimony about the appearance of the moon was an innovation occasioned by the contention of Zadok and Boëthus that the law required the beginning of the month to be determined by actual observation; witnesses were heard only to prove that observation confirmed the calculation. To this the author replies: "The book of the Zadokites (Sadducees) is well known, and there is no such thing in it as that man (Saadia) avers. In the book of Zadok are various things in which he dissents from the Rabbanites of the second temple with regard to sacrifices and other matters, but there is not a syllable of what the Fayyumite (Saadia) says." [97] Saadia himself appears not to have questioned the authenticity of the writings that went under the name of Zadok, with which he seems to have been acquainted, directly or indirectly, for in a passage quoted by Yefet ben 'Ali he says that Zadok had proved from the one hundred and fifty days in the story of the flood just the opposite of what the Karaites try to prove from them.[98]

[94] Harkavy attributed it conjecturally to Sahl ben Masliah; Poznanski, whom Dr. Schechter follows, thinks it more likely that the author was Hasan ben Mashiah.

[95] As the Karaites do. See e.g. Mishna, Rosh ha-Shana, 1 7 ff., 2 1 f.

[96] See Poznanski, Jewish Quarterly Review, vol. x (1898), pp. 159, 248, 273.

[97] Quoted in the original by Poznanski, Revue des études juives, vol. xliv, p. 176.—The point is that the "Zadokite" writings known to the author said nothing about fixing the beginning of the month by observation. Saadia doubtless based his assertion, not on anything he found in "Zadokite" books, but on Rosh ha-Shanah 22 a–b.

[98] Poznanski, l. c., p. 177; cf. also Jewish Quarterly Review, vol. x, pp. 246 ff.—Saadia probably means that "Zadok" argued from the fact that the 150 days of Gen. 7 24, 8 3, make an even five months (7 11, 8 4), that each month had thirty

Zadokite books thus meant, for all those from whom our information comes, Sadducean books; and so, in the sense that, whatever their age and origin, they contained substantially Sadducean teachings, most modern scholars, also, have understood the name.

The possibility that Sadducean writings from the beginning of the Christian era had survived to the Middle Ages cannot well be denied, especially in view of the preservation of the book of the unknown sect that forms the subject of our present study in copies as late as the tenth or eleventh century; and even if the book which the Karaites took for Sadducean was erroneously attributed to that sect, there is no sufficient ground for identifying it with the texts in our hands or for ascribing it to our sect. A thirty-day month, and the prohibition of divorce and of marriage with a niece, are much too slender a foundation to support so large an inference, and it is hardly legitimate to argue that if we had the entire book, of which only a part—or, according to Dr. Schechter, excerpts—is preserved, we might find other and more significant agreements.

Dr. Schechter has also remarked certain coincidences between the tenets of our sect and those of the Falashas, or Abyssinian Jews, whom, with Beer, he is disposed to connect in some way with the Dositheans. Their Sabbath laws resemble those in the Jubilees and in the texts before us; they also prohibit marriage with a niece; they have a tradition that the Pentateuch was brought to Abyssinia by Azariah, the son of Zadok (1 Kings 4 2); certain features of their calendar may possibly be related to that of the Zadokites as described by Kirkisani. Here, again, the correspondences are not numerous or distinctive enough to establish an historical connection.

Putting together these scattered indicia, Dr. Schechter arrives at a theory of the history and relations of the sect which must be given in his own words:—

We may, then, formulate our hypothesis that our text is constituted of fragments forming extracts from a Zadok book, known to us chiefly

days (cf. Jubilees 5 27), while for the Karaites thirty days was only the extreme length of a lunar month. See Poznanski, Jewish Quarterly Review, vol. x, p. 241.

from the writings of Kirkisani. The Sect which it represented, did not however pass for any length of time under the name of Zadokites, but was soon in some way amalgamated with and perhaps also absorbed by the Dosithean Sect, and made more proselytes among the Samaritans than among the Jews, with which former sect it had many points of similarity. In the course of time, however, the Dosithean Sect also disappeared, and we have only some traces left of them in the lingering sect of the Falashas, with whom they probably came into close contact at an early period of their (the Falashas') existence, and to whom they handed down a good many of their practices. The only real difficulty in the way of this hypothesis is, that according to our Text the Sect had its original seat in Damascus, north of Palestine, and it is difficult to see how they reached the Dositheans, and subsequently the Falashas, who had their main seats in the south of Palestine, or Egypt. But this could be explained by assuming special missionary efforts on the part of the Zadokites by sending their emissaries to Egypt, a country which was especially favourable to such an enterprise because of the existence of the Onias Temple there. The severance of the Egyptian Jews from the Palestinian influence (though they did not entirely give up their loyalty to the Jerusalem Sanctuary), prepared the ground for the doctrines of such a Sect as the Zadokites in which all allegiance to Judah and Jerusalem was rejected, and in which the descendants of the House of Zadok (of whom indeed Onias himself was one) represented both the Priest and the Messiah.

The evidence adduced in support of this ingenious hypothesis has already been examined in detail, and the results need only be summarized here: There is nothing in the book before us to warrant classing the men who made the new covenant in the land of Damascus as a Zadokite sect;[99] neither the external nor the internal evidence suffices to identify the work quoted by Kirkisani as Zadokite (by which he and all the rest understood Sadducean) with the book before us; the connection of the sect with the Dositheans rests in great part on misunderstanding of the testimonies about the Dositheans—misunderstandings, it is fair to say, which are not all original with Dr. Schechter,—in part upon points of resemblance which are not distinctive enough to prove anything. Of the peculiar organization of our sect, which would be conclusive, there is no trace anywhere.

A much more sensational hypothesis was broached by Mr. G. Margoliouth in the *Athenaeum* for November 26, 1910, under

[99] See above, p. 359 f.

the title, "The Sadducean Christians of Damascus." He takes "the root" which God caused to spring from Israel and Aaron (1 7) for the same person who is subsequently called the Anointed one (Messiah), and distinguishes this figure from the Teacher of Righteousness, also called the Anointed one, who appeared twenty years later. "Both these Messiahs were dead when the document was composed, but they were both expected to reappear in the latter days."

The first of them, the Messiah descended from Aaron and Israel, in consequence of whose work "they meditated over their sin, and knew that they were guilty men," is John the Baptist. John's father was a priest, and though his mother also is said to have been of priestly descent, "this need not stand in the way of believing that there was a strain of non-priestly Israelite blood in the family." The Sadducees would naturally prefer a priestly Messiah to a Davidic one, and, when John won the recognition of the people as a prophet sent by God, it would not be strange if a priestly party acclaimed him as in some sense a Messiah, or anointed leader of the nation.

The other Messiah, the Teacher of Righteousness, must then be Jesus. That he appeared twenty years after John, so far from being an argument against this identification, would relieve the difficulty of trying to crowd John's whole history into little more than a year. "It is surely not necessary to defend the Lucan tradition on this point at all hazards, and it seems quite likely that the newly discovered document has at last given us the right perspective of events."

If these identifications are correct, the "man of scoffing," or Belial,[100] who is sent to pervert the nation and turn it from the law, can be no other than the Apostle Paul, and it is noted for confirmation that "the period here assigned to his activity and that of his immediate following is about forty years, a space of time not far removed from the result of recent critical computation."

The New Covenant so often referred to in the texts is clearly to be connected with the identical conception and expression

[100] In "Belial is let loose," Mr. Margoliouth finds a witless pun on Paul's apostolic claims.

in the New Testament, nor does it seem to be accidental that the Teacher of Righteousness is several times spoken of as the "only" or "unique" one.

Mr. Margoliouth presents his complete hypothesis as follows:—

The natural and apparently inevitable conclusion of the whole matter, therefore, is that we have here to deal with a primitive Judaeo-Christian body of people which consisted of priests and Levites belonging to the Boëthusian section of the Sadducean party,[101] fortified—as the document shows—by a considerable Israelitish lay element, besides a real or contemplated admixture of proselytes. They acknowledged, as we have seen, John the Baptist, as a Messiah of the family of Aaron, and they also believed in Jesus as a kind of second (or, perhaps, as pre-eminent) Messiah whose special function it was to be a "Teacher of Righteousness." Paul they abhorred; and they strove with all their might to combine the full observance of the Mosaic Law, as they understood it, with the principles of the "new covenant," again as they understood it. On the destruction of the Temple by Titus, finding that it would not serve any good purpose to linger in Judaea, they determined to migrate to Damascus,[102] intending to establish their central organization in that city, and to found communities of the sect in different parts of the neighboring country. It was at this juncture that the manifesto,

[101] Mr. Margoliouth is led to the opinion that they were Boëthusians by the obscure passage in 2 13, which he interprets, "in the explanation of his name (sc. the Messiah's) are also their names,"—the name of the sect points mysteriously to the name of the Messiah. "Now the Boëthusians derived their name from a priest named Boëthus, and the meaning of *βοηθὸς* is the same as that of the Hebrew name represented by Jesus. The inference would be that the section of the Zadokite or Sadducees who adopted an attitude of belief toward John the Baptist and Jesus were none other than the Boëthusians (perhaps identical with the great company of believing priests of Acts 6 7), who not unnaturally liked to dwell on the identity of meaning between their names and that of the Teacher."—*Boëthos*, it may be remarked, is probably a Greek equivalent for the name Ezra, not for Jeshua.

[102] Mr. Margoliouth thinks that "the end of the destruction of the land," after which the migration to Damascus took place, "can hardly be anything else than the completion of the Roman conquest in A.D. 70." "At the end of the devastation of the land" means, however, not when the destruction was complete, but when the period of desolation was over. The phrase itself, therefore, is no more appropriate to Titus than to Nebuchadnezzar—or to Hadrian. Mr. Margoliouth does not say how he interprets the rest of the passage. Are the men who, at the end of the devastation of the land, "removed the boundary and led Israel astray," the great rabbis of the generations after the destruction of Jerusalem, and does the sequel, "and the land was laid waste because they spoke rebelliously against the commandments of God by Moses and against his holy Anointed one," refer to the war under Hadrian?

bearing as it does unmistakable marks of personal touch, was composed by a leader of the movement.

No scholar who has made an independent study of the texts published by Dr. Schechter can have failed to consider the question whether these schismatics, with their "unique teacher," [103] their "new covenant," their "Supervisor," whose name and functions might be compared with those of a bishop (ἐπίσκοπος), their loyalty to their dead leader, God's Anointed one (Messiah), who made them know his holy spirit, and their expectation of an Anointed one in the last times, their hostility to the Pharisees, can have been a Jewish Christian sect.

The more closely the documents are examined, however, the less tenable this conjecture appears. One feature of the sectarian eschatology which, if established, would afford the most striking coincidence with early Christian belief, namely, that the Messiah who died in the early days of the sect is to "reappear" (Margoliouth), or "rise again" (Schechter), has no support whatever in the text.[104] The "new covenant" in the land of Damascus is plainly the obligation by which the members of the sect bind themselves to the organization, with its peculiar interpretations of the law and its distinctive observances. Neither in the terms of the covenant nor in the law itself is there anything that suggests Christian origin or influence. That "a man should love his neighbor as himself" is not peculiarly or even preëminently a Christian precept. The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs reiterate it; by the most orthodox rabbis it was recognized as the most comprehensive commandment in the law.

The things which the sect esteems of vital importance lie wholly in the sphere of the law; polemic zeal for a code which is at every point more rigorous than that of the Pharisees is the salient characteristic of both parts of the book. The moral precepts are the commonplaces of Judaism narrowed to a sectarian horizon.[105]

[103] As has been noted above, *yāḥīd* is sometimes rendered in the Greek Old Testament by μονογενής.

[104] See above, p. 341.

[105] The commandment to love one's neighbor as himself, for example. In the context of the covenant formula, in contrast to Jewish orthodoxy no less than to Christianity, the neighbor is not the fellow man, nor even the fellow Jew, but the fellow member of the schismatic church.

The judgment of God is similarly circumscribed. It is not a judgment of the world or of the Jewish people, but of those who reject and controvert the legal interpretation of the sect, and of those who have fallen away from it.

The code of law which is the constituent principle of the sect and the reason for its existence was given it by its founder, the Teacher of Righteousness. This unique teacher was not a prophetic reformer, but "the interpreter of the law who came to Damascus," "the legislator." The statutes he decreed are final; the sect "shall receive no others until the teacher of righteousness shall arise in the last times."

Mr. Margoliouth thinks that the "teacher of righteousness" to whom the sect attributed its institutions and laws was Jesus. The statement of this conjecture is its refutation. The rôle of a legislator is the last which the character and teaching of Jesus in the Gospels would suggest even to a sect in search of a founder. That he, whose disregard for the Pharisaic rules of Sabbath observance repeatedly got him into trouble, should, within a generation after his death, have been metamorphosed into the author of the sabbatical code in our texts, which outpharisees the Pharisees at every point, surpasses ordinary powers of imagination. The Christian Jews of the first century in Palestine, so far as we know anything about them, conformed in the matter of observance to the authority of the scribes and Pharisees, and alleged the express command of Jesus for this practice (Matt. 23 2). Early Christian heresies sometimes exhibit ascetic features reminding us of the Essenes; but none of ultra-legalistic tendency is known.

As our sect is very zealous for things which have no connection with Christianity, so on the other hand the texts disclose no trace of specific Christian beliefs or conceptions. For the Christian Jews of the first century, the belief that Jesus, who had been crucified under Pontius Pilate, was the Messiah of prophecy, that he had risen from the dead and ascended to heaven, whence he was presently to come in might and majesty, according to the vision of Daniel, to usher in the new era, was the pith and substance of their faith, the "heresy" by which they were separated from their countrymen, the focus of their polemic and

apologetic in controversies with those who rejected their Messiah. It is impossible to imagine a writing as long as this, and imbued as strongly as this with a controversial spirit, proceeding from any Christian sect, in which there should not be so much as an allusion to any of these things; or that a sect which put John the Baptist in so high a place should not make something of baptism in the admission of members.

Apart from these general considerations, Mr. Margoliouth's identifications rest upon a palpable misinterpretation. On page 1 we read: "But because God remembered the covenant with the forefathers, he left Israel a remnant, and did not suffer them to be exterminated. And at the end of wrath . . . he visited them and caused to spring up from Israel and Aaron a root of his planting *to inherit his land and to prosper on the good things of his earth.*" The italicized clauses prove beyond question that the "root" is not an individual, but is a collective designation for the first generation of the sect.[106] The parallel passage on p. 5 says explicitly: "God remembered the covenant with the forefathers, and he raised up from Aaron men of insight and from Israel wise men, and he heard them, and they dug the well." "The well is the law, and they who dug it are the exiles of Israel who migrated to Judah and sojourned in the land of Damascus." In the face of this perfectly plain meaning of the passage Mr. Margoliouth takes "the root" for the person designated in other places as "the Anointed from Aaron and Israel," who led the people "to recognize their wickedness and know that they were guilty men."[107] In this first Messiah he recognizes John the Baptist, and, consequently, in the Teacher of Righteousness who came after him, Jesus. The point of correspondence is the relation between the forerunner and his successor. The text, however, as I have just showed, says nothing of a precursor of the teacher of righteousness; on the contrary, it was this teacher who first brought light to the generation which in the consciousness of its sin was

[106] See above, p. 334.

[107] That the repentance of the people was brought about by the work of "the root" is not suggested in any way in the text; on the contrary, the only natural construction and interpretation of the passage would make the penitent generation the same with that which is called "the root."

groping like the blind, and guided them in the way of God's heart.[108]

That by the "man of scoffing" the Apostle Paul is meant is for Mr. Margoliouth a corollary of the preceding identifications, and falls with them. The enemies of Paul were doubtless capable of calling him all sorts of hard names, but there is nothing in the epithets "scorner" and "liar," or in the doings attributed to this figure, which fits Paul better than any other false teacher and sower of discord, while the reference to the fate of the men of war who followed the "man of lies" seems quite inapplicable to Paul.[109]

That we should be unable to identify the Covenanters of Damascus with any sect previously known is not surprising. The three or four centuries in the middle of which the Christian era falls were prolific in sects and heresies of many complexions, as were the centuries following the rise of Islam. Through Philo, Josephus, the church Fathers, and the Talmud, we are acquainted with some of them; but it is probable that there were many others of which no reports have reached us. If we cannot, out of the collection at our disposal, put a label on our Covenanters, we may console ourselves with the reflection that here we know one Jewish sect from its own monuments, and that the texts in our hands, mutilated as they are, suffice to give us a much clearer notion of its peculiarities than we get of most of the other sects from the descriptions which have come down to us.

Its affinities with various antipharisaic or antirabbinical parties, such as the Samaritans, the Sadducees, and, in later times, the Karaites, is obvious. It shared with all these a zeal for the letter and the literal interpretation, and a disposition to extend the law by analogy of principle, as a result of which their rules were in general much stricter than those of the Rabbis, who possessed

[108] See above, p. 334.

[109] Gressmann is sure that this "man of lies" must be Bar Coziba (Bar Cocheba), the Messianic leader of the rebellion under Hadrian. He might have added that the contrast to the true star out of Jacob, the founder of the sect, would be peculiarly pertinent. The punning etymology, "Say not 'Star,' but 'liar'" (Echa Rabbathi on Lam. 2 2), is ascribed to the Patriarch Judah.

in the theory of tradition and in their methods of exegesis the means of adapting the law to changed conditions, and who were also more disposed to give the precedence to the great principles of humanity in the law over its particular prescriptions when the two seemed to conflict. The organization of the sect, on the other hand, has no parallel within our knowledge. In view of the use of the name "camps" for the local communities, and the references to the "mustering" of the members, the "trumpets of the congregation," and the like, it may be surmised that the organization of Israel in the wilderness suggested the plan, and that the Supervisors were meant to correspond to the chiefs of the tribes (for instance, Num. 1 10), each having authority over a separate camp.

The sect seems to have perpetuated itself for a considerable time, otherwise this book would hardly have been preserved. It may perhaps be conjectured that it survived long enough to be gathered, along with numerous younger sects, into the capacious bosom of Karaism, of which it was in various points a precursor. Such an hypothesis would explain how it came about that copies of the book were made in the tenth century and later, we should then suppose by Karaite scribes.[110]

Dr. Schechter has laid all students of Judaism under new obligations by the discovery and publication of these texts. They will join with their congratulations the hope that he may find yet other treasures among the accumulations of the Genizah.

[110] Perhaps the manuscripts may have been in the possession of some Rabbanite controversialist in Egypt, and thus found their way, like various Karaite writings, into the Genizah of the Synagogue.

GOD IN ALL AND OVER ALL

WARREN SEYMOUR ARCHIBALD

PITTSFIELD, MASS.

Each generation and each century seems to have its own peculiar danger and its own peculiar genius. The Christian church, for example, was confronted in the early centuries with the dangerous and subtle opposition of Greek thought; and the genius of the church victoriously faced this opposition with that spiritual interpretation of the life and teachings of Jesus which we find in the Fourth Gospel. Later, in the sixteenth century, the danger appeared in a materialistic church, and the genius of the Reformation was unmistakably present in the religion of the spirit and the liberty of the individual. In the eighteenth century the peril was seen in dogma, or irreligion, or a tepid morality; and the opposition developed Pietism in Germany, Methodism in England, and the Great Awakening in New England. Every century appears to be led into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil in some new guise, and is compelled to find the apt, victorious text in Scripture.

And yet, whatever be the temptation and whatever be the triumphant reply, the issues are always the same,—sin and salvation. In the Greek myth of Proteus, when that old man of the sea was grappled with, he assumed most horrible and terrifying forms. Now he was a fire, now a wild stag, now a screaming seabird, now a three-headed dog, now a serpent. Sin is always protean, and presents to the wrestling centuries new and terrible aspects. What, then, we ask, seem to be the principalities and protean powers against which we are compelled to wrestle? I venture to think they may be suggested in one word, Materialism.

This is most noticeable in our economic life. Within a very short period, virtually since 1870, unprecedented fortunes have been made in America. Through all classes the great desire for money has spread like fire. The college man who enters the

broker's office on Wall Street and the Greek immigrant who starts a fruit-stand on the sidewalk are both in search of wealth. America has become synonymous with money. All this is so well known that there is no necessity for any lengthy exposition of it. I wish only to emphasize—what any careful student of events well knows—that this great material prosperity has produced a striking capacity to see the material and a corresponding incapacity to see the ideal.

Nor is this materialism confined to our economic life. For one reason and another much of the keenest thinking of our time is materialistic. The doctrine of the superman and the theory of the survival of the fittest are the stars in the intellectual firmament of many students. A philosophy like that of Nietzsche influences the man in college, in the settlement house, and in the café. The magazines with their adulation or their execration of the great masters of wealth, the theatre with the drama of Sudermann, Hauptmann, and Pinero, give prominence to the value of the material and the futility of the ideal. Christianity is openly ridiculed as a system which perpetuates the socially unfit, violently attacked as the defender of an unjust industrial system, or silently disregarded as an obsolete institution. Not only without the churches but also within our fellowships we find altogether too often the absence of that capacity to see the ideal, and to endure as seeing Him who is invisible. The congregation in more than one church has become the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. Even in the church of a great spiritual leader the mid-week service will be deserted for the opera. In the summer the city church is closed, while the country club is open. Our athletic men and maidens speak much of God's out-of-doors, and quote the Christ who went into the country, who climbed the hills, who knew the flowers of the field and the birds of the air. They do not seem to recollect, however, the rather striking fact that the only habit known to us in the youth of Christ is his custom of going into the church of his fathers on the Sabbath-day. The plain fact is that many people of church-going ancestry are not going to church. A group of young business men in Boston, who happen to belong to the same organization, may be taken as representatives of a large class.

Their fathers were deacons, elders, members of the church, and ministers. Only two out of two dozen in this group attend church. Here are thoroughly good men, actively interested in civic questions, good citizenship, and the body politic, but they are not interested in church attendance. They are proud, and justly proud, of their fathers, but they should remember that even all these, though they obtained a good report through faith, obtained not the promises, God having provided some better thing for their descendants, that the fathers without the sons should not be made perfect. At the bottom of all this feeling, whether we find it in the churches or out of the churches, whether in economic or intellectual forms, is, I am compelled to think, the belief consciously or unconsciously entertained that the things which are seen are of more value than the things which are unseen. Food and raiment are more to be desired than righteousness and the beauty of holiness, because people see very clearly the value of things which perish, and very darkly the unsearchable riches of Christ. For I dare to believe that if men can see God in the churches, they will come to church. To see God in the churches! To make God a visible reality! That is the awful task to which the ministers commit themselves. Without this vision the people turn to things which are visible, temporal, sensual. This is materialism. Whether you find it in economic greed, injustice, and brutality, in social discontent, hypocrisy, and beastliness, in intellectual doubt and spiritual indifference, it is materialism,—the peculiar peril of our time and our country.

To this evil genius of our country the religion of the present opposes two emphatic ideals: social and spiritual. By the social ideal, I mean the proclamation of social justice between employer and employed, capital and labor, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, for we are all brethren and we must all live under the shadow of a great name. By the spiritual, I mean emphasis on the authority of the spirit rather than the spirit of authority. Any one familiar with the young men in the ministry and the congregation will again and again note the appearance of these two aspects in the religious utterance of our time,—social justice and the authority of the spirit. No other-worldly justice can be preached as a compensation for injustice in this world. No

mansions in the sky will be accepted as a substitute for intolerable rents on earth. "Woe unto him that buildeth his house by unrighteousness and his chambers by wrong; that useth his neighbor's service without wages and giveth him not for his work." This prophetic preaching constitutes the ancient and modern message of social justice.

The other message of our time is the authority of the spirit. The character of the last century was the spirit of authority, whether it was found in science, or religion, or ecclesiastical councils. Today the preacher turns to the authority of the spirit. Of course the peril here is the old danger of antinomianism, that Serbonian bog where armies whole have sunk. But into that disaster the intelligent and humble preacher who governs his thought by the classic experience of the past and by communion with the eternal will not fall. Such a source of authority may be called mystical, spiritual, idealistic. Whatever we call it, it is that region above time and space where all leaders in spiritual guidance, Paul, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Edwards, have conferred not with flesh and blood, but with the eternal God. It is, above all, the region from which Jesus Christ our Lord drew that power and influence so impressive to men that they remembered him as one having authority. This capacity to speak as seeing him who is invisible, this ability to make the ideal a more glorious reality than food and raiment, this genius for the mystical approach to God, constitutes the authority of the spirit.

Now over these two aspects so conspicuous in the thought of our time are the two eternal ideals of the kingdom of God and the vision of God. The kingdom of God is the ideal which looms above the question of social justice, the question of man's relation to man. The vision of God is the ideal which hovers above the religion of the spirit, the question of man's relation to God. It is of the latter that I wish to speak more particularly here.

The thought of God's relation to the world which appeals convincingly to our generation has two mutually complementary aspects,—God's pervasive indwelling in the world and God's supreme purpose of perfection for the world.

God is present in our universe, for the world is the work of his hands and the firmament is his handiwork. God is present in

all men as the inward light which leads them into the eternal. This present help and inward light is, as John Woolman said, "deep and inward, confined to no forms of religion nor excluded from any when the heart stands in perfect sincerity." This inner light has been the source of grandeur in prophet and priest, disciple and apostle, saint and martyr. This inner light was so infinitely real in Jesus that in his spirit there was neither darkness nor shadow of darkness. Our highest prayer must be, "May the light that was in Jesus be in us also!" This conception fits a world in the making, in the rough,—a growing, struggling, fighting, glorious world. It takes into account all the facts, and admits the presence of evil as well as good. It believes that God is the maker and builder of this unfinished world. He is toiling for the increase of the good and the destruction of the evil. As John Scotus said, "There are as many unveilings of God as there are saintly souls." This light shining in the darkness of our world I take to be the manifest presence of God.

It is not enough, however, to know God only as the power which works in the world for good; for this leaves the great question of finality hanging in the air; it does not tell us whether in the long run good or evil will triumph. It does not "live," as Thomas à Kempis would say, "under the shadow of a great name." It needs to be completed by the conviction that in this struggle the sovereign will of God is engaged to make the good triumph over evil, that in the universe there shall be peace. This conception of God, then, recognizes him, first, as the divine light shining in the darkness, even if the darkness comprehends it not; and secondly, as the infinite Father, who has made it his purpose that in this world there shall be peace.

Let me now take this doctrine and submit it to the tests prescribed by the men of our time, and employed by Professor Drown in his article, "A Basic Principle in Theology." [1] These tests are two: first, is it true? and secondly, does it work?

Regarding the truth of any doctrine, a large party in Christendom today would declare a doctrine to be true because it received the sanction of Holy Church under the infallible guidance of her divinely appointed representation of God. And a large num-

[1] Harvard Theological Review, July, 1909.

ber in our Protestant communion, forgetting their origins and slipping into the error of the old church, would declare a doctrine true because "olde bookes" said so. There is, however, an increasing and significant tendency to turn neither to ancient hierarchies nor venerable books, but to life itself. Is it true, he asks, of life? is it true of man? is it true of the perfect man, Jesus Christ? Man is still the measure of all things, even of the eternal. And Jesus Christ, the perfect son of man, is the highest measure of God. If the doctrine is true of him, it is true of God. If a doctrine is not true when applied to men, we reject it as false when applied to God. What is bad in me cannot be good in Him. If it is wrong for the Greeks to lie, steal, murder, and commit adultery, it is also wrong for the gods on Olympus. If it is wrong for the Jews to be men of wrath, war, and blood, it is also wrong for Jahveh. Not through imperfect, but through perfect, humanity shall we venture to measure our conceptions of the infinite. Through Jesus Christ we have our perfect measure of God.

Is this doctrine, then, true of Jesus? In my belief, it is. We find in him these two values, that of the earthly life and of the eternal spirit. The former we have in the historic Christ, Jesus of Nazareth, the man who became obedient to time and space, who was tempted in all points as we are, yet without sin, who continually went about doing good, who had compassion on the multitudes, who suffered little children to come unto him, who died for us on the cross. That brave and radiant figure, full of grace and truth, will never fade on the canvas of a world's remembrance. And the church has followed a wise instinct when through symbol and through sacrament, through the cross and the communion, she has preserved in the minds of men this picture of the Lord Jesus. "Remember the Lord Jesus—how he said—how he lived —how he died,"—these were the words of the disciples and apostles. This labor of the church has been a ministry of remembrance. "Remembering the Lord Jesus,"—that very often describes with deep fidelity the lives of saints and martyrs, the work of holy men who wrought a visible recollection in stone and wood, in sound and color, and the toil of scholars who gave their lives in order that this memory might not pass away from

the earth. The church has always acted over again this divine life in the world.

Yet if the life of Jesus had only this value, and if the work of the minister and priest were only to react and reproduce this life, we should not be saved in our sincerest moments from profound despair. What help is it to a man in misery just to know that one man found peace that passeth understanding? What help is it to a man in sin just to know that one man never yielded to temptation? If there were nothing more than that, life would be torture. It would be just as if I were sinking into the depths of the sea, and, while I gasped and struggled, heard above me sweet voices chanting in solemn music and in ancient words—"*in saecula saeculorum*"—that years and years ago one man passed triumphantly through these waters. As a matter of fact, the Hamlets and Othellos and Lears in real life are not to be found as a rule in the boxes or the orchestra circle. They are outside in the night and the darkness, in the tenement and the broken home. The people in the theatre, however Aristotelian may be their motives, are simply spectators. Now in some such capacity many people attend the churches,—to see a great, divine drama. And if such is the chief end in the worship of God, then of course the drama should be given the best staging and the best cast. But the church must be more than an Oberammergau for the presentation of a Passion Play. Such a service will attract the tourist, but not the sinner. The church will never save the lost, if the service, however noble and splendid, is only a dramatic reproduction of an historical episode. It must be more than that. The life of Christ has more than an historical value. His spirit transcends time and space. And this I feel to be the source of inexpressible riches in the life of Christ. The spirit that was in Jesus must be in every man if his kingdom is to come on earth. And our joy is found in the sight of this eternal spirit forever moving in the hearts of men. The spirit that was in Jesus was manifest in the Apostolic Age, in the days of Augustine, in the century of Saint Francis, in the glory of the Reformers. He has never left us nor forsaken us. He has appealed through different centuries to different men,—to the Platonist

in the first century, to the Pragmatist in the twentieth,—to the Oriental and Occidental, to the Roman and the Greek, barbarian, Scythian, bond, and free. This mystic spirit, triumphant over time and space, into whose communion we all desire more and more to come, I call the transcendent value in the life of Christ.

Since, then, these two values are true of Jesus, I conclude that they are also true of God. For we have agreed that the perfect man Christ Jesus shall be the measure of all things, even of God who is all in all. Therefore we feel the doctrine to be true. For it has been submitted to the test of life, even the excellency of the abundant life as found in Jesus.

If this doctrine has passed the bar of truth, may I now submit it to the second requirement, "Does it work?" This doctrine of God is, I think, peculiarly adapted to our time, because a strong, sincere feeling among our younger men welcomes the pragmatic description of the world. Such a doctrine as I have given squares with pragmatism. For through this vision of God we see a world still in the making, a world where the good and evil, the holy and the unholy, the light and darkness, struggle for dominion. Such a description appeals to the brave man, and he welcomes with joy the thought that in this world God is laboring to bring the good into complete and perfect triumph. He hears his footsteps behind the curtains of sweet light, and rejoices in the struggle because he knows the Lord his God will fight for him. He receives with reverence the belief that God immanent in the world is also transcendent; that his purpose is from everlasting to everlasting, and that he will bring this universe into his peace. This conception of God is therefore peculiarly adapted to that intellectual mood we call Pragmatism.

Moreover it possesses another value in adaptability: it opens the mystic approach to God. The man who lives in a world in which God is at once the eternal spirit, in whom we live and move and have our being, and the infinite purpose, to whose fulfilment the whole creation steadily advances, lives in a world where the highways to God's presence are open and unobstructed. No irresistible grace opens those highways only to the elect; no dogmas nor holy church dooms to eternal hell the multitude of

the damned; no one book contains the only revelation of the infinite spirit; no one institution, however ancient its reverberating service, and however gorgeous its imposing sacerdotalism, can absolutely govern that approach. This approach is open to all who hear and obey the spirit, which from the beginning has spoken in the hearts of men. This approach is an historic highway in Protestantism, and especially to those Protestant societies who laid the foundations of these American colonies. For here, especially in the northern colonies, as Burke said in his great oration, was observed "the dissidence of dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion." Now Protestantism, and especially that which has been called most dissident, is a protest against the obstructed approach to God. No worship of graven images and no idolatry of the mass, no bishop and no priest, no king and no pope, no infallible book, shall stand between man and God. Protestantism in its purity stands for the open door. And Protestantism has been most vital and Puritanism most vigorous when this free, unobstructed, mystic approach to God has been so open and so clear to those who walked therein that God was very near to them. The nearness of God! This is the source of Jonathan Edwards's power, the right door into a true appreciation of that great soul. This is the light which shines on every page in the journal of John Woolman. Both men felt supremely that God was nigh to them. To the Puritan in New England, the sovereignty of God was over all, in all, and through all. To the Quaker in Pennsylvania the indwelling of God, the inner light, made irresistible appeal. Whether they felt that Holy Presence through the sovereign will or the inward voice, they were alike in the essential fact of nearness to God. Both were mystics; both fashioned for their souls a road whereon only the spirit was their guide. Over their lives, over Protestantism at its best, over Puritan and Pilgrim, Baptist and Methodist, Quaker and Moravian, Huguenot and Presbyterian,—over all that "dissidence of dissent and that Protestantism of the Protestant religion" which established the American colonies, may rightly be inscribed what Cotton Mather in the *Magnalia* said of Thomas Shepard, "a trembling walk with God."

This capacity has been the genius of our land and our relig-

ion. This spirit is our rich endowment and our truest inheritance. And it has not vanished from our people. There is alive in the rising generation a great desire to journey on this mystic path to God, to know the reality of his presence, to win the Holy City and to find the Holy Grail. To this spirit in our youth, the thought of God I have attempted to set forth is peculiarly attractive, because it enables theology to give spacious utterance to an increasing desire and an inherited genius. The doctrine, then, passes successfully before that question, "Will it work?" It will work, and enter into the reward of its labor, because it is adapted to pragmatism, which is the intellectual mood of our generation, and to mysticism, which is the genius of our Protestantism.

With deference I submit this attempt to define the ideal which hovers above the spiritual longing of our day. Under the guidance of this idealism we may confidently confront the materialism of our country. This is our peculiar problem. This is the character of the battle in our corner of the field. And this indicates that however different may be the incidents of this long struggle, yet the essentials in the religions of the present and the past and the future are the same, because Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever. Only the symbols of that spirit change from century to century. For we wrestle with protean powers, and to the evils of the time we oppose a religion whose spirit is eternal and whose refuge is the everlasting God.

THE PASTOR AND TEACHER IN NEW ENGLAND

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The necessity of moral and religious training in the education of children and the significance of education in matters of religion have in our day become the subject of much discussion. It may be profitable, therefore, to examine a unique institution of early New England by which religion was linked to education, and religious education was given a high place in the life of the churches. It is remarkable that this institution seems never to have received the attention of a single book, pamphlet, or magazine article.

In early New England a fully organized church had as officers a pastor, a teacher, and at least one ruling elder, and one deacon.[1] The deacon was the treasurer, and the ruling elder the trustee and censor of morals. The pastor was the administrative head of the church, who was expected to inspire its life and activities; the teacher was the educational and doctrinal leader. This office of teacher was undoubtedly the distinctive feature of the New England system. The teacher was exclusively a church officer, and had no more connection with any school than the pastor or deacon; he was as unlike a schoolmaster as a modern theological professor is unlike a teacher in our public schools.[2] As far as it is possible to make a comparison, the teacher may be described as a kind of theological professor whose sphere of work was exclusively a church.[3]

[1] The polity also called for the office of deaconess, which never existed in America, although there are several instances of it in Puritan England.

[2] The teacher taught the church-members, while the schoolmaster taught the children of the town. The former dealt exclusively with religion, the latter was concerned with religion only as religion was then linked to education.

[3] If a theological professor were the regular minister of a church, conducted a lecture (or mid-week religious service), and were responsible for the religious principles of his congregation, we should have the counterpart of the teacher. Something like this is sometimes found to-day among the Quakers. In a few instances, a schoolmaster acted as substitute for a pastor or teacher, or even was

The difference between the functions of the pastor and the teacher was as follows:[4] In general, pastoral visitation and friendly advice were expected from the pastor, while the teacher preached studied sermons and published treatises in elucidation of the truths of the Bible. In the church service the teacher expounded the meaning of a passage of the Bible, after which the pastor applied the truths to daily life and exhorted the congregation to conduct themselves accordingly.[5] While the exposition of the teacher was carefully prepared, the application of the pastor had in the nature of the case to be extemporaneous.[6] It was pre-eminently the business of the teacher to read[7] and expound the Bible in the church service.

In the administration of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper the pastor and the teacher usually alternated[8] without any other distinction than the character of each officer might impart to his administration of the rite. In matters of church discipline, over which the ruling elder usually presided, the teacher was called upon whenever there was a point of New Testament procedure to elucidate; but when it was a question of

called to a permanent office. Increase Mather was president of Harvard College while teacher of the Second Church of Boston, but the laws of the colony forbade a minister to be a schoolmaster. Daniel Neal, History of New England, vol. ii, appendix iv.

[4] These generalizations are based on the recorded efforts of the various independent churches to carry out the ideals of their leaders amid the fluctuating conditions of a new settlement.

[5] The afternoon service was less formal, and the order more variable. Thomas Lechford, Plain Dealing, p. 47, and Robert Keayne, manuscript of Boston sermons of Cotton, with three by Wilson and one by Cobbett (described, somewhat erroneously, in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 2d series, vol. iv, pp. 313–316, and vol. v, p. 435), indicate no difference in the order of the afternoon service.

[6] Note Wilson's remarks of January 13, 1642: "What ever I had otherwise provided to speake to you, yet because the time is about spent, so I shud possibly keepe you no longer. Yet soe I will speke but a word or 2 to presse the whel on you, what you have soe proffitably heard all ready." See also Cotton Mather, Magnalia, vol. i, pp. 311–312, 435.

[7] Often omitted if there was no teacher. H. M. Dexter, Congregationalism in Literature, p. 452, note 147; Dedham church records; Thomas Lechford, Plain Dealing, pp. 47, 52; Cotton Mather, Ratio Disciplinae, pp. 63–68.

[8] In England only the pastor could administer these rites. Mayo, of the Second Church of Boston, says (church records, vol. iii, p. 3): "Ordinances being here dispensed by ye Pastor & Teacher in our several vicissitudes."

daily conduct, the assistance of the pastor was invoked.[9] If the case of discipline was dependent upon the interpretation of Scripture, the verdict was delivered by the teacher; but if a matter of church life, by the pastor.[10]

The teacher was exempt from all administrative work. This belonged to the pastor, assisted by the ruling elders. If, however, any subject arose pertaining to Scripture or doctrine, it was referred to the teacher.[11] About the year 1700 it became customary for a minister to preside at funerals and marriages, and the pastor usually performed that function.[12] The teacher, thus relieved from administrative work, spent the week in strenuous study, preparing himself to "explain and defend the principles of the Christian religion."[13] The fruits of this study were doctrinal and expository sermons,[14] addresses at ecclesiastical councils and meetings, and pamphlets and books, which won from the Great and General Court many a grant for eradicating heresy. Moreover, the teacher was the leader in catechizing. He prepared the catechisms and directed the instruction.[15] The Thursday Lecture, however, which was the traditional sphere of the teacher in England, became in New England an occasion for exhortation as well as instruction, and it was, in fact, scarcely more than a Sunday service in the middle of the week.

But the fundamental difference between the pastor and the

[9] See trials in Keayne manuscript; Connecticut Historical Society Collections, vol. ii, pp. 75–77.

[10] See Keayne manuscript (excellent); New Haven church records, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.; Connecticut Historical Society Collections, vol. i, pp. 22–51; Thomas Lechford, Plain Dealing, pp. 30 f.

[11] As at the First Church of Boston on May 20. 1640, when a certain request for a letter was answered by "our teacher and consented to by the church," it being against all Scripture precedent. Keayne manuscript for date. There are many instances in which the teacher and ruling elder sign the correspondence of their church. Both the pastor and teacher kept the church records.

[12] The earlier theory had been that a minister ought not to be "burthened with the execution of civil affairs, as the celebration of marriage, burying the dead, &c." Points of Difference, art. 6. See Boston town records from 1687 for the marriages by Samuel Willard and by Increase and Cotton Mather.

[13] Cotton Mather, Magnalia, vol. i, p. 550.

[14] These expository sermons on entire books of the Bible often extended over several months and even years. See Keayne manuscript, and Richard Mather's Lectures upon Second Peter.

[15] The actual work was usually done by the pastor or ruling elder.

teacher, both in theory and practice, consisted in the innate or divinely endowed character of one minister as fitted to be pastor and of another as teacher. An examination of the lives of the various pastors and teachers of New England will make it apparent that this distinction was more than purely theoretical. Note the following characterizations of pastors: "a zealous and pious preacher," "a very gracious, sincere man"; "a very lively preacher and a very preaching liver"; "a very affectionate man, who seldom ended a sermon without weeping"; a man "abounding in zeal, prudence, and charity"; "a man eminent in faith, love, humility, self-denial, prayer, soundness of mind, zeal for God, liberality to all men, especially to the saints and ministers of Christ."[16] Compare these with the following descriptive phrases of teachers: "mighty in the Scriptures"; "a solid man"; "a theological drill-sergeant"; "a living, breathing Bible"; "as clear and smart a disputant as most ever lived in the world"; "sage, sober, grave, and learned"; "had an excellent talent in training up children in a catechetical way in the grounds of the Christian religion"; "apt to teach"; "greatest star in the churches of Christ that we could hear of in the Christian world for opening and unfolding the counsels of Christ to the churches."[17] Descriptions of the pastor and teacher of a church given by the same person especially reveal this contrast.[18]

[16] The preceding characterizations are from the following sources: John Hull, Diary for June 24, 1649 (Thomas Shepard); John Winthrop, History of New England, vol. i, p. 376 (313) (Tomson of Braintree); Cotton Mather, Magnalia, vol. i, p. 430 (Samuel Newman), and vol. ii, p. 61 (Samuel Danforth); William Emerson, First Church in Boston, p. 1 (Wilson); and Roxbury church records, p. 206.

[17] The first phrase is used to describe many men. The others are: Life of Richard Mather (anonymous, but undoubtedly by Increase Mather), p. 32; M. C. Tyler, American Literature, vol. ii, p. 168, and H. A. Hill, Old South Church, vol. i, p. 339; J. L. Sibley, Harvard Graduates, vol. i, p. 27 (the description of John Cotton by Woodbridge); John Cotton, Plymouth, in Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 1st series, vol. iv, p. 118 (Reyner); Edward Johnson, Wonder Working Providence, p. 21 (Higginson) and p. 59 (Cotton); A. B. Ellis, First Church in Boston, p. 327, note, and fly-leaf of First Church records (Cotton).

[18] See Edward Johnson, Wonder Working Providence, pp. 21 f. for Skelton and Higginson; Roxbury church records, p. 206, First Church in Boston records, and Keayne manuscript for Cotton and Wilson; Cotton Mather, Magnalia, vol. i, p. 252, and John Cotton (in G. L. Walker, First Church, Hartford, pp. 428, 443) for Hooker and Stone; and Benjamin Colman's funeral sermons upon the two

It is evident from this description of the functions and character of the pastor and teacher that the two men were colleague ministers, each contributing an indispensable part to the life and growth of the formative New England churches. The teacher was not, as has sometimes been affirmed, the assistant of the pastor. In many instances both pastors and teachers had assistants, but such assistants were specifically designated assistants, and bore no other title. The teacher was no more the assistant of the pastor than the pastor of the teacher. Greater age, length of service in the ministry, and physical activity were no criteria for selecting a pastor. And more thorough college training, physical inability for visitation, and feeble health never appear to have been the motives leading to the assignment of a minister to the work of teacher. Neither office conferred any ascendency over the other. A larger salary is no indication of greater esteem or ability.[19] When one man towered above his colleague it was the teacher even more frequently than the pastor; and such pre-eminence was due, not to office, but to personality. This equality of colleagueship is also revealed by the pride which each minister took in his title, and the scrupulous care with which the titles were applied in all official documents.[20] Even when, as not infrequently occurred, there was slight difference in the inherent characters of the two men, each was expected to "bend himself" to the performance of his half of the work. Otherwise the full strength of the church could not be utilized. By this division of ministerial labor and this co-operation between the leaders of a church, the New Englanders obtained a harmony between the ideal and the practical in life and religion, and a unity of religious and moral education.

Mathers. Henry Ware (Second Church, Boston, p. 17) thus distinguishes Cotton Mather from his father: "As a preacher he differed much from his father; having less strength and more rhapsody, less dignity and more declamation."

[19] See Good News from New England, 1648, for a list of salaries. And Second Church, Boston, records for salaries of ministers. A New England salary was based upon need (size of family, age of minister, etc.) and not upon ability.

[20] See Dury's letter (in Samuel Mather's Apology, appendix, part i, number 3); Charlestown church records, p. 12; Thomas Lechford, Plain Dealing, pp. 89 ff.; John Winthrop, History of New England, vol. i, p. 217 (182); Cudworth's letter (in New England Historical and Genealogical Register, vol. xiv, pp. 101 ff.); Robert Keayne, notes on a council at Weymouth (in Stiles Collection).

Let us next consider the prevalence and evolution of the institution. If we consider the churches of the first generation, in 1630, Salem, Plymouth, Dorchester, Roxbury, and Boston-Watertown [21] had pastors and teachers. In 1635, in addition to these four, Charlestown, Ipswich,[22] and Newbury had the two officers. By 1640, in addition to these, the officers had been elected at Braintree, Hingham, Lynn, Hampton, Hartford, Windsor, Wethersfield, Milford, Barnstable, Taunton (or Cohasset), and Dorchester.[23] In 1650, after the institution had been discontinued in some churches because of the exodus to England, the two offices existed at Braintree, Salem, Boston (First Church), Dorchester, Charlestown, Ipswich, Hartford, Lynn, Newbury, and Roxbury.[24] Moreover, Andover-Haverhill, New Haven, Guilford, and Rowley had established the offices in the mean time. In other words, only four churches (besides Boston-Watertown) had the two officers in 1630, and only eight in 1635; by 1640 the number had increased to twenty;[25] by 1650 it had receded to

[21] Boston-Watertown was probably a colony church, with Wilson as teacher and Phillips as pastor, because (1) neither possessed more than one minister; (2) Winthrop invariably calls Phillips pastor and Wilson teacher; (3) the colony raised the salaries of both; and (4) both preached at Charlestown for the first two years, at least part of the time (Roger Clap, Memoirs, p. 22). However, it may be said that polity was still indefinite.

[22] Bracy preceded Norton for one year. J. B. Felt, Ipswich, pp. 218, 222.

[23] If Burr was not the pastor in 1640, he was about to be called and was serving in that capacity. John Winthrop, History of New England, vol. ii, pp. 26–27 (22); Edward Johnson, Wonder Working Providence, p. 74; Dedham church records, p. 12; Dorchester church records, p. 250 [255]. Mather also had assistants from 1636–1649. Dorchester church records, pp. 7 [9], 8 [10]; 250th Anniversary Proceedings at First Church, Dorchester, p. 104; and C. F. Adams, Quincy, p. 15. Plymouth was in search of a pastor to help its teacher from 1636 to 1644. William Bradford, History of the Plimoth Plantation, published by the State of Massachusetts, 1898, pp. 456 f.; John Cotton, Plymouth, p. 118; for Salem, see J. B. Felt, Annals of Salem, vol. ii, p. 626, and New England Historical and Genealogical Register, vol. xxxvi, pp. 38 f.; vol. xxxix, p. 374; John Winthrop, History of New England, vol. ii, pp. 27, 31; Eliot's list; Stiles's list; Good News from New England, 1648.

[24] Salem apparently regarded Peters as its pastor, although he was in England. Roxbury, abandoning all hope of the return of Welde, had elected a colleague for Eliot in 1650.

[25] Cambridge (with Harvard College to supply the function of teacher), Hampton (rather uncertain), and the Indian churches (with both officers) are omitted. Similarly, nothing is said of churches with a single minister whom they called a teacher.

fourteen. In the year 1660, when practically all the leaders of the first generation were dead, the two offices continued at all of the churches that had possessed them in 1650, except Lynn and Guilford, the Second Church of Boston being in search of a teacher. By 1675, the two offices still existed in the three churches of Boston,[26] at Salem,[27] Ipswich, Roxbury,[28] Rowley, Charlestown, and Newbury.[29] Thus thirteen churches had the two offices in 1660, and nine in 1675. By 1690, only the First and Second Churches of Boston, and the churches of Salem, Ipswich, Roxbury,[30] and Rowley (six in all) possessed the offices;[31] and by 1715 only Salem and the Second Church of Boston remain on the list.

The teachership died out at Boston, in the First Church, with Allen in 1710;[32] in the Second Church, with Increase Mather in 1723; and in the Third Church, with Willard in 1707.[33] At Salem it ended with the death of Noyes in 1717;[34] at Dorchester, with the death of Richard Mather in 1669; at Charlestown, with the death of Shepard in 1677;[35] at Ipswich, with the death of Hubbard in 1704;[36] at Lynn, with the departure of Cobbett in

[26] The First Church records invariably call Allen teacher. The search of the Third Church was rewarded by the call of Willard in 1676.

[27] Nicholet was supplying as teacher and was desired permanently.

[28] John Eliot, Jr., was supply pastor from 1674 to 1688. Roxbury church records, pp. 132, 142.

[29] Both Rowley and Charlestown were having supplies for the assistance of their single minister, Charlestown calling Browne in 1678 and Rowley calling Payson in 1682. Richardson at Newbury (1673–1696) was called a teacher. Joshua Coffin, Newbury, pp. 68, 69, 73, 158, etc.; note also the epitaph on his tombstone.

[30] Eliot died in 1690, leaving Walter as the single minister, the "teaching pastor," as the venerable Eliot ordained him, in 1688.

[31] And in these churches the distinction between the two had practically disappeared.

[32] The church records and Allen himself invariably call him teacher.

[33] See titles of his books in H. A. Hill, Old South Church, in bibliography appended to vol. ii; Samuel Sewall, Journal, for date.

[34] See C. W. Upham, Salem, p. 485; C. S. Osgood and H. M. Batchelder, Salem, pp. 82 ff.; D. A. White, New England Congregationalism, as illustrated by Records of the First Church in Salem, pp. 293 f.

[35] See church records, p. 12; W. I. Budington, First Church, Charlestown, pp. 44, 65, 79, 83; Roxbury church records, p. 198.

[36] See J. B. Felt, Ipswich, pp. 233 f.

1655; at Newbury, with the death of Richardson in 1696;[37] at Roxbury, with Eliot in 1690; at Rowley, with Payson in 1732;[38] at Hartford, with Stone in 1663; at New Haven, with Street in 1674; at Braintree, with Flint in 1668;[39] and in the smaller churches at some date anterior to 1660.

There were, however, colleague-pastors at the First Church of Boston until 1789; at the Second Church until 1751 (with an attempt to secure one even after that date); at the Third Church, until 1769; at Charlestown, until 1774; at Ipswich, until 1756; and at Hartford until 1666. Andover had colleagues from 1682 to 1697, and Roxbury from 1718 to 1725. Several churches had colleague-pastors, but never had both a pastor and a teacher. This was the unique arrangement at Watertown from 1639 to 1649, and also from 1687 to 1692; Brattle Street, Boston, from 1716 to 1747; the New Brick, Boston, from 1738 to 1753; and the New North, Boston, from the time of its organization.[40] Furthermore, the churches frequently had assistants for the ministers, especially if the pastor or teacher were in poor health, or overworked, or if the church were temporarily without one or the other minister.

Looking at these facts from another angle, the churches that had both a pastor and a teacher at the time of their foundation were Braintree,[41] Concord, Dorchester, Newbury, Roxbury,[42] Salem, Taunton, Hampton, Dover, Hartford, Windsor,[43] Guilford, Milford,[44] and Wethersfield.[45] These churches were organ-

[37] See note 29 above.

[38] Payson was sole minister of the church from 1696 to 1729, when he was given an assistant.

[39] See George Whitney, Early History of Quincy, pp. 32 ff.; F. A. Whitney, First Church of Quincy, p. 40; D. M. Wilson, Commemorative Services of the Two Hundred and Fifty Years of Braintree, pp. 35–37; Good News from New England, 1648.

[40] Chandler Robbins, Second Church, Boston, p. 170. The church desired to conform to the custom of the time and have two ministers.

[41] Teacher Flint was not ordained at once, because of his defence of Wheelwright and refusal to erase his signature from a petition.

[42] Eliot was ordained within five months of Welde.

[43] This is the Dorchester-Windsor church.

[44] The church wished to call Sherman as teacher, and he supplied in that capacity, but declined a call.

[45] There were two ministers from 1636 to 1639, probably known by the current terms. Connecticut Ecclesiastical Contributions, p. 506.

ized between 1629 and 1643. In only six of them did the institution of pastor and teacher continue longer than seven years, namely at Braintree, Dorchester, Newbury, Roxbury, Salem, and Hartford. And only Salem, Roxbury, and Newbury continued the offices beyond 1670. The churches that instituted the two offices within five years of their organization were the First Church, Boston, Charlestown, Hingham, Ipswich, Lynn, and New Haven. Plymouth and the Third Church, Boston, established the offices within ten years of their organization, in 1630 and 1676 respectively,[46] while the Second Church, Boston, and Rowley elected the officers within twelve years of their organization, in 1664 and 1650 respectively.[47]

Thus it is evident that the institution of pastor and teacher was the general practice of the New England churches about 1640. A church without the two officers could not regard itself as a fully organized church, so that the smallest churches, and even the Indian churches, tried to institute the two offices. This attitude of the incomplete churches "perishing without vision" induced Welde to say that all the churches of New England had both a pastor and a teacher. However, although the pamphlet warfare which crystallized into the Westminster Confession in England and the Cambridge Platform in New England put a quietus upon all discussion against the Scriptural necessity of a pastor and teacher in a local congregation, and although the Cambridge Platform reigned triumphant for almost a hundred years (and has never been formally superseded), yet ultimately the institution ended in the modern system of a single minister. In the larger churches the intermediate stage was that of colleague-pastors, in the smaller, the combination of the two functions in one minister, called "pastor and teacher." The call to a Congregational church is still given in this form. The educational ideal of the ministry in the Congregational churches makes the minister a teaching pastor.

The institution of pastor and teacher fell gradually into disuse,

[46] The Old South had tried to secure a teacher for seven years.

[47] The authorities of the colony objected to the call of ruling elder Powell as teacher in 1655, because he was "illiterate, as to his academicall education" (church records, vol. iii, p. 3, and Henry Ware, Second Church, Boston, p. 6).

and with the American Revolution disappeared completely. The reasons for its disappearance are various. Some of them are simple and evident; others are complex and subsidiary. They may be grouped as follows: the increasing opposition to the theory as unscriptural;[48] the lack of clear Scriptural differentiation of the offices and the theoretical character of the distinction that was made;[49] the confusion of the two offices, with the elimination of many traditional distinctions;[50] the difficulty of securing suitable men, especially teachers;[51] church quarrels engendered by the institution;[52] migrations from the older to the newer settlements, and the returning emigration to England during the Commonwealth;[53] inadequate support of the ministers;[54] the rise of public schools and of Harvard College, all of these being religious schools;[55] the crystallization of theological beliefs, and the religious, social, and political turmoil during the period of the later Stuarts and early Georges with its tendency to divert public attention to other subjects.

For the origin of the institution, search must be made beyond the solid rock of Scripture on which the Puritans based it, and even beyond the copious and interesting notes with which the Geneva

[48] See New Haven Colony records, pp. 253–255, for an amusing trial over the question of the Scriptural authority for pastor and teacher.

[49] See John Cotton on Canticles, and Peter Thacher on Canticles (in H. A. Hill, Old South Church, vol. i, p. 180, note; Cambridge Platform, 6 : 5; John Cotton, Way of the Churches in New England, pp. 13, 14, 44, 54, Questions and Answers on Church Government and Church Covenant (probably by Richard Mather), pp. 22–26, Treatise, pp. 3 f.; Thomas Hooker, Survey of Church Discipline, vol. ii, chap. 1, sect. 19–20; Richard Mather, Model of Church Government, p. 23; Thomas Welde, Brief Narration, p. 3; Ralph Partridge, On Church Government, p. 23; Samuel Stone, Whole Body of Divinity, p. 325; etc.

[50] Plymouth and Salem are typical cases.

[51] The history of every church presents instances of this.

[52] Due to insufficient salaries, incompatibility of temperament, lack of cooperation of ministers, and theological and political differences.

[53] Lynn, Taunton, and the Connecticut churches are typical cases.

[54] This is a much overrated consideration. Behind most of the instances cited in proof of it there were other causes, such as theological differences, bickerings in church and state, vagueness of ideas, and unsettled conditions. This position is elaborately defended in a book by the present writer soon to appear.

[55] See Cambridge Platform, 6: 6; Colonial laws of Massachusetts for 1644 and 1647; Colonial laws of Plymouth for 1643 and 1671; Colonial laws of Connecticut for 1656 and 1660; H. T. Blake, New Haven Green, p. 184.

Bible was furnished. The seeker comes directly upon Theodore Beza, who undoubtedly was influenced by Calvin (although he never quotes Calvin). It was from Erasmus and the church fathers, especially Ambrose and Gregory Nazianzen, that Beza seems to have drawn most of his ideas. However, the idea that every local congregation should possess both a pastor and a teacher was unquestionably derived from the conception of the church as a local congregation, independent of all outside authority—the early theory of Luther, and especially of Zwingli, Calvin, and the Anabaptists, who derived it from the various democratic agitators beginning with Marsiglio of Padua.[56]

The institution of pastor and teacher was a praiseworthy effort, intended to produce an enlightened church-membership and to foster an intelligent religion. It was a wise recognition of the principle that religion ought to educate and that education ought to make religious. Otherwise religion becomes stagnant and education breeds anarchy. The institution has died, but it was an important element in the growth of a greater institution—the public school system of our day. Thus the vision of the Puritans, embodied in the dream of Pastor John Wilson before he crossed the ocean, has been largely realized. He dreamed that he was in America, and saw a church rise out of the ground, that "grew and became a marvellous goodly church." [57]

In one particular, however, modern civilization has erred flagrantly from the Puritan ideal: it has separated education and religion. The American Revolution and the contemporary era of French scepticism preached liberty of conscience and the separation of education and religion, as well as the separation of the church and the state. The nineteenth century, rejecting the wisdom of the centuries, that religion is essential to the building of character, undertook in practice to separate education and religion. The unwisdom of the separation is gradually becoming evident, and sunday-schools have spread over the country in order to meet the deficiency in our public schools. The need of moral instruction in our school system is widely

[56] These conclusions are based on a careful comparison of the Puritan ideas with the writings of the Reformation period.

[57] See John Winthrop, History of New England, vol. i, p. 97 (81).

felt. But we must have religious training in order to make moral instruction effective. Denominationalism must yield to co-operation and to emphasis upon the essentials in religion, common to all denominations. We must have religious instruction in our public schools, and religion and education must again join hands to train up our youth in character and fit them to be citizens. If religion can pervade our public schools and education be included in the work of our churches, the Puritan ideal of life, with its Teacher of God's truth and its Pastor of souls, will be realized among us.

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